Samso Market Update | Thursday, 22 October 2026 | Market close 4:30pm AEDT On the ASX today, the S&P/ASX 200 closed down 38.1 points, or 0.43%, at 8,793.2. Nick Scali (ASX: NCK) fell 15.34% to A$12.03, the biggest fall among companies worth more than A$1 billion, on the first trading day after it said it expects first-half profit of A$28 million to A$32 million. The All Ordinaries, which tracks the 500 largest listed companies, fell 0.44% to 8,917.1. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries, an index of the companies ranked 101 to 300 by size, fell 0.49% to 3,138.4. This morning's pre-market edition is below. Wednesday's editions are at ASX today, Wednesday 21 October 2026. ASX today: Key Highlights The ASX 200 fell 0.43% to 8,793.2. Energy was the weakest sector, down 2.42%, and materials fell 1.96%. Industrials rose the most, up 0.90% (Yahoo Finance data). Nick Scali (ASX: NCK) fell 15.34% to A$12.03 on turnover, the dollar value of shares traded, of A$27.7 million. Fortescue (ASX: FMG) fell 4.52% to A$14.57 on the day it said its iron ore sales were below its shipments because of its negotiations with China Mineral Resources Group. NEXTDC (ASX: NXT) rose 7.48% to A$5.75, a day after it fell 41.7% on the day it cut its FY27 guidance. It had no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Hong Kong's Hang Seng was down 3.10% and Tokyo's Nikkei 225 down 2.28% at about 4:18pm AEDT, with both still trading (Yahoo Finance data). More shares fell than rose. Of the 1,485 companies that traded and have a market value on the ASX, 491 rose, 623 fell and 371 were unchanged. Energy and mining shares, and the fall in Asia Energy fell 2.42% and materials 1.96%, the two weakest of the 11 sectors (Yahoo Finance data). Woodside Energy (ASX: WDS) fell 3.50% to A$32.77, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Santos (ASX: STO) fell 1.29% to A$9.19 on the day it reported record quarterly production of 26.3 million barrels of oil equivalent. Viva Energy (ASX: VEA) fell 4.93% to A$2.89 on the day of its September quarter operating update. December Brent crude futures, contracts for oil delivered in December, were up 2.10% at US$111.10 a barrel at 4:22pm AEDT. BHP (ASX: BHP) fell 2.41% to A$57.13 on the day of its annual meeting, and Rio Tinto (ASX: RIO) fell 1.47% to A$150.30. Gold miners fell, with Evolution Mining (ASX: EVN) down 2.39% to A$11.84 and Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST) down 1.08% to A$24.79. December gold futures were down 1.16% at US$4,101.90 an ounce at 4:23pm AEDT. Fortescue told the ASX at 8:56am AEDT that it shipped 46.8 million tonnes of iron ore in the September quarter and sold 42.9 million tonnes. It said sales were below shipments "reflecting impacts from ongoing negotiations with China Mineral Resources Group (CMRG)", the state-owned company that coordinates iron ore buying for China's steel mills. Fortescue kept its FY27 guidance unchanged, subject to those negotiations. It said that "if negotiations with CMRG are not concluded by calendar year-end, operations may be affected." Shares fell across Asia. The Associated Press reported that Tokyo's losses were led by technology companies such as SoftBank Group and Tokyo Electron, and that memory chipmakers led the fall in Seoul. The AP said "AI stocks, at the center of market action in recent months, are under pressure from worries that construction of data centers may slow as it is becoming increasingly expensive to borrow money." At about 4:18pm AEDT the Hang Seng was at 22,917.57, down 3.10%, the Nikkei 225 at 63,147.46, down 2.28%, and the Shanghai Composite at 3,658.48, down 1.47% (Yahoo Finance data). All three markets were still trading. Banks rose. ANZ (ASX: ANZ) rose 1.20% to A$39.69, Westpac (ASX: WBC) 0.42% to A$35.68, National Australia Bank (ASX: NAB) 0.20% to A$40.01 and Commonwealth Bank (ASX: CBA) 0.10% to A$157.17. Financials rose 0.44%. Brambles (ASX: BXB) rose 3.16% to A$21.23 on turnover of A$126.7 million on the day of its annual meeting. Nick Scali and retail shares Nick Scali told the ASX at 7:10pm AEDT on Wednesday that it expects underlying net profit after tax of A$28 million to A$32 million for the six months to 31 December 2026. It said first-quarter written sales orders in Australia and New Zealand were 15% lower than a year earlier, with store traffic about 10% lower. Its UK written sales orders were 29% higher. The ABC reported that the guidance compares with profit of A$41 million a year earlier and is 20% below market expectations. Wednesday was the shares' last trade before the release, at A$14.21. Temple & Webster Group (ASX: TPW), the online furniture and homewares retailer, fell 8.95% to A$4.07 with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Wesfarmers (ASX: WES) fell 3.11% to A$77.38, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Consumer discretionary fell 1.72%. Domestic data The Australian Bureau of Statistics released the first issue of its new monthly Regional Labour Force publication, which estimates unemployment by region, the ABC reported at 1:39pm AEDT. Blue Chips (above A$1 billion) Samso's four size bands use market value at Wednesday's close. They are not the S&P/ASX indices of the same names. Gainers. NEXTDC (ASX: NXT) rose 7.48% to A$5.75 on turnover of A$172.8 million, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. It fell 41.7% on Wednesday, the day it cut its FY27 guidance. Smartgroup Corporation (ASX: SIQ) rose 5.42% to A$12.25 and Pro Medicus (ASX: PME) 4.65% to A$193.42. Megaport (ASX: MP1) rose 4.39% to A$16.89 on turnover of A$164.1 million. DigiCo Infrastructure REIT (ASX: DGT) rose 3.36% to A$2.00 and Benz Mining Corp (ASX: BNZ) 3.35% to A$4.32. None of those five had an ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Fallers. Nick Scali (ASX: NCK) fell 15.34% to A$12.03, as set out above. Magellan Financial Group (ASX: MFG) fell 9.52% to A$7.70 on the day of its annual meeting. In its chief executive's address it said first-quarter revenue in its Financial Markets business was "materially lower" than the run rate of the first half of last year, after large moves in global bond markets. It said funds in its Investment Management business fell 8% in the quarter to A$38.0 billion. Codan (ASX: CDA) fell 8.08% to A$56.53 on turnover of A$49.3 million and Telix Pharmaceuticals (ASX: TLX) 5.92% to A$13.66, each with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Telix fell 7.87% on Wednesday, the day of its September quarter report. Viva Energy (ASX: VEA) fell 4.93% to A$2.89 and Fortescue (ASX: FMG) 4.52% to A$14.57, as set out above. Mid Caps (A$500 million to A$1 billion) Gainers. Bapcor (ASX: BAP) rose 13.55% to A$0.88 on turnover of A$13.2 million. At its annual meeting it kept its FY27 outlook and said first-quarter Trade parts sales rose 2.5% on a year earlier and net debt fell A$19 million to A$116 million. AVITA Medical (ASX: AVH) rose 9.27% to A$4.36, Nuix (ASX: NXL) 6.48% to A$1.89, Tuas (ASX: TUA) 6.32% to A$1.85, SiteMinder (ASX: SDR) 4.83% to A$2.82 and Viridis Mining and Minerals (ASX: VMM) 4.29% to A$3.65. None of those five had an ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Fallers. Brightstar Resources (ASX: BTR) fell 15.67% to A$0.565 on turnover of A$9.3 million. At 8:18am AEDT it reported a drill hole at Two Mile Hill, at its Sandstone Gold Project in Western Australia, with 305 metres downhole at 1.33 grams of gold a tonne from 584 metres, including 173 metres below the limit of the current Mineral Resource. A Mineral Resource is an estimate of the metal in the ground. Samso's three-part Brightstar Resources workup covers the company. Temple & Webster (ASX: TPW) fell 8.95% to A$4.07 and MA Financial Group (ASX: MAF) 7.71% to A$4.43, each with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Aeris Resources (ASX: AIS) fell 7.53% to A$0.43 on the day it reported a Mineral Resource of 200,000 ounces of gold at Golden Plateau, at its Cracow operations in Queensland, up 220% on its previous estimate. Forrestania Resources (ASX: FRS) fell 7.14% to A$0.325 on the day it declared its takeover offer for Zenith Minerals unconditional. Clarity Pharmaceuticals (ASX: CU6) fell 5.90% to A$1.675, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Small Caps (A$150 million to A$500 million) Gainers. Corporate Travel Management (ASX: CTD) rose 16.11% to A$3.82 on turnover of A$16.2 million, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. It rose 23.4% on Tuesday, the day it said IATA, the global airline industry body, had released its A$65 million security guarantee, and 7.52% on Wednesday. Brazilian Rare Earths (ASX: BRE) rose 13.91% to A$1.965, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. It fell 4.83% on Tuesday and 7.75% on Wednesday. Centaurus Metals (ASX: CTM) rose 13.24% to A$0.385, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Garda Property Group (ASX: GDF) rose 11.22% to A$1.14. It said a Charter Hall managed fund will buy its seven remaining investment properties for A$300.0 million, and said it intends to pay special distributions estimated at about 10 cents a security, subject to conditions including settlement of the sales. EchoIQ (ASX: EIQ) rose 9.64% to A$0.455, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Nova Minerals (ASX: NVA) rose 6.94% to A$0.385 on the day it said the US Government had committed US$249 million to a rail line in Alaska that would link to its planned processing hub. Fallers. Titomic (ASX: TTT) fell 15.38% to A$0.11. It said the US Export-Import Bank had approved a US$10.3 million loan to its US subsidiary, and it dispatched the booklet for its scheme of arrangement, a court-supervised process that needs a shareholder vote. The scheme meeting is on 23 November. Orthocell (ASX: OCC) fell 12.50% to A$0.525 on the day it reported September quarter revenue of A$3.6 million. Dateline Resources (ASX: DTR) fell 11.49% to A$0.077, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Coronado Global Resources (ASX: CRN) fell 11.11% to A$0.16 on the day it reported third quarter earnings of US$44 million, its highest since the second quarter of 2024. Amaero (ASX: 3DA) fell 10.53% to A$0.17 and Sky Metals (ASX: SKY) 8.57% to A$0.16, each with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Micro Caps (below A$150 million) Gainers. Elixir Energy (ASX: EXR) rose 25.45% to A$0.069 on turnover of A$490,000. Its only announcements were three notices of changes in directors' holdings, lodged between 5:26pm and 5:40pm AEDT on Wednesday. Roolife Group (ASX: RLG) and AXP Energy (ASX: AXP) each rose 25.0% to A$0.005, from A$0.004, a move of one tenth of a cent. Roolife held its annual meeting on Wednesday. AXP said gas supply to power generation at its Edwards Lease in Oklahoma ran above 95% uptime over 30 days. Nexsen (ASX: NXN) rose 15.38% to A$0.15, with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. LaserBond (ASX: LBL) rose 14.81% to A$0.62 on the day of its annual meeting addresses. Tambourah Metals (ASX: TMB) rose 13.79% to A$0.033 on turnover of A$1.3 million. It reported gold assays at Baxters South including 4 metres downhole at 41.7 grams a tonne, and dispatched the prospectus for an entitlement offer, an offer of new shares to existing holders. Fallers. Bellavista Resources (ASX: BVR) fell 22.41% to A$0.225 on turnover of A$1.1 million on the day it reported the first assays from its drilling at the Pickle Crow Gold Project. Energy Technologies (ASX: EGY) fell 21.74% to A$0.036, from A$0.046, on the day of an investor presentation on its Cogenic subsidiary. It rose 130% on Wednesday, the day Cogenic signed a heads of agreement with SYNCH. Provaris Energy (ASX: PV1) fell 20.0% to A$0.004, from A$0.005. Pioneer Minerals (ASX: PMM) fell 19.64% to A$0.225 and Jade Gas Holdings (ASX: JGH) 14.29% to A$0.054, each with no ASX announcement since Wednesday afternoon. Lodestar Minerals (ASX: LSR) fell 14.29% to A$0.006 on the day it reported a maiden Inferred Resource of 221,000 ounces of gold at Ned's Creek in Western Australia. Inferred is the lowest-confidence category of a Mineral Resource. Commodities and Currency Prices were taken between 4:22pm and 4:33pm AEDT (Yahoo Finance data) and are compared with this morning's edition. December gold futures were at US$4,101.90 an ounce, down from US$4,152.80 at 7:41am AEDT. December copper futures were at US$6.478 a pound, down from US$6.571. December silver futures were at US$56.23 an ounce, down from about US$58.00. December Brent crude futures were at US$111.10 a barrel, up from US$109.38 at 7:41am AEDT. December West Texas Intermediate crude futures were at US$99.02 a barrel, up from US$97.51. Iron ore was at US$90.70 a tonne at about 4:30pm AEDT, down 0.3%, according to the ABC News market snapshot. The Australian dollar was buying 70.18 US cents at 4:33pm AEDT, down from about 70.3 US cents at 7:51am AEDT. Samso Concluding Comments The ASX 200 fell 0.43% to 8,793.2. Energy and materials were the weakest sectors, with Woodside, BHP and Fortescue lower. Banks and Brambles rose. Nick Scali fell 15.34% on its first trade since its profit guidance. At about 4:18pm AEDT the Hang Seng and the Nikkei 225 were each down more than the ASX 200, and 623 ASX companies fell against 491 that rose. General information only. This is not financial advice. Samso Market Update | Thursday, 22 October 2026 | Pre-market 9:45am AEDT Futures point to a slightly higher open on the ASX today. ASX 200 futures were up 0.1% at 8,854 points at about 7:15am AEDT, according to the ABC News market snapshot. A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell at a set price on a later date. Its price is used as a guide to where the index will open. That 0.1% is the change in the futures price, which is a separate measure from Wednesday's index close. The ABC said futures were pointing up "as Wall Street closes higher for Wednesday afternoon trading". The Australian dollar was buying approximately 70.3 US cents at 7:51am AEDT (Yahoo Finance data). The S&P/ASX 200 closed on Wednesday at 8,831.3, up 14.4 points or 0.16%. The All Ordinaries, which tracks the 500 largest listed companies, rose 0.14% to 8,956.6. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries, an index of the companies ranked 101 to 300 by size, rose 0.11% to 3,153.7. Wednesday's editions are at ASX today, Wednesday 21 October 2026, and Tuesday's are at ASX today, Tuesday 20 October 2026. ASX today: Key Highlights ASX 200 futures were up 0.1% at 8,854 at about 7:15am AEDT (ABC News). The Nasdaq Composite rose 1.05% on Wednesday, the S&P 500 0.58% and the Dow Jones Industrial Average 0.69%. Meta Platforms reported its third-quarter result after the US close, and its shares were up approximately 3.5% in extended trading at about 5:20pm New York time. Netflix fell 5.31% and Hong Kong's Hang Seng fell approximately 0.9%. House prices across the capital cities fell 4.7% in the September quarter, the steepest quarterly drop on record, according to Domain data reported by the ABC. Prices fell in every capital city. Fisher & Paykel Healthcare told the ASX at 7:30am AEDT that it had been made aware of unauthorised and unlawful access to two employee email accounts and a subset of company files. Wall Street overnight Wall Street finished higher on Wednesday. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 360.21 points or 0.69% to 52,856.09. The S&P 500 rose 44.60 points or 0.58% to 7,757.17. The Nasdaq Composite rose 278.04 points or 1.05% to 26,702.86. The Russell 2000, an index of smaller US companies, rose 0.27% to 2,781.02 (Yahoo Finance data). Reuters, in a report published at 4:01pm New York time, said SpaceX shares rose after the company reported its first profit as a public company. It said Super Micro Computer rose after it forecast quarterly revenue and profit margin above Wall Street estimates. Reuters said information technology was the best of the S&P 500's 11 sectors. It said AT&T, Netflix and Alphabet fell in the communication services sector, and that Abbott Laboratories fell after it cut its 2026 sales growth forecast. SpaceX closed up 7.79% and Netflix down 5.31% (Yahoo Finance data). Meta Platforms and Tesla reported after the close. Meta reported third-quarter revenue of US$64.60 billion, up 26% on a year earlier. It now expects 2026 capital expenditure, including principal payments on finance leases, of US$135 billion to US$145 billion, narrowed from its earlier outlook of US$130 billion to US$145 billion (Meta results release). Its shares were up approximately 3.5% in extended trading at about 5:20pm New York time, from approximately 5.5% at about 4:50pm (Yahoo Finance data). Tesla reported third-quarter revenue of US$28.05 billion, flat on a year earlier and in line with a consensus of US$28.06 billion, and adjusted earnings of 48 US cents a share against a consensus of 45 cents, Electrek reported. Tesla shares were up approximately 0.3% in extended trading at about 4:50pm. The US 10-year Treasury yield was at approximately 5.15% at about 3pm New York time on Wednesday, up about 3 basis points from Tuesday (Yahoo Finance data). A Treasury is a US government bond. A bond yield is the yearly return from buying a government bond at today's price and holding it until it is repaid. When yields rise, bond prices fall. A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point. The US Federal Reserve's next policy meeting is on 27 and 28 October (Federal Reserve calendar). Japan and Asia The Nikkei 225 closed on Wednesday at 64,621.24, up 545.82 points or 0.85% (Yahoo Finance data). The US dollar was buying approximately 158.13 yen at 7:51am AEDT, little changed from approximately 158.14 yen at 8:46am AEDT on Wednesday. Hong Kong's Hang Seng fell approximately 0.9% on Wednesday, and the Shanghai Composite fell 0.60% to 3,713.03. Asia was split, with Tokyo higher and Hong Kong and Shanghai lower. London and Europe London's FTSE 100 closed on Wednesday at 10,752.88, up 19.88 points or 0.19% (Yahoo Finance data). Germany's DAX rose 1.35% to 25,645.04. France's CAC 40 rose 1.06% to 7,921.68. UK consumer price inflation rose to 3.5% in the 12 months to September, from 3.1% in August, the Office for National Statistics reported. It said transport, particularly motor fuels, made the largest upward contribution. FXStreet reported that economists had expected 3.4%. Currencies The Australian dollar's 70.3 US cents at 7:51am AEDT compares with approximately 70.1 cents at 8:45am AEDT on Wednesday (Yahoo Finance data). The US dollar index, which measures the US dollar against six major currencies, was at approximately 101.70 at 7:41am AEDT, little changed from Tuesday's close. At 7:51am AEDT the euro was at approximately US$1.124 and the British pound at approximately US$1.340. Commodities Brent crude futures for December, the front-month contract, which is the one closest to expiry, settled little changed at US$108.82 a barrel, Bloomberg reported. Bloomberg also reported that a drone attack on a Saudi Aramco oil field left two people dead, citing the state-run Saudi Press Agency. Brent for December delivery was at US$109.38 in after-settlement trading at 7:41am AEDT (Yahoo Finance data). West Texas Intermediate, the US oil benchmark, settled at US$97.15 a barrel, Bloomberg reported. That was the December contract. December became the front-month contract after November expired on Tuesday, so Bloomberg's 4.6% fall compares two different contracts. WTI December was at US$97.51 at 7:41am AEDT, down 0.3% from Tuesday's close for that contract (Yahoo Finance data). Gold futures for December were at US$4,152.80 an ounce at 7:41am AEDT, up 0.25% from Tuesday's close (Yahoo Finance data). Silver futures for December were little changed at approximately US$58.00 an ounce. Copper futures for December fell 0.49% to US$6.571 a pound. Iron ore was at approximately US$91.00 a tonne at about 7:15am AEDT, down 0.2%, according to the ABC News market snapshot. Today's diary All times AEDT. Wednesday 7:10pm. Nick Scali expects underlying net profit after tax of A$28 million to A$32 million for the six months to 31 December 2026, excluding approximately A$980,000 of costs from its August cyber security incident. It said first-quarter written sales orders in Australia and New Zealand were 15% below a year earlier, with store traffic approximately 10% lower, and it expects first-half revenue there to be approximately 11% to 14% lower. Its UK written sales orders were 29% higher, and 14% higher on a like-for-like basis. 12:01am. The ABC reported Domain's September quarter house price figures. Perth had the sharpest fall, at 7.4%. Sydney fell 4.7% and Melbourne 3.3%. 7:30am. Fisher & Paykel Healthcare said some of the files accessed contained personally identifiable information. It believes the incident has been contained and does not expect any material impact on its financials or operations. 8:16am. Vault Minerals reported September quarter gold production of 76,849 ounces and sales of 79,085 ounces, at an average realised price of A$6,023 an ounce and an all-in sustaining cost of A$3,529 an ounce. All-in sustaining cost is an industry measure of the cost of producing gold and keeping existing mines running. It leaves out growth spending, exploration for new projects, tax and interest. Vault closed the quarter with cash and bullion of A$886.7 million. It said its merger with Genesis Minerals, by scheme of arrangement, is on track for implementation in late November 2026. A scheme of arrangement is a court-supervised process that needs a shareholder vote, and Vault's scheme meeting is on 11 November. 11:30pm. US initial jobless claims for the week to 17 October. Samso Concluding Comments The ABC linked this morning's small rise in futures to Wall Street's higher finish on Wednesday. Reuters said information technology led the US market, with SpaceX up after its first profit as a public company and Super Micro Computer up after an above-estimate forecast, while Netflix, AT&T and Alphabet fell. Meta reported after the US close and its shares were higher in extended trading. Locally, investors will watch the Domain house price figures, Fisher & Paykel Healthcare's cyber incident statement, Nick Scali's trading update and Vault Minerals' September quarter report. General information only. This is not financial advice.

Gold Fields has agreed to buy the Kambalda nickel concentrator from BHP. The purchase raises the question of whether nickel is coming back. The 2026 average price to September is above the 2025 average. The International Nickel Study Group forecast a deficit in April, and on 13 October 2026 it changed that to a small surplus. The price on 8 October 2026 and the exchange stockpile do not yet show a recovery. On 7 October 2026 BHP said it had agreed to sell the Kambalda Nickel Concentrator in Western Australia to Gold Fields, together with a package of tenements and mineralisation rights [R1]. A concentrator is a processing plant that crushes ore and separates the valuable minerals from the waste rock. The price was not disclosed. BHP expects the sale to complete during calendar 2027, subject to conditions that include regulatory approvals. Gold Fields is a gold producer listed in Johannesburg and New York. It already owns the St Ives gold mine at Kambalda. Its statement, as reported, said gold production remains its core focus. International Mining reports that Gold Fields is evaluating the long-term use of the plant for both gold and nickel processing [R2]. The price on 8 October 2026 does not show a recovery, though the 2026 average to September is above the 2025 average [R12]. The three-month nickel price on the London Metal Exchange is the price for metal delivered in three months, and it is the one most often quoted. It was US$15,600 a tonne on 8 October 2026 [R13]. The average for May 2026 was US$18,806 a tonne [R12]. Nickel held in exchange warehouses was 284,178 tonnes on 7 October 2026, which is higher than at the end of 2025 [R13][R20]. All share prices are as at the close of ASX trading on 8 October 2026. Global prices for nickel, gold and the Australian dollar are for the same date. WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS 1.00 THE TRANSACTION ANNOUNCED ON 7 OCTOBER 2026 What was announced, what is included and what has not been disclosed. 2.00 KAMBALDA AND THE CONCENTRATOR The location, the history of the plant and why it has shut twice since 2018. 3.00 GOLD FIELDS AT KAMBALDA The St Ives gold mine, the Lunnon Metals shareholding, a right of pre-emption over nickel ore, power supply and the Northern Star proposal. 4.00 HOW THE NICKEL MARKET WORKS Stainless steel, batteries, the London Metal Exchange and the two kinds of nickel ore. 5.00 THE NICKEL PRICE FROM 2019 TO OCTOBER 2026 The four parts of the price line and the price on 8 October 2026. 6.00 INDONESIA AND THE ORE QUOTA How Indonesia's mining quota moved the price in 2026 and what has happened to the quota since. 7.00 STOCKPILES, DEMAND AND FORECASTS The International Nickel Study Group figures, exchange stockpiles, stainless steel and battery demand, and the published price forecasts. 8.00 THE AUSTRALIAN NICKEL INDUSTRY IN 2026 Which operations are suspended, which are running and what governments have offered. 9.00 ASX COMPANIES WITH NICKEL ASSETS The status of each company from its own ASX documents, and how their share prices have moved. 10.00 THE GOLD PRICE AT 8 OCTOBER 2026 The gold price in US and Australian dollars beside the cost Gold Fields reports for St Ives. 11.00 THE EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST A NICKEL RECOVERY The four facts behind the answer, the case for a recovery and the dated events to watch. 12.00 SAMSO VIEW The Samso view on the purchase and on nickel for large, mid, small and micro companies. A NOTE ON THE VOCABULARY AND THE SOURCES Each technical term is explained in plain English where it first appears. The same terms are collected in one box at the back, immediately above the references. Every source has a number in square brackets, such as [R1]. The number appears in the text where that source is used, and the full entry is in the reference list at the back. Clicking a number jumps to its entry. The nickel price is the London close for the date shown, which falls after the ASX close on the same day. Where two published sources give different figures for the same thing, both are quoted as published with the name of each source, and no attempt is made to resolve them. Where Samso reasons past what a company has said, the passage is labelled as a model. Samso could not open the Gold Fields media release directly. Its wording is taken from the report of it by International Mining [R2]. Bank forecasts are taken from news reports of the bank notes. Samso has not read the notes. Samso read the BHP release [R1] through a text extract of the web page. Statements about how ore is mined and processed that carry no reference number are general industry knowledge and are not drawn from a cited document. 1.00 — THE TRANSACTION ANNOUNCED ON 7 OCTOBER 2026 What BHP sold and what it kept BHP announced the sale on 7 October 2026 [R1]. The assets are the Kambalda Nickel Concentrator and what BHP called a package of tenements and mineralisation rights. A tenement is a licence from the State to explore or mine a defined area of ground. A mineralisation right is a right to one mineral on ground where another party may hold the rights to other minerals. At Kambalda it is common for one company to hold the nickel and another to hold the gold on the same lease. BHP did not say which tenements or which rights are in the package. Samso has not found a list in any public document. The price was not disclosed either. Plate 01 shows the plant. BHP said Gold Fields will evaluate options for the long-term use of the concentrator and will offer employment to the people directly supporting the asset [R1]. BHP will manage the plant until completion. BHP kept the rest of its Western Australian nickel business. That business is the Mt Keith and Leinster mines, the Kalgoorlie smelter, the Kwinana refinery and the West Musgrave project. A smelter melts concentrate into nickel matte, which is an intermediate product, and a refinery turns the matte into nickel metal [R8]. BHP announced on 11 July 2024 that these operations would be suspended from October 2024, and that it would review the decision by February 2027 [R6]. The options BHP has named for that review are divestment, continued suspension, restart or closure [R1]. BHP said in July 2024 that it would spend about US$300 million a year to keep a restart possible [R6]. It had already written down the value of the nickel business in its accounts. That write-down, called an impairment, was about US$3.5 billion before tax and US$2.5 billion after tax, taken in the half year to 31 December 2023 [R7]. News reports of the Kambalda sale quote US$2.5 billion, which is the after-tax figure [R11]. The Kambalda plant is the first part of the business that BHP has agreed to sell. The plant relied on ore from other companies [R8]. 2.00 — KAMBALDA AND THE CONCENTRATOR Where Kambalda is and what the plant does Kambalda is a mining town in the Eastern Goldfields of Western Australia, about 56 kilometres south of Kalgoorlie [R8]. Fig. 01 shows the location. The left panel places Kambalda in the State, and the right panel shows the nickel and gold deposits around the town and the salt lake beside it, Lake Lefroy. Western Mining Corporation opened the first nickel mine in Western Australia at Kambalda in 1967, and BHP took over Western Mining in 2005 [R44]. Plate 02 shows one of the early shafts in 1969 [R30]. The nickel at Kambalda is in sulphide ore, which means the nickel is bound to sulphur in minerals such as pentlandite. Plate 03 shows a specimen [R31]. At Kambalda the sulphide ore is in narrow bodies that are mined underground. Sulphide ore elsewhere can be different. BHP describes its Mt Keith mine as a large open pit in low-grade sulphide ore [R8]. The share of metal in the rock is called the grade. Sulphide ore suits a concentrator, because the sulphide minerals can be floated off from the waste in tanks of water and air bubbles. That process is called flotation. BHP described the concentrator in 2017 as having a nominal capacity of 1.6 million tonnes of ore a year and producing a concentrate of about 13 per cent nickel [R8]. Nominal capacity is the rated amount a plant is built to treat in a year. Wikipedia, citing a company history of Western Mining, gives 1.4 million tonnes a year by 1972 [R44]. Both figures are quoted as published. The plant has not had a BHP mine feeding it for many years. Western Mining stopped its own mining at Kambalda in 2003 and the plant then treated ore from other companies [R44]. BHP described the feed in 2017 as ore treated for other parties and concentrate bought from them [R8]. The plant has shut twice since 2018, and both times the cause was that the mines supplying it stopped. In 2018 the last supplier closed. BHP looked at converting the plant to treat gold ore, and that plan did not proceed because no supplier of gold ore was found [R44]. The plant restarted in 2022 to treat ore from the Cassini mine. Wyloo, a private company, bought the owner of that mine in 2023. BHP said in February 2024 that Wyloo would suspend its Kambalda mines from 31 May 2024 and that the concentrator would go onto care and maintenance in June 2024 [R7]. Care and maintenance means a plant is shut but kept in working order. 3.00 — GOLD FIELDS AT KAMBALDA What public documents show about Gold Fields at Kambalda Gold Fields has not given a detailed reason for the purchase. Its senior vice president of operations in Australia, Craig Bradshaw, is quoted by International Mining [R2]. “These are highly strategic assets located in a region where we have operated and invested for many years, and we see significant potential to explore future opportunities.” Craig Bradshaw, Gold Fields, as reproduced by International Mining [R2] The same statement, as reproduced, said gold production remains the core focus of the company and that there are no changes to its operations or workforce as a result of the acquisition [R2]. The five facts below are from public documents. None of them is a statement by Gold Fields about why it agreed to buy the plant. The St Ives gold mine and the Lefroy plant Gold Fields owns the St Ives gold mine, which is about 20 kilometres south of Kambalda by road [R5]. St Ives produced 370,000 ounces of gold in 2025. Its processing plant, which Lunnon Metals calls the Lefroy gold plant [R4], treated 4.545 million tonnes of ore in that year against a nameplate capacity of 4.7 million tonnes a year [R5]. Nameplate capacity is the rated figure for a plant. The same filing shows the plant treated 4.817 million tonnes in 2020, so the nameplate figure is not a ceiling [R5]. Lunnon Metals gives the capacity of the same plant as 4.8 million tonnes a year [R4]. Both figures are quoted as published. What follows is a theoretical model and Gold Fields has not published it. On the Gold Fields figures the Lefroy plant treated about 97 per cent of its nameplate capacity in 2025, which is 4.545 divided by 4.7. In plain terms, the Lefroy plant ran close to its rated figure in 2025. The 1.6 million tonnes a year figure for the Kambalda concentrator is for nickel ore and may not apply to gold ore. A gold plant and a nickel concentrator share a front end. Both crush and grind the ore, and both need power, water and storage for tailings, which are the finely milled waste left after processing. The back end differs, because the Lefroy plant dissolves the gold out of the milled ore with a chemical solution, a step called leaching, and collects it on carbon [R5]. A nickel concentrator floats sulphide minerals. To treat gold ore, a nickel concentrator would need a leaching and carbon circuit added, along with money, time and approvals. BHP looked at the same conversion in 2018. It did not go ahead because no supplier of gold ore was found [R44]. Gold Fields mines its own gold ore at St Ives. BHP had no gold ore of its own. The model shows only that the front end of the plant could have a use for gold. Fig. 02 shows how close the gold and the nickel are. The Lefroy gold plant is at the top left, Gold Fields gold deposits are on three sides, and the Baker nickel deposit of Lunnon Metals is at the right. The Gold Fields shareholding in Lunnon Metals Lunnon Metals (ASX: LM8) holds nickel and gold ground at Kambalda. Gold Fields holds 29.61 per cent of the voting power in Lunnon Metals through its subsidiary St Ives Gold Mining Company [R3]. The Gold Fields annual filing for 2025 gives the holding as 30.5 per cent in one note and 30.2 per cent in another at 31 December 2025 [R5]. All three figures are quoted as published. Lunnon Metals reports a nickel Mineral Resource at its Foster and Baker deposits of more than 3 million tonnes at 3.0 per cent nickel, for more than 95,000 tonnes of contained nickel [R3]. Contained nickel is the tonnes of ore multiplied by the grade. It is metal in the ground, before any losses in mining and processing. A Mineral Resource is an estimate of metal in the ground that has reasonable prospects of being mined at a profit one day. It is reported under the JORC Code, which is the Australian standard for public reporting of these estimates. A resource is split into three levels of confidence. Measured is the highest, Indicated is the middle and Inferred is the lowest. Only Measured and Indicated material can be converted into an Ore Reserve. The Baker deposit on its own is 1,030,000 tonnes at 3.3 per cent nickel. Of that, 110,000 tonnes is Measured, 622,000 tonnes is Indicated and 298,000 tonnes is Inferred [R3]. Lunnon Metals has not reported an Ore Reserve for nickel [R4]. An Ore Reserve is the part of a resource that a study has shown can be mined at a profit. The absence of one means the economics have not yet been proven to that standard. The right of pre-emption over Lunnon Metals nickel ore The Lunnon Metals annual report says that BHP Nickel West retains a right of pre-emption over the sale of nickel ore or nickel products from Foster and Baker [R4]. A right of pre-emption is a right to be offered something before anyone else. A scoping study is the first and least detailed level of mining study. The same report says the company's scoping study assumes its ore would be treated at the Kambalda concentrator under that right, or by a later owner of the plant who holds the right [R4]. BHP and Gold Fields have not said whether this right is part of the package being sold. If it is, Gold Fields would own the plant, would hold the first right over nickel from Foster and Baker, and would hold 29.61 per cent of the company that owns them, as its largest shareholder [R3]. This is Samso's observation from the documents, and neither company has confirmed it. Lunnon Metals said on 7 October 2026 that it looks forward to investigating the opportunities from the change of ownership. It said it will consider whether its scoping study needs updating once the details are understood [R3]. Power supply at St Ives Gold Fields states that St Ives buys its electricity under a contract with BHP Nickel West [R5]. The same filing describes a wind and solar project at St Ives. It is 42 megawatts of wind and 35 megawatts of solar. It was under construction at the date of the filing and is planned to supply about 73 per cent of the site's power [R5]. On this filing, Gold Fields relies on BHP for power at St Ives. The proposal for Northern Star Gold Fields made a proposal in September 2026 to buy Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST), a gold producer listed on the ASX. The offer was in Gold Fields shares and cash, and Gold Fields valued it at A$27.00 for each Northern Star share [R9]. Northern Star put the value of the whole offer at A$38.7 billion, based on the Gold Fields share price on 11 September [R10]. Northern Star's board rejected it and said so publicly on 28 September 2026 [R10]. Bloomberg has reported that Gold Fields is considering a higher offer with more cash [R11]. Gold Fields has not confirmed that. Northern Star owns the South Kalgoorlie Operations, 35 kilometres south of Kalgoorlie. They include a processing plant of up to 1.2 million tonnes a year that has been on care and maintenance since the September 2023 quarter [R50]. Neither company has linked the Kambalda purchase to the Northern Star proposal, and the Gold Fields filing on the proposal does not mention Kambalda [R9]. Samso's observation is that both involve gold assets and processing plant in the same district. THE CASE THAT THE PURCHASE IS ABOUT NICKEL The nickel reading of the purchase has some support. The managing director of Lunnon Metals told the ABC in January 2026 that companies around Kambalda hold about 600,000 tonnes of nickel that has no plant to go to [R40]. A plant owner would be in a position to treat that nickel if the price came back and the mines reopened. The same report said a restart of the Foster mine could cost up to A$60 million and that no early revival was expected [R40]. The same report said Wyloo had no restart date for its Kambalda mines [R40]. S&P Global reported in April 2026 that Wyloo was working toward a restart [R32]. 4.00 — HOW THE NICKEL MARKET WORKS What nickel is used for and how its price is set Most nickel goes into stainless steel. ING, a bank, puts stainless steel at more than 60 per cent of nickel use [R21]. The second largest use is rechargeable batteries, where nickel is part of some battery types and absent from others. The price is set on the London Metal Exchange, a market where metal is bought and sold for delivery from approved warehouses. Two prices are quoted. The cash price is for metal delivered now. The three-month price is for metal delivered in three months. Nickel comes from two kinds of ore, sulphide and laterite. Sulphide ore, described in section 2.00, is mined in Australia, Canada and Russia. Laterite ore is a weathered, clay-rich ore found near the surface. Most of it is in tropical countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Western Australia has laterite too, at Murrin Murrin and at the Ardea Resources project (sections 8.00 and 9.00). Laterite deposits are large. The Ardea Resources resource in section 9.00 is 854 million tonnes at 0.71 per cent nickel. For most of the industry's history laterite was the harder ore to treat. Over the past decade Chinese companies built plants in Indonesia that turn laterite into two products. One is nickel pig iron, a crude iron and nickel alloy that goes into stainless steel. The other is an intermediate product for batteries, made by dissolving the ore in acid under heat and pressure. That second process is called high-pressure acid leaching. The result was a large new supply of nickel from Indonesia. The nickel price fell from 2023 (section 5.00), and the Australian suspensions listed in section 8.00 followed. 5.00 — THE NICKEL PRICE FROM 2019 TO OCTOBER 2026 The nickel price rise in early 2026 and the fall since May Fig. 03 is the monthly average nickel price since January 2019. The line has four parts. From 2019 to early 2022 the price rose, and it peaked at a monthly average of US$33,924 a tonne in March 2022 [R12]. It then fell to late 2025 as Indonesian supply grew. The annual average was US$21,521 in 2023, US$16,814 in 2024 and US$15,162 in 2025. The lowest monthly average was November 2025 at US$14,671. The price was lower on single days in April 2025. S&P Global reported the three-month price at US$14,084 and called it a low of nearly five years [R41]. In the third part the monthly average rose to US$17,769 in January 2026 and reached US$18,806 in May 2026. The fourth part is the fall since May. The September 2026 average was US$16,324 [R12]. Trading Economics reported the price on 1 October 2026 as the lowest since December 2025 [R14]. The three-month price on 8 October 2026 was US$15,600 a tonne and the cash price was US$15,415, as reported by The Vault Report, a price data site [R13]. That three-month price is about 17 per cent below the May average. Set against the rise from the December 2025 average of US$14,884 to the May average, about 82 per cent of the rise has been given back. Both figures are Samso arithmetic, and they compare one day's price with monthly averages, which is a rough comparison. The average for the first nine months of 2026 was US$17,344, which is Samso's simple average of the World Bank monthly figures [R12]. That is higher than the 2025 average. A producer selling at the average price through 2026 has received a higher price than in 2025. The price on 8 October is back near where 2025 ended. 6.00 — INDONESIA AND THE ORE QUOTA Indonesia's share of nickel mining and its ore quota Fig. 04 shows mine production by country. Indonesia supplies most of the world's mined nickel. The United States Geological Survey estimates that Indonesia mined 2.6 million tonnes of nickel in 2025 out of a world total of 3.9 million tonnes [R15]. That is 67 per cent on Samso's arithmetic. The second largest producer, the Philippines, mined 270,000 tonnes. Australia mined an estimated 45,000 tonnes, down from 98,000 tonnes in 2024. Indonesia controls its output through an annual mining quota. Each mine applies to the government for approval of the amount of ore it may dig in the year. The quota is counted in tonnes of ore. The production figures above are in tonnes of nickel contained in the ore, so the two are on different scales. The quota for 2025 was 379 million tonnes [R22][R27]. In December 2025 the energy minister, Bahlil Lahadalia, said production would be cut in 2026 to support the price [R41]. The 2026 quota was then set well below the 2025 figure. Reuters and Antara, the Indonesian news agency, report it as 250 to 260 million tonnes [R22][R27]. Argus, a price reporting agency, reports it as 260 to 270 million tonnes [R28]. Both ranges are quoted as published. Argus put the ore needed by Indonesian smelters at about 330 million tonnes [R28]. Both quota ranges are below that figure. Most of the price rise came between December 2025 and January 2026, after the energy minister said production would be cut [R41][R12]. The monthly average then reached US$18,806 in May as the lower quota was reported [R22][R28]. Trading Economics reports that ore shipped from the Philippines has helped Indonesian smelters keep up their feed [R14]. Quota revisions have been approved since, and the volumes have not been disclosed. In late June 2026 there were reports of a rise to about 360 million tonnes, which were not confirmed [R29]. On 10 July Tri Winarno, the director general of minerals and coal at the energy ministry, said there would be no increase for nickel, except to supply smelters that were short of ore [R27]. On 6 August Argus reported that the price had fallen below US$17,000 on expectations that the quota of one large operation had more than trebled, and said the details were unconfirmed [R28]. On 19 August about a dozen nickel companies had quota revisions approved, with the volumes not disclosed [R33]. Samso has not found a published total for the revised quota. Indonesia has also raised its royalties on nickel and changed the formula that sets the benchmark ore price [R41][R24]. The 2026 price rise followed a supply decision by the Indonesian government, which can revise it. The 2026 quota is still below the 2025 quota on every published figure [R22][R28]. 7.00 — STOCKPILES, DEMAND AND FORECASTS The supply balance, warehouse stocks, demand and forecasts The International Nickel Study Group is a body of governments that publishes production and usage figures twice a year. Fig. 05 shows its figures for the gap between the two. Its April forecast of a deficit in 2026 was the main published evidence for a recovery. On 13 October 2026 it changed the 2026 forecast to a surplus of 19,000 tonnes [R53]. The world produced more nickel than it used in 2023, 2024 and 2025. The surplus in 2025 was 283,000 tonnes [R16]. In October 2025 the group forecast a surplus of 261,000 tonnes for 2026 [R17]. In April 2026 it forecast a deficit of 32,000 tonnes, because it cut its forecast of production by 370,000 tonnes after the Indonesian quota was set [R16]. The group qualified its forecast. Its April release said the Indonesian quota remains open to upward revision and acknowledged uncertainty about Indonesian output [R16]. ING wrote on 30 June that the projected deficit could disappear quickly if higher quotas lifted output [R29]. A deficit of 32,000 tonnes is less than 1 per cent of the group's forecast production of 3.7 million tonnes, on Samso's arithmetic [R16]. The group met again in the week of 12 October 2026. It now forecasts a surplus of 19,000 tonnes for 2026 and 70,000 tonnes for 2027 [R53]. Fig. 06 shows the stockpile, which is a count of metal on the dates shown. Nickel in London Metal Exchange warehouses was 231,504 tonnes on 30 September 2025 and 254,364 tonnes on 28 November 2025 [R19]. It was about 255,000 tonnes at the end of 2025 [R20]. It was 278,898 tonnes on 24 September 2026, counting metal on warrant, which is metal available for delivery [R14]. It was 284,178 tonnes on 7 October 2026 [R13]. These figures are from four secondary reports and may not be counted the same way. Their direction is the same in every report. If the world were using more nickel than it produced in 2026, the stockpile would usually be expected to fall. It has risen by about 29,000 tonnes since the end of 2025, on Samso's arithmetic. The exchange figure counts refined metal only, so it is a partial measure of the market. ING reported in December 2025 that metal made in China had risen to 70 per cent of the nickel available in exchange warehouses [R21]. World stainless steel production was 32.964 million tonnes in the first half of 2026, up 5.0 per cent on a year earlier [R42]. That is growth in the main use. In batteries, the Chinese market has moved to a battery type called lithium iron phosphate, which contains no nickel. In May 2026 that type was 81.3 per cent of Chinese battery production and the nickel-bearing type was 18.6 per cent, on Chinese industry figures reported by S&P Global [R24]. Fig. 07 sets the published forecasts beside the actual price. Forecasts of the 2026 average ranged from US$15,250 by ING in December 2025 to US$18,500 by Goldman Sachs in a note reported in May 2026 [R21][R23]. The World Bank forecast US$17,000 for 2026 and US$17,500 for 2027 in April [R18]. The others are in the chart with their sources [R25][R26][R24]. The price on 8 October 2026 is below every forecast in the chart except ING's. Goldman Sachs in February also expected the price to end 2026 at about US$15,500, with a surplus of 191,000 tonnes for the year [R22]. Macquarie said in March that the market could move into deficit and that it saw a floor forming at US$17,000 to US$18,000 [R22]. The price is now below that range. 8.00 — THE AUSTRALIAN NICKEL INDUSTRY IN 2026 Australian nickel operations and their status The United States Geological Survey estimates that Australian nickel mine production fell by 54 per cent in 2025, to 45,000 tonnes [R15]. Table 01 lists the main operations and their status from company documents and, where marked, from news reports. Table 01 shows two operating mines. One of them, Nova, is expected to reach the end of its mine life in the December quarter of 2026 [R34]. Of the operations in Table 01, only Murrin Murrin would then be running, and it treats laterite ore. Governments have offered support. The Australian Government added nickel to its Critical Minerals List on 16 February 2024, which opens access to federal financing [R43]. The Western Australian Government offered interest-free loans to nickel miners in a statement of 1 April 2026, from a pool of A$15 million. S&P Global reports that the loans are free of repayments until 1 July 2028, or until the nickel price is above 22,000 dollars a tonne for two quarters in a row [R32]. The report as read by Samso does not say which dollar is meant. Samso has not found an announcement of a nickel mine restart in Australia in 2026 in the documents Samso reviewed. That review covered the companies in section 9.00 and the news reports in the reference list. It was not a search of every ASX announcement. 9.00 — ASX COMPANIES WITH NICKEL ASSETS The status of eleven ASX-listed companies with nickel assets Table 02 lists eleven ASX-listed companies with nickel assets. The facts come from each company's ASX documents. A company with a Mineral Resource is still exploring or studying its ground unless the table says it is producing. Each contained nickel figure is an in-ground estimate made by that company at its cut-off grade, which is the lowest grade it counts. The figures are not comparable with each other. The Kambalda district Lunnon Metals is the company closest to the transaction. Its nickel work is on hold and its activity is in gold. It mined the Lady Herial open pit from January to August 2026 and sold the ore to the Gold Fields Lefroy plant under an ore purchase agreement [R4]. It had A$22.2 million in cash at 30 June 2026 and has budgeted 43,000 metres of drilling for the 2027 financial year [R4]. Lunnon Metals published a scoping study on Foster and Baker on 21 July 2025. The Lunnon Metals annual report says the study applied a nickel price of A$23,000 a tonne [R4]. Samso has not read the study itself and has relied on the annual report and a press report of the study [R46]. The three-month price of US$15,600 on 8 October 2026 converts to about A$22,401 a tonne at the 8 October exchange rate of 0.6964 US dollars to the Australian dollar, which is Samso arithmetic. That is below the A$23,000 used in the study. WIN Metals holds the Mt Edwards nickel project about 30 kilometres south-west of Kambalda, with a resource of 12.66 million tonnes at 1.43 per cent nickel at 30 June 2026. Its focus is the restart of the Radio gold mine. On 28 September 2026 it announced a A$9 million sale of tenements to Astral Resources, a gold developer, and said it keeps the large majority of its nickel resource [R39]. Estrella Resources agreed on 6 October 2026 to sell its Spargoville nickel rights to the same buyer for 20 million Astral shares [R45]. Westgold Resources mines gold at Beta Hunt, at Kambalda, where it also reports a nickel resource [R49]. Lefroy Exploration holds the small, high-grade Goodyear nickel deposit and is working on gold [R48]. Samso's observation from these documents is that two holders agreed to sell nickel rights or tenements to one gold developer, Astral Resources, in the fortnight before the Gold Fields purchase was announced [R39][R45]. Two sales are a small sample. The larger companies IGO produced 15,304 tonnes of nickel at Nova in the 2026 financial year. It expects mining there to end in the December quarter of 2026 and has agreed to sell the site to a subsidiary of Global Lithium Resources [R34]. Its Cosmos project stayed on care and maintenance, and it sold Forrestania. On its statements IGO will have no operating nickel mine once Nova finishes. Nickel Industries mines and processes nickel in Indonesia, so it works under the Indonesian quota. It reported 62,019 tonnes of nickel for the half year to 30 June 2026. The quota for its Hengjaya mine was lifted from 9.0 million to 14.3 million wet tonnes for 2026 [R35]. Wet tonnes count the ore with the water in it. It reported on 15 September 2026 that the start-up of its new acid leaching plant was being held back by dry conditions [R35]. Centaurus Metals is working toward a decision to build the Jaguar nickel sulphide project in Brazil. On 2 October 2026 it signed a power connection contract and said it was at an advanced stage of negotiating further sales agreements and funding [R36]. It has not announced a final investment decision, which is the board's commitment to spend the money and build. Chalice Mining is studying the Gonneville project north-east of Perth. Its Ore Reserve is 260 million tonnes, reported at 0.86 grams a tonne of palladium, platinum and gold combined. The same reserve grades 0.16 per cent nickel, for 400,000 tonnes of contained nickel. Chalice Mining describes palladium, nickel and copper as co-products, meaning each is a main product. The feasibility study is due in the second half of 2027 [R37]. Ardea Resources holds a laterite resource north-west of Kalgoorlie of 854 million tonnes at 0.71 per cent nickel. It is completing a definitive feasibility study, the most detailed level of study, with Sumitomo Metal Mining and Mitsubishi Development. Ardea Resources said in July that the final report would run past its 30 June 2026 date and that it would update the market before the end of October 2026 [R38]. Share prices Fig. 08 shows the change in share price over twelve months for eight of the eleven companies. A recovery in a commodity usually shows in the shares of the companies that depend on it. BHP and IGO rose, and neither depends on nickel. Nickel Industries and Lunnon Metals were close to flat. Centaurus Metals, Ardea Resources, WIN Metals and Chalice Mining fell [R47]. A share price moves for many reasons. Chalice Mining reports its reserve on palladium, platinum and gold, and WIN Metals has turned to gold, so the chart is a rough guide. Of the eight companies charted, Lunnon Metals shares moved the most on the day of the announcement. They closed at 30.0 cents on 6 October 2026, 33.5 cents on 7 October and 31.5 cents on 8 October [R47]. The rise on 7 October was about 12 per cent, on Samso's arithmetic. Apart from BHP, Lunnon Metals was the only one of the eleven companies that made a public statement about the sale in the documents Samso reviewed. 10.00 — THE GOLD PRICE AT 8 OCTOBER 2026 The gold price and the St Ives cost Gold Fields is a gold company, so the gold price bears on what it buys. Fig. 09 shows the gold price over two years in US dollars and in Australian dollars. The Australian dollar price is the one an Australian gold mine is paid. Gold futures, which are contracts for later delivery, on the COMEX exchange in New York closed at US$4,157 an ounce on 8 October 2026. At an exchange rate of 0.6964 US dollars to the Australian dollar that is A$5,969 an ounce [R47]. The high of the past two years was US$5,318 on 29 January 2026 and A$7,581 on 28 January 2026. A year earlier, on 8 October 2025, the price was US$4,070 and A$6,186. Over the year the US dollar price is up 2.1 per cent and the Australian dollar price is down 3.5 per cent, because the Australian dollar has strengthened. Gold Fields reported an all-in cost at St Ives of A$3,352 an ounce for 2025 [R5]. All-in cost is the company's measure of everything it spends to produce an ounce, including the capital needed to keep the mine going. The price on 8 October 2026 is A$2,617 an ounce above that cost. This is Samso arithmetic, and it sets a 2025 cost against a 2026 price. The same filing says Gold Fields expects a higher cost for 2026 [R5]. A wide gap between price and cost makes processing capacity more useful to a gold miner. Ore that was too low in grade to treat at a lower gold price can pay its way at a higher one, and that ore needs a plant. Samso has written about the gold price in The Gold Question of 21 June 2026 and The Big Consolidation of 8 July 2026. Samso's view on the gold price range is set out in those two Insights and is not changed here. 11.00 — THE EVIDENCE FOR AND AGAINST A NICKEL RECOVERY The evidence on a nickel recovery at 8 October 2026 The purchase of the Kambalda concentrator is not, on its own, evidence of a nickel recovery. Gold Fields has said gold is its core focus, and it is reported to be evaluating the plant for both gold and nickel processing [R2]. The plant is at Kambalda and St Ives is about 20 kilometres south of the town by road. Two recent sales of tenements or nickel rights near Kambalda went to a gold developer [R5][R39][R45]. The price and the stockpile at 8 October 2026 do not show a recovery. Four facts point that way. The case for a recovery follows them. The price on 8 October 2026 was about 17 per cent below the May 2026 average and close to where 2025 ended [R12][R13]. Exchange stockpiles are higher than at the start of 2026 [R13][R20]. The rise early in the year followed Indonesia's statement that production would be cut, and then a lower quota. About a dozen companies have since had revisions approved, with the volumes not disclosed [R41][R27][R33]. No Australian nickel mine restart has been announced in the documents Samso reviewed, and over twelve months Nickel Industries shares were close to flat while Centaurus Metals and Ardea Resources fell [R47]. A share price moves for many reasons, so this is a rough guide. THE CASE FOR A RECOVERY Indonesia now limits its output through the quota. The 2026 quota is still below the 2025 quota of 379 million tonnes on every published figure [R22][R28]. Its energy minister said in December 2025 that production would be cut to support the price [R41]. The 2026 average price to September was above the 2025 average [R12]. Stainless steel production grew 5.0 per cent in the first half of 2026 [R42]. The International Nickel Study Group forecast a deficit for 2026 in April. Its October forecast is a small surplus of 19,000 tonnes [R16][R53]. Argus put the ore needed by Indonesian smelters at about 330 million tonnes, which is above either published quota figure [R28]. On 10 July the energy ministry said there would be no general increase for nickel [R27]. In Australia, nickel mines have been closing since 2024 [R6][R7]. Most Australian capacity is shut and would take time to restart, so Australian supply would be slow to respond if the quota holds into 2027. S&P Global reported in April 2026 that Wyloo was working toward a restart, and the Western Australian Government has offered loans to nickel miners [R32]. The dated events below will test both cases. The International Nickel Study Group met in the week of 12 October 2026 and now forecasts surpluses for 2026 and 2027 [R16][R53]. Ardea Resources has said it will update the market on its feasibility study before the end of October 2026 [R38]. Indonesia will set its 2027 mining quota. Reports of the 2026 quota figures appeared in February 2026 [R22][R28]. BHP will review the rest of its Western Australian nickel business by February 2027 [R1]. The Kambalda sale is expected to complete in calendar 2027, and Gold Fields has said it will assess the plant before deciding its use [R1][R2]. 12.00 — SAMSO VIEW The Samso view on the purchase and on nickel SAMSO VIEW In our industry we like to say that the best place to find a mine is next to a mine. I think the same is true of a mill. A plant that is already built and already next door is worth a lot more to the neighbour than to anyone else, and Gold Fields is the neighbour. So my reading is that this is a gold decision with a nickel option attached. Gold Fields gets a plant, tenements and mineral rights at Kambalda while BHP is a willing seller. If nickel comes back, Gold Fields will own the nickel concentrator at Kambalda. If it does not, the company still has infrastructure it can put to work for gold. That is my opinion, and Gold Fields has not said it. On nickel itself, I do not see a resurgence yet. What we had in the first half of 2026 was Indonesia tightening the tap, and the price responded. Since then some quota revisions have been approved, the stockpile has kept growing and the price has given most of it back. In my opinion the nickel price is now a policy price set in Jakarta, and the quota tells me more than the demand does. For the large ASX companies, nickel is a small line. BHP has now agreed to sell one nickel asset on its own, and the rest is under review. For the mid-sized companies, IGO is close to having no nickel mine at all, and Nickel Industries is the one that lives inside the Indonesian system, with the benefits and the risks that come with that. For the small companies around Kambalda, the important change is that the plant will have an owner that says it will assess how to use it. Lunnon Metals is the company most directly affected, because its largest shareholder is buying the mill. For the micro explorers that hold nickel ground, the market is telling them to work on their gold, and several already are. The question I would leave with investors is this. If the owner of the nickel plant at Kambalda is a gold company, who decides when Kambalda nickel is mined again, the nickel price or the gold price? THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH Concentrator A plant that crushes ore and separates the metal-bearing minerals from the waste rock. The product is called concentrate. Smelter and refinery A smelter melts concentrate into nickel matte, an intermediate product. A refinery turns the matte into nickel metal. Care and maintenance A mine or plant that is shut but kept in working order so it can restart. Tenement A licence from the State to explore or mine a defined area of ground. Mineralisation right A right to one mineral on ground where someone else may hold the rights to other minerals. Right of pre-emption A right to be offered something before anyone else. Impairment A write-down in a company's accounts of the value it carries for an asset. Sulphide ore Ore in which the metal is bound to sulphur. Kambalda nickel is sulphide ore, mined underground. Nominal and nameplate capacity The rated amount a plant is built to treat in a year. A plant can treat more or less than this. Tailings The finely milled waste left after a plant has taken the valuable minerals out of the ore. Laterite ore A weathered, clay-rich ore found near the surface, mostly in tropical countries. Most Indonesian nickel is laterite. Grade The share of metal in the rock, given as a percentage for nickel and as grams a tonne for gold. Flotation and leaching Flotation separates sulphide minerals in tanks of water and air bubbles. Leaching dissolves metal out of ore with a chemical solution. Nickel pig iron A crude alloy of iron and nickel made from laterite ore and used to make stainless steel. High-pressure acid leaching A process that dissolves laterite ore in acid under heat and pressure to make a nickel product for batteries. London Metal Exchange The market where the world nickel price is set. The cash price is for delivery now and the three-month price is for delivery in three months. Surplus and deficit A surplus means more metal was produced than used in a year. A deficit means less was produced than used. The Indonesian mining quota and wet tonnes The quota is the annual approval Indonesia gives each mine for the amount of ore it may dig. Wet tonnes count the ore with the water in it. Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve A Mineral Resource is an estimate of metal in the ground with reasonable prospects of being mined at a profit one day. An Ore Reserve is the part a study has shown can be mined at a profit. Contained nickel and cut-off grade Contained nickel is the tonnes of ore multiplied by the grade, before any losses in mining and processing. The cut-off grade is the lowest grade a company counts in its estimate. JORC Code The Australian standard for reporting resources and reserves. Measured, Indicated and Inferred are its three levels of confidence, from highest to lowest. Only Measured and Indicated material can become a reserve. Scoping study and feasibility study Levels of mining study. A scoping study is the first and least detailed. A definitive feasibility study is the most detailed. Final investment decision A board's commitment to spend the money and build a project. All-in cost A gold company's measure of everything it spends to produce an ounce, including the capital needed to keep the mine going. References and sources Each entry carries the number used in the text. Plates 01 to 03 and Figs 01 and 02 are reproduced from the sources named in their captions. Figs 03 to 09 are original Samso illustrations of sourced data. Market prices are stated at their dates and are refreshed before publication. Entries marked as press reports or secondary sources have not been checked against a primary document. The cover photograph is credited at [R51]. [R1] BHP, media release, "BHP and Gold Fields agree on divestment of Kambalda Nickel Concentrator", 7 October 2026. www.bhp.com/news/media-centre/releases/2026/10/bhp-kambalda-nickel-concentrator [R2] International Mining, "BHP agrees to sell Kambalda nickel concentrator to Gold Fields", 7 October 2026. Used for the Gold Fields statement of the same date, which Samso could not open directly. im-mining.com/2026/10/07/bhp-agrees-to-sell-kambalda-nickel-concentrator-to-gold-fields/ [R3] Lunnon Metals Limited, ASX announcement, "BHP Reports Kambalda Nickel Concentrator Transaction", 7 October 2026. wcsecure.weblink.com.au/clients/lunnonmetals/headline.aspx?headlineid=61348080 [R4] Lunnon Metals Limited, Annual Report 2026, lodged with the ASX on 25 September 2026. wcsecure.weblink.com.au/clients/lunnonmetals/headline.aspx?headlineid=61345780 [R5] Gold Fields Limited, Form 20-F for the year ended 31 December 2025, United States Securities and Exchange Commission. www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1172724/000162828026021904/gfi-20251231.htm [R6] BHP, media release, "Western Australia Nickel to temporarily suspend operations", 11 July 2024. www.bhp.com/news/media-centre/releases/2024/07/western-australia-nickel-to-temporarily-suspend-operations [R7] BHP, media release, "Half year 2024 exceptional items update", 15 February 2024. www.bhp.com/news/media-centre/releases/2024/02/half-year-2024-exceptional-items-update [R8] BHP, Form 20-F for the 2017 financial year, United States Securities and Exchange Commission. www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0000811809/000119312517297000/d440935d20f.htm [R9] Gold Fields Limited, Form 6-K, proposal for Northern Star Resources, 28 September 2026, United States Securities and Exchange Commission. www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/0001172724/000162828026063642/finalgoldfieldsproposalf.htm [R10] Northern Star Resources Limited, ASX announcement on the Gold Fields proposal, 28 September 2026. announcements.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20260928/pdf/074l5nsn2s3xjy.pdf [R11] Bloomberg, as republished by Mining.com, "BHP sells shuttered Australian nickel plant to Gold Fields", 6 October 2026, and "Gold Fields said to weigh sweetening Northern Star bid with cash", 29 September 2026. Press reports. The first report carries the date of 6 October, which is the United States date. www.mining.com/web/bhp-sells-shuttered-australian-nickel-plant-to-gold-fields [R12] World Bank, Commodity Price Data (the Pink Sheet), monthly historical data file, updated 2 October 2026. thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/74e8be41ceb20fa0da750cda2f6b9e4e-0050012026/related/CMO-Historical-Data-Monthly.xlsx [R13] The Vault Report, London Metal Exchange nickel prices and stocks page, read 9 October 2026. A third-party data site. Samso has not checked it against the exchange. thevaultreport.com/lme/nickel [R14] Trading Economics, nickel commodity page and news stream, read 9 October 2026. tradingeconomics.com/commodity/nickel [R15] United States Geological Survey, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026, nickel chapter, February 2026. pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2026/mcs2026-nickel.pdf [R16] International Nickel Study Group, press release, 22 April 2026. insg.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/pressrel_INSG-Press-Release-April_2026-bnjjkmn7jka88.pdf [R17] International Nickel Study Group, press release, 7 October 2025. insg.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/pressrel_INSG-Press-Release-October_2025-nd782v78.pdf [R18] World Bank, Commodity Markets Outlook, April 2026 forecasts table. thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/f3138644a1e8e2bb631399ae11d6c408-0050012026/related/CMO-April-2026-Forecasts.pdf [R19] Investing News Network, as published by Nasdaq, "Nickel Price 2025 Year-End Review", 19 December 2025. www.nasdaq.com/articles/nickel-price-2025-year-end-review [R20] Metalurgika, "Nickel Price 2026" article on the Indonesian ore quota and exchange stocks, October 2026. A secondary source. metalurgika.com/en/nickel-price-2026-indonesia-quota/ [R21] ING Think, "Nickel still capped by surplus", 8 December 2025. think.ing.com/articles/nickel-still-capped-by-surplus/ [R22] Reuters, as republished by OE Digital, "Goldman Macquarie raises average nickel price forecasts for 2026 on tighter Indonesian supplies", 4 February 2026, and Mining.com, "Nickel market could turn deficit due to Indonesia quota, says Macquarie", 11 March 2026. Press reports of bank notes. energynews.oedigital.com/mineral-resources/2026/02/04/goldman-macquarie-raises-average-nickel-price-forecasts-for-2026-on-tighter-indonesian-supplies [R23] Reuters, as published by TradingView, "Goldman Sachs raises 2026 average nickel price forecast". The page is undated. A secondary source dates the note to about 11 May 2026. www.tradingview.com [R24] S&P Global, as republished by Hellenic Shipping News, "TRADE REVIEW" of the Asian nickel market for the third quarter, July 2026. www.hellenicshippingnews.com/?p=1140965 [R25] Shanghai Metals Market, nickel market flash on the BMI forecast for 2026, 21 April 2026. news.metal.com/newscontent/103867465-SMM-Nickel-Market-Flash-BMI-Raises-2026-Nickel-Price-Forecast-to-16600t-on-Policy-and-Supply-Risks [R26] TradingPedia, "Nickel Forecast Raised as Market Surplus Narrow", 9 July 2026. A secondary report of a Bernstein note. www.tradingpedia.com/2026/07/09/nickel-forecast-raised-as-market-surplus-narrow/ [R27] ANTARA News, "Indonesia limits nickel quota expansion to support global prices", 11 July 2026. en.antaranews.com/news/422261/indonesia-limits-nickel-quota-expansion-to-support-global-prices [R28] Argus Media, "Indonesia to cut nickel mining quota in 2026", 11 February 2026, and "LME nickel prices fall on expectations of higher supply", 6 August 2026. www.argusmedia.com/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2787275-indonesia-to-cut-nickel-mining-quota-in-2026 [R29] ING Think, "Indonesia's reported quota rethink caps nickel rally", 30 June 2026. think.ing.com/articles/indonesia-caps-nickels-rally-with-a-quota-rethink/ [R30] Wilford Peloquin, photograph, "69-1400 Kambalda, Australia 1969", Wikimedia Commons, licence CC BY 2.0. commons.wikimedia.org [R31] John Sobolewski, photograph, "Pentlandite - Kambalda, Coolgardie Shire, Western Australia", Wikimedia Commons from Mindat, licence CC BY 3.0. commons.wikimedia.org [R32] S&P Global, report on Western Australian interest-free loans for nickel mines, 2 April 2026. spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/040226-western-australia-offers-interest-free-loans-to-revive-nickel-mines [R33] Mysteel, flash report on approvals of 2026 RKAB revisions for nickel and coal, 20 August 2026. www.mysteel.net/news/5137348-flash-indonesias-esdm-approves-2026-rkab-revisions-for-nickel-and-coal [R34] IGO Limited, June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report, lodged with the ASX on 28 July 2026, and FY26 results, lodged 27 August 2026. announcements.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20260728/pdf/0723kqz5668r86.pdf [R35] Nickel Industries Limited, Half Year Financial Report to 30 June 2026, lodged with the ASX on 26 August 2026, and "Operating Update", lodged 15 September 2026. ASX document keys 2924-03126291-2A1692196 and 2924-03135460-2A1697137. www.nickelindustries.com [R36] Centaurus Metals Limited, "Power Transmission System Contract for Jaguar Executed", lodged with the ASX on 2 October 2026, and Half Year Accounts, lodged 10 September 2026. ASX document keys 2924-03143650-6A1347374 and 2924-03134240-6A1343269. www.centaurus.com.au [R37] Chalice Mining Limited, Annual Report 2026, lodged with the ASX on 29 September 2026. announcements.asx.com.au/asxpdf/20260929/pdf/074p88tsz6jx5b.pdf [R38] Ardea Resources Limited, June 2026 Quarterly Report, lodged with the ASX on 23 July 2026. ASX document key 2924-03113413-6A1335013. ardearesources.com.au [R39] WIN Metals Limited, Financial Report to 30 June 2026, lodged with the ASX on 30 September 2026, and announcements of 28 September and 6 October 2026 on the tenure sale to Astral Resources. ASX document key 2924-03142635-6A1346917. www.asx.com.au/markets/company/WIN [R40] ABC News, report on Kambalda and its nickel industry, 31 January 2026. A press report. www.abc.net.au/news/2026-01-31/kambalda-discovery-led-to-australias-first-nickel-mine/106159740 [R41] S&P Global, "Indonesia navigates nickel market with output cuts, policy shifts", 29 December 2025. www.spglobal.com/energy/en/news-research/latest-news/metals/122925-indonesia-navigates-nickel-market-with-output-cuts-policy-shifts [R42] worldstainless, stainless steel melt shop production for the first half of 2026, release of 27 August 2026. worldstainless.org/?p=5858 [R43] Engineering News, "Australia places nickel on critical minerals list", 16 February 2024. www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/australia-places-nickel-on-critical-minerals-list-2024-02-16 [R44] Wikipedia, "Kambalda Nickel Operations", read 9 October 2026. A secondary source used for the history of the plant. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kambalda_Nickel_Operations [R45] Estrella Resources Limited, "Divestment of Nickel Rights", lodged with the ASX on 6 October 2026. ASX document key 2924-03144592-6A1347786. www.estrellaresources.com.au [R46] Engineering News, report on the Lunnon Metals scoping study, 21 July 2025. A press report. www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/lunnon-flags-price-linked-potential-in-wa-nickel-study-2025-07-21 [R47] Yahoo Finance, daily closing prices for ASX shares, COMEX gold futures and the Australian dollar, read 9 October 2026. A data vendor. Samso has not checked it against the exchanges. finance.yahoo.com [R48] Lefroy Exploration Limited, Annual Report 2026, lodged with the ASX on 23 September 2026. ASX document key 2924-03139065-6A1345348. lefroyex.com [R49] Westgold Resources Limited, presentation to the Mining Forum Americas, lodged with the ASX on 28 September 2026. ASX document key 2924-03140317-6A1345909. www.asx.com.au/markets/company/WGX [R50] Northern Star Resources, Kalgoorlie Operations page, read 9 October 2026. nsrltd.com/our-assets/kalgoorlie-operations [R51] Cover photo. Silver Lake shaft, Kambalda, 1969, Wilford Peloquin. CC BY 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons. Cropped. commons.wikimedia.org [R52] Mining.com, "Indonesian onslaught wipes out Australia's nickel industry", 2024, and Mining.com.au, "The five largest nickel mines operating in Australia", 17 June 2026. Press reports. mining.com.au/the-five-largest-nickel-mines-operating-in-australia/ [R53] Reuters, "Global nickel market set for surplus this year and next, INSG says", 13 October 2026, as published by Kitco. Added on 22 October 2026, after the International Nickel Study Group's October meeting. www.kitco.com/news/off-the-wire/2026-10-13/global-nickel-market-set-surplus-year-and-next-insg-says The Samso Way – Seek the Research Here at Samso, we pride ourselves on delivering content for investors that is independent and informed by over three decades of experience in the industry. Our content is well-researched and is only created if I see merit in discussing the company's story. Our mission is simple. Cut through the noise and spotlight what matters. Genuine stories, grounded insights, and real opportunity. Investors can explore our four core platforms: Coffee with Samso Samso Insights Samso News Samso Research There may be numerous paths to success in investing, but the common thread among successful individuals is that they remain committed to making informed decisions. Equip yourself with the right knowledge and tools, and you will be well on your way to achieving your financial goals. 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Rimfire Pacific Mining (ASX: RIM) has applied for two exploration licences covering 500 square kilometres next to the Nyngan Scandium Deposit in central New South Wales. This release adds new ground to the portfolio and Samso has taken the opportunity to look at what historical data exist and what they are saying about Rimfire's applications. All prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 19 October 2026. The Announcement On 20 October 2026 Rimfire released “Rimfire builds its 100% owned scandium footprint” to the ASX [R1]. The company has lodged Exploration Licence Applications 7124 and 7125, which it names the Bogan River Project. EXPLORATION LICENCE APPLICATION A request to the New South Wales government for the right to explore an area. Work on the ground can only start once the licence is granted. The release places the ground immediately west of the town of Nyngan, near Rimfire’s Rabbit Trap Project, which the company also owns outright (FIG. 01). Rimfire’s Fifield district deposits, including Murga, are more than 100 kilometres to the south. At the close on 19 October 2026, Rimfire’s 2,999,138,802 shares were priced at 1.0 cents, a market value of about A$30.0 million [R2]. Highlights Two exploration licence applications covering 500 square kilometres, close to the existing 100% owned Rabbit Trap Project. The ground adjoins the Nyngan Scandium Deposit, owned by Scandium International Mining Corporation. The company says there are numerous untested magnetic anomalies, which it interprets as mafic-ultramafic intrusions similar to those that host scandium elsewhere in New South Wales. Rimfire says the ground has seen little, if any, earlier exploration for scandium. The company expects the licences to be granted within the next two to three months. What the Magnetic Targets Are Rimfire says the Geological Survey of New South Wales interprets many of the magnetic anomalies at Bogan River as Ordovician mafic-ultramafic intrusions [R1]. Rocks of this kind host the Nyngan scandium deposit next door and the Fifield deposits more than 100 kilometres to the south. MAFIC-ULTRAMAFIC INTRUSIONS Bodies of dark rock, rich in iron and magnesium, that cooled from molten rock below the surface. Ordovician means they formed roughly 485 to 444 million years ago. They often carry magnetic minerals, so they tend to show up on an aeromagnetic image, a survey flown by aircraft that maps small changes in Earth’s magnetic field. The release places them in the Fifield Intrusive Suite, a belt of Alaskan-Ural style intrusions that runs several hundred kilometres north to south along the margin of the Macquarie Arc in central New South Wales. The style is named after similar intrusions in Alaska and the Ural Mountains of Russia. Rimfire sees the Bogan River intrusions as similar to those that host the scandium deposits at Fifield. Rimfire has outlined its targets in red on its aeromagnetic image (FIG. 02), and Samso counts ten. The release says the most recent holders of the ground were looking at carbon sequestration, which means storing carbon dioxide in the ultramafic rock, and that the project has seen little, if any, earlier exploration for scandium. The release points to the Nyngan Deposit next door, where shallow scandium in the weathered top of the rock overlies one of the magnetic anomalies. Rimfire says this “reinforces the scandium prospectivity” of Bogan River. The release also describes the town of Nyngan as a regional centre with major roads and a rail network. The Nyngan Deposit Next Door The Bogan River ground is next to the Nyngan Scandium Deposit, owned by Scandium International. Nyngan is well studied, with a resource, a reserve and a definitive feasibility study behind it. SCANDIUM INTERNATIONAL Scandium International Mining Corporation is listed in Canada. Its Nyngan titles are held on the state register by EMC Metals Australia Pty Ltd. The release calls it “TSX – listed” in the highlights and lists it on the TSX-V under the code SCY in the introduction. The company’s website lists it on the TSX Venture Exchange [R3]. At Nyngan the scandium is in clay. The release says it is in the weathered top of the Gilgai Intrusion (Whitbarrow Creek Ultramafic Complex), a body of pyroxenite and olivine pyroxenite. Most of the scandium is in the limonite and saprolite layers. The weathered profile can extend more than 60 metres deep, and it is covered by 8 to 40 metres of sediment from the Bogan River floodplain. LATERITE, LIMONITE AND SAPROLITE The weathered top over the rock is called a laterite, a layer rich in iron and clay that forms over a long time in a warm, wet climate. Limonite is an iron-rich clay layer below the haematitic clay at the top. Saprolite is the softer weathered rock beneath it. TABLE 01 sets out Nyngan’s resource and reserve as Rimfire quotes them [R1]. The resource is 16.92 million tonnes at 235 ppm scandium, in the Measured and Indicated categories. The reserve is 1.43 million tonnes at 409 ppm. RESOURCE, RESERVE AND PPM A Mineral Resource is an estimate of the scandium in the ground, and Measured and Indicated are its two more confident categories. A Mineral Reserve is the part that at least a pre-feasibility study shows can be mined economically, and Proven and Probable are its categories. Ppm means parts per million, the same as grams per tonne. These figures come from a technical report dated 4 May 2016, prepared under NI 43-101, the Canadian reporting standard, rather than the JORC Code used on the ASX. The release gives the resource grade as 235 ppm in its text and 253 ppm on the Figure 2 label. Scandium International is now updating its 2016 definitive feasibility study for Nyngan, according to its June 2026 release [R4]. The 2016 study planned to treat about 75,000 tonnes of limonite ore a year and produce about 38.5 tonnes of scandium oxide a year. It used less than 20 per cent of the resource, at an average head grade of 409 ppm, the same grade as the Reserve [R4]. DEFINITIVE FEASIBILITY STUDY The most detailed study of a project, done before a decision to build a mine. What Samso Found in the Old Exploration Reports Samso has read the historical open-file reports (Geological Survey of New South Wales library, called DIGS) that cover parts of the Bogan River ground [R5] and plotted every known drill hole against Rimfire’s targets. No report holds a scandium assay from inside the two applications, supporting the release, which says the ground has seen little, if any, earlier exploration for scandium. Scandium was not unknown here. Jervois Mining, Platina Resources and New Age Resources each named it as a target over parts of the ground between 2010 and 2023, although none of them sampled or drilled for scandium inside. The work that was done would have been mainly desk studies, with one site visit and one roadside photo traverse [R5]. FIG. 03 shows Rimfire’s ten target outlines, traced by Samso from the release’s Figure 2, on the state magnetic image with the drill holes on top. Fourteen drill holes are recorded inside the applications. On the recorded positions, four of the targets have one hole each and six have no known hole. One of those six appears to lie almost entirely outside the applications on the state register, although Rimfire’s Figure 2 draws it inside. Four more Helix holes plot just outside T10, on positions the state database calls a best estimate. Whether these holes missed any "potential" targets is yet to be proven. BHP drilled hole N1 in 1984 on a magnetic and gravity high. Under 67 metres of clay and sand it hit ultramafic rock, which BHP’s petrologist described as altered pyroxenite or peridotite. Magnetite and ilmenite made up as much as 30 per cent of some chips. BHP concluded the hole had found the source of the anomaly [R5]. Pyroxenite is the same family of rock that hosts the scandium at Nyngan. BHP was looking for platinum, gold and base metals, so it never assayed for scandium. So the old record does not show scandium at Bogan River, and it also does not rule it out, which is what could be the potential as management narrates. From our reading, at least one target has the same family of rock as the host at Nyngan, and nobody has yet tested it, or any weathered profile on top of it, for scandium. Most of the old holes were open holes sited on magnetic peaks for other metals. The record also tells us what Rimfire will be working with. Only N1 of the four holes on targets hit ultramafic rock. The others ended in diorite, a weathered intrusive rock and metasediment. One hole on a target of about 5 to 32 square kilometres, by Samso’s measurement, tests a single point, so these results do not rule a target in or out. The cover is deeper than at Nyngan, at 67 to 145.5 metres in the three target holes that measured it, against 8 to 40 metres next door. N1 logged 4 metres of weathered ultramafic rock and no laterite, so the weathered profile is something the new drilling will need to find. On the state magnetic image, the strong high under the Nyngan deposit stays within the titles held by EMC Metals Australia for Scandium International. Jervois gave up EL 7664 next door because the scandium magnetic anomaly “does not extend into EL 7664” [R5]. Rimfire interprets its targets as intrusive bodies separate from the one under Nyngan, so each one will stand on its own results. The scandium at Nyngan was first found by going back to old samples. Jervois found it in old drill core, then had the stored pulps from Anaconda’s 1999 to 2001 nickel holes assayed, and many showed scandium enrichment [R5]. That route is not open at Bogan River, because the state database records no core or cuttings kept for any of the 13 holes it lists inside the applications [R6]. The scandium test there will come from new drilling. PULP The fine powder left after a drill sample is crushed and ground for assay. Explorers sometimes keep it in storage. What Comes Next at Bogan River The two applications have to be granted first, and the release expects grant within two to three months. Application for land access will need to follow from the granting. Six of the targets have no known drill hole, and the four that have one were drilled for other metals. That leaves the scandium question open on all ten. A magnetic high tells us where the magnetic rock is likely to be. What we still need to know is whether a scandium-bearing laterite has formed on top of that rock, and how thick and how rich it is. Only drilling will answer that, and with the cover seen in the old holes on the targets, the drilling is likely to go deeper than at Nyngan. Being next to Nyngan is a good starting point. It usually means the right geology is close by. The grade at Bogan River will come from Rimfire’s drilling. Leadership Commentary Executive Chair Bronwyn Barnes said in the release [R1]. “Expanding our 100% owned projects in Australia’s scandium epicentre supports our strategy of building a globally significant scandium inventory within the region.” She also described the applications as “a low-cost entry point for shareholders” and said demand for scandium is growing across advanced manufacturing, AI data centres, defence and aerospace. Near-term Milestones to Watch Grant of the two licences applied for under Exploration Licence Applications 7124 and 7125, which Rimfire expects within two to three months. Compilation of earlier exploration data, then target generation and geophysical modelling to rank the targets for drilling. Talks with landholders on access, which the release says start after grant. Results from the expanded Murga leach tests, which Rimfire set out in its 28 September release and Samso covered in Murga scandium leach tests. The update of the Nyngan feasibility study by Scandium International. Its June release gave no completion date. Samso Concluding Comments What this release adds is more exploration upside to the Rimfire story. As we all know in exploration, potential does not always lead to a resource. It does add another chapter, because Rimfire now holds applications next to known mineralisation that already has a resource, a reserve and a feasibility study behind it. For readers who have followed Samso, this is the kind of potential an exploration story is built on. The release highlights that Bogan River, once granted, and Rabbit Trap are 100 per cent Rimfire’s. Rimfire would keep all of any discovery on that ground. Nyngan gives a sense of the potential upside for Rimnfire by adding the element of a nearology play with mineralisation potential in the area. Its Measured and Indicated resource holds 6,099 tonnes of scandium oxide. That is about half the 12,000 tonnes Rimfire labels for Murga on its regional map, a whole-deposit figure (FIG. 04). Rimfire’s share depends on the partner’s earn-in at Fifield. The two are not alike. Murga’s resource is Inferred, at 138 ppm scandium under the JORC Code. Nyngan’s is Measured and Indicated at 235 ppm under the 2016 Canadian code. The comparison is a guide to size only. From here, Bogan River needs the licences granted, the targets drilled through the cover, and a weathered profile that carries scandium at a useful grade. THE OTHER WAY TO READ THIS Rimfire has a market value of about A$30.0 million and an active test program at Murga. Each new project spreads the same people and the same money across more ground. Licence applications are cheap to lodge, and a regional map with more ground on it can look like progress before any drilling has been done. On this reading, the next set of Murga results is more important to shareholders than another 500 square kilometres. The cover also adds cost. Where the old holes on the targets measured it, the cover is 67 to 145.5 metres, against 8 to 40 metres at Nyngan. Drilling through that depth costs more per hole than at Nyngan, and the money comes from the same budget as the Murga work. This box is Samso’s counterpoint. SAMSO TAKE Bogan River is a ground position next to a deposit that has been studied for more than ten years. Its owner is now updating that study. If the Bogan River intrusions do carry scandium in their weathered profile, would that ground be more valuable to Rimfire as its own project, or as a source of ore close to whichever processing plant is built first in the district? Previous Samso Coverage of Rimfire Pacific Mining Every earlier Samso post on Rimfire, newest first, with the two Samso Insights on the scandium market. RIMFIRE PACIFIC MINING 9 OCT 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining (ASX: RIM) - Fifield Scandium Recovery Results and the Scandium Market” The 15-week leach recoveries at Murga and the scandium market after them. 30 SEP 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining (ASX: RIM) - Murga Scandium Study Adds Column and Tank Leach Tests” The expanded Murga metallurgical program and its timetable. 11 AUG 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining (ASX:RIM) Strengthens Leadership as Scandium Strategy Advances” Bronwyn Barnes becomes Executive Chair, and the A$2.3 million raising. 30 JUN 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining: Murga’s Low-Iron Scandium Points to a Cheaper Route” Why the low iron content at Murga may point to a lower-cost leach. 15 JUN 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining Limited (ASX: RIM) to Secure 60% of Avondale Scandium Project as Seismic Survey Kicks Off at Fifield” The partner vests 40 per cent of Avondale, and the Fifield seismic survey. 14 MAY 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining Limited – Fifield District Scandium Resource Builder Investigating Lower-Cost Leaching Pathway at Murga” The Fifield district position and the Murga leach pathway. 14 APR 2026 “Rimfire Pacific Mining Limited – Murga Scandium Mineral Resource Increases” The upgraded Murga Mineral Resource. SAMSO INSIGHTS ON SCANDIUM 28 AUG 2026 “The Scandium Market in 2026 - Does a lower scandium price make the investment case stronger?” Scandium prices, supply and the projects that are only announced. 6 APR 2026 “The Scandium Story - A Small-Market Metal with Outsized Leverage in Lightweight Alloys and Clean-Energy Ceramics” What scandium is used for and why its market is small. THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH Exploration licence application A request to a state government for the right to explore an area. No work on the ground is allowed until the licence is granted. Aeromagnetic survey A survey flown by aircraft that records small changes in Earth’s magnetic field. Magnetic rocks show up as highs. TMI_RTP The label on the release’s Figure 2. Total magnetic intensity, reduced to the pole, a standard way of processing magnetic survey data so that each high lies over the rock that causes it. Mafic and ultramafic Dark igneous rocks rich in iron and magnesium. Pyroxenite is an ultramafic rock. Intrusion A body of molten rock that cooled and set below the surface. Ordovician A period of geological time roughly 485 to 444 million years ago. Laterite A weathered layer, rich in iron and clay, formed on top of rock over a long time in a warm, wet climate. Limonite and saprolite Two layers in a laterite profile. Limonite is the iron-rich clay higher up. Saprolite is the softer weathered rock beneath it. Ppm Parts per million, the same as grams per tonne. Mineral Resource An estimate of the metal in the ground. Measured and Indicated are its more confident categories. Mineral Reserve The part of a resource that at least a pre-feasibility study shows can be mined economically. Proven and Probable are its categories. NI 43-101 The Canadian standard for reporting mineral projects. ASX companies report under the JORC Code instead. Definitive feasibility study The most detailed study of a project, done before a decision to build a mine. Competent Person The qualified professional who signs off on the technical information in an ASX release. Open-file report An explorer’s report to the state government. It becomes public once the licence it covers is given up. Pyroxenite and peridotite Ultramafic rocks made mostly of the minerals pyroxene and olivine. Diorite A grey igneous rock of intermediate composition, between granite and the mafic rocks. Metasediment A sedimentary rock changed by heat and pressure. Pulp The fine powder left after a drill sample is crushed and ground for assay. Explorers sometimes store it. References and sources Each source carries an identifier, [R1] to [R6], which appears in the text where the source is used. FIG. 01 and FIG. 02 are reproduced from the Rimfire release. FIG. 03 is a Samso map of Rimfire’s targets, traced from the release’s Figure 2. FIG. 04 is a Samso chart of the labels on Rimfire’s Figure 1. [R1] Rimfire Pacific Mining, “Rimfire builds its 100% owned scandium footprint”, ASX release, 20 October 2026, 5 pages. [R2] ASX, Rimfire Pacific Mining (RIM) announcements page and its market data feed, last close and shares on issue, read 20 October 2026 before the open. [R3] Scandium International Mining Corp, company website, read 20 October 2026. [R4] Scandium International Mining Corp, “Scandium International Mining Initiates an Update of Its Definitive Feasibility Study at Nyngan Scandium Project”, news release dated 16 June 2026 in North America (17 June in Australia), as republished by Stock Titan. [R5] Geological Survey of New South Wales, DIGS open-file report library. Reports read by Samso include R00010280 (BHP Minerals, EL2124, 1984), R00008047 and R00008048 (Helix Resources, EL3064, 1988 and 1989), RE0014464 (Australian Consolidated Gold Holdings, EL8730, 2020), RE0005419 (Jervois Mining, EL7664, 2014), RED240092 (Jervois Mining, EL6009), RE0003585 (Platina Resources, EL7838, 2012) and RE0011544 (New Age Resources, EL8737). 87 reports and title documents in all, read October 2026. [R6] Geological Survey of New South Wales, statewide magnetic image (total magnetic intensity, reduced to the pole), drillhole database and title layers, public geoscience web services, read 20 October 2026. Cover photo. Bogan River aeromagnetic image, Rimfire Pacific Mining, ASX release, 20 October 2026, Figure 2, page 4. The Samso Way – Seek the Research Here at Samso, we pride ourselves on delivering content for investors that is independent and informed by over three decades of experience in the industry. Our content is well-researched and is only created if I see merit in discussing the company's story. Our mission is simple. Cut through the noise and spotlight what matters. Genuine stories, grounded insights, and real opportunity. Investors can explore our four core platforms: Coffee with Samso Samso Insights Samso News Samso Research There may be numerous paths to success in investing, but the common thread among successful individuals is that they remain committed to making informed decisions. Equip yourself with the right knowledge and tools, and you will be well on your way to achieving your financial goals. Most importantly, investors need to be absolutely diligent in understanding their own risk-reward tolerance and capabilities. Never bite off more than you can chew. As they say, Rome wasn't built in a day, and the Great Wall stood because it took centuries to complete. The Samso Philosophy: Stay curious. Stay sharp. And remember, digging deeper always uncovers the real value. 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Readers should consider obtaining advice from a licensed financial adviser and should conduct their own research before making any investment decision. Samso and its associates may hold interests in companies mentioned. Read full Disclaimer. About Samso Samso is a trusted platform that equips dedicated investors with up-to-date industry knowledge and insights from top CEOs and thought leaders. By staying informed on business advancements and market trends, investors can enhance their financial decisions through a combination of expert guidance and their own research. Coffee with Samso, Samso Insights, Samso News and Samso Research are four ways into the same work. Interviews, long-form research, short takes on announcements and company-specific studies. Every one of them is about how to think about investing rather than what to buy. Samso Insights | www.samso.com.au | An Investor Lens on ASX-Listed Companies Samso News is independent research commentary for general information only. 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Samso Market Update | Wednesday, 21 October 2026 | Market close 4:30pm AEDT On the ASX today, the S&P/ASX 200 closed up 14.4 points, or 0.16%, at 8,831.3. NEXTDC (ASX: NXT) fell 41.7% to A$5.35 on its first day of trading since Friday, on the day it cut its FY27 guidance. The ASX 200 was down 0.24% at its low of 8,795.9 at about 1:00pm AEDT and finished higher. The All Ordinaries, which tracks the 500 largest listed companies, rose 0.14% to 8,956.6. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries, an index of the companies ranked 101 to 300 by size, rose 0.11% to 3,153.7. This morning's pre-market edition is below. Tuesday's editions are at ASX today, Tuesday 20 October 2026, and Monday's are at ASX today, Monday 19 October 2026. ASX today: Key Highlights The ASX 200 rose 0.16% to 8,831.3. Communication services was the best sector, up 2.23%, and information technology the worst, down 3.32%. NEXTDC (ASX: NXT) fell 41.7% to A$5.35 on turnover, the dollar value of shares traded, of A$247.8 million, on the day it cut its FY27 revenue and earnings guidance over a power delay at its M3 Melbourne data centre. Telix Pharmaceuticals (ASX: TLX) fell 7.87% to A$14.52 on the day it reported September quarter revenue of US$245 million, up 19% on a year earlier and down 1% on the June quarter. Energy Technologies (ASX: EGY) rose 130% to A$0.046 on the day its subsidiary Cogenic signed a binding heads of agreement, a document setting out the main terms of a deal, with SYNCH for purchase orders of up to US$10 million. More shares fell than rose. Of the 1,499 companies that traded and have a market value on the ASX, 514 rose, 591 fell and 394 were unchanged. Reserve Bank deputy governor Andrew Hauser spoke in Sydney before the open. Market Index reported that market pricing, the chance of a rate rise implied by interest rate futures, moved to 41% for November, from 27% before his remarks. NEXTDC's guidance cut and the fall in technology shares Information technology fell 3.32%, the weakest of the 11 sectors (Yahoo Finance data). NEXTDC is in that sector. Xero (ASX: XRO) rose 5.02% to A$64.42 and WiseTech Global (ASX: WTC) rose 2.92% to A$39.77. NEXTDC told the ASX at 8:35am AEDT that Jemena, the electricity distributor, had suspended parts of the network works needed for the next increase in grid supply to its M3 Melbourne data centre. NEXTDC said Jemena attributed the suspension to community and stakeholder opposition and the absence of local council consent. NEXTDC cut its FY27 net revenue guidance to A$475 million to A$500 million, from A$615 million to A$640 million. It cut its underlying EBITDA guidance to A$245 million to A$265 million, from A$385 million to A$410 million. EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. The new guidance leaves out the affected M3 contracts. NEXTDC also cut its capital expenditure guidance to A$4.5 billion to A$5.0 billion, from A$5.25 billion to A$5.75 billion. It said it will eliminate all material discretionary capital expenditure and announce the outcome of a review of its spending by its annual meeting on 20 November 2026. NEXTDC went into a trading halt on Monday morning, so its last trade before today was at A$9.18 on Friday 16 October. Market Index reported at 10:34am that the shares had fallen 42% in early trade. They closed at A$5.35. On Samso's arithmetic from the ASX market value at Friday's close, that is a fall in market value of about A$2.9 billion. Market Index reported at 11:20am that engineering contractors working on data centres also fell. Southern Cross Electrical Engineering (ASX: SXE) closed down 7.06% at A$3.95 and SKS Technologies Group (ASX: SKS) down 3.62% at A$6.12. Banks, telcos and utilities rose, and miners fell, Market Index reported at 2:10pm. Financials rose 0.96% and communication services 2.23%. Telstra (ASX: TLS) rose 1.89% to A$4.85. National Australia Bank (ASX: NAB) rose 1.86% to A$39.93, Westpac (ASX: WBC) 1.14% to A$35.53, Commonwealth Bank (ASX: CBA) 0.91% to A$157.01 and ANZ (ASX: ANZ) 0.62% to A$39.22. Materials fell 1.04%. BHP (ASX: BHP) fell 1.61% to A$58.54 and Rio Tinto (ASX: RIO) 1.48% to A$152.55. Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST) rose 1.79% to A$25.06 on the day it reported September quarter gold sales of 363,891 ounces and kept its FY27 guidance unchanged. The Reserve Bank and the November meeting Reserve Bank deputy governor Andrew Hauser spoke at a Citi investment conference in Sydney before the open. The ABC reported that he said the bank's rate rises "are laying pain on top of pain" for many households. Market Index reported at 12:38pm that market pricing for a rate rise at the November meeting moved to 41%, from 27% before his remarks. Blue Chips (above A$1 billion) Samso's four size bands use market value at Tuesday's close, or at the last trade for a company that was halted. They are not the S&P/ASX indices of the same names. Gainers. Metals X (ASX: MLX) rose 5.94% to A$1.695 and Mesoblast (ASX: MSB) 5.68% to A$1.86, each with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Service Stream (ASX: SSM) rose 5.63% to A$2.25 on the day of its annual meeting. Beach Energy (ASX: BPT) rose 5.49% to A$0.96 on turnover of A$17.8 million. It released its first quarter activities report, and its partner Omega Oil & Gas said drilling had started at Canyon North-1 in Queensland, a well in which Beach holds 25%. EBOS Group (ASX: EBO) rose 5.04% to A$17.08 on the day of its annual meeting. Xero (ASX: XRO) rose 5.02% to A$64.42 on turnover of A$56.8 million, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Fallers. NEXTDC (ASX: NXT) fell 41.7% to A$5.35, as set out above. Telix Pharmaceuticals (ASX: TLX) fell 7.87% to A$14.52 on turnover of A$63.6 million. It reported September quarter group revenue of US$245 million, up 19% on a year earlier and down 1% on the June quarter, and said it expects FY2026 revenue and other income above US$1 billion. Southern Cross Electrical Engineering (ASX: SXE) fell 7.06% to A$3.95, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Zimplats Holdings (ASX: ZIM) fell 4.99% to A$13.53 on turnover of A$185,000, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Reliance Worldwide Corporation (ASX: RWC) fell 4.87% to A$4.30 on turnover of A$77.7 million. Its only announcement was a notice that AustralianSuper had raised its holding to 16.18%, from 14.68%. PDI Gold (ASX: PDI) fell 4.66% to A$3.89 on the day it released its annual meeting notice. Mid Caps (A$500 million to A$1 billion) Gainers. Vulcan Steel (ASX: VSL) rose 10.61% to A$5.63 on turnover of A$645,000, on the day of its annual meeting. AVITA Medical (ASX: AVH) rose 5.56% to A$3.99. Its only announcement set 6 November as the date for its third quarter results. Viridis Mining and Minerals (ASX: VMM) rose 5.11% to A$3.50. On Tuesday evening, MUFG and Morgan Stanley each lodged a notice of a change in a substantial holding, meaning a holding of 5% or more. Aura Consolidated Group (ASX: AXQ) rose 4.72% to A$3.55, Meteoric Resources (ASX: MEI) 4.65% to A$0.225 and Alpha HPA (ASX: A4N) 3.66% to A$0.425. None of the three had an ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Fallers. BMC Minerals (ASX: BMC) fell 10.45% to A$2.40 on turnover of A$95,000, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Brazilian Rare Earths (ASX: BRE) fell 7.75% to A$1.725, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. It fell 4.83% on Tuesday. Symal Group (ASX: SYL) fell 5.43% to A$2.61. 29Metals (ASX: 29M) fell 4.84% to A$0.295 on the day it released its September quarterly report. Turaco Gold (ASX: TCG) fell 4.67% to A$0.715 and SHAPE Australia (ASX: SHA) 4.10% to A$6.78. Symal, Turaco and SHAPE had no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Small Caps (A$150 million to A$500 million) Gainers. Omega Oil & Gas (ASX: OMA) rose 12.23% to A$0.78 on turnover of A$1.8 million. At 8:55am it said drilling had started at Canyon North-1 in the Taroom Trough, the first well for a joint venture in which it holds 45% and is the operator. It expects results in about four weeks. Actinogen Medical (ASX: ACW) rose 11.63% to A$0.048. It said its XanaMIA Alzheimer's disease trial had reached database lock, the point at which the trial data are final and cannot be changed, and that topline results are now expected in mid-November. Whiterock Lithium Corp (ASX: WLC) rose 8.81% to A$3.21 on turnover of A$53,000 and Acusensus (ASX: ACE) 8.72% to A$1.185, each with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Smart Parking (ASX: SPZ) rose 7.81% to A$0.69 on the day it said it expects no material impact from a new UK private parking code of practice. Corporate Travel Management (ASX: CTD) rose 7.52% to A$3.29, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. It rose 23.4% on Tuesday, the day it said IATA, the global airline industry body, had released its A$65 million security guarantee. Fallers. Mastermyne Group (ASX: MYE) fell 12.50% to A$0.56, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. It fell 11.1% on Tuesday. Mayfield Group Holdings (ASX: MYG) fell 9.74% to A$1.575 on turnover of A$9.1 million. Its only announcement was the result of its annual meeting held on Tuesday, where every resolution passed. Cettire (ASX: CTT) fell 8.33% to A$0.385 and Orthocell (ASX: OCC) 7.69% to A$0.60, each with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. BLS Pharmaceuticals (ASX: BLS) fell 7.50% to A$0.925 on the day it released a quarterly activities update. Gateway Mining (ASX: GML) fell 7.35% to A$0.063, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Micro Caps (below A$150 million) Gainers. Energy Technologies (ASX: EGY) rose 130% to A$0.046, from A$0.02, on turnover of A$998,000. At 9:33am it said its subsidiary Cogenic had signed a binding heads of agreement with SYNCH, a one-year framework under which SYNCH may place orders worth up to US$10 million for Cogenic's smart glasses once a proof-of-concept trial is accepted. LinQ Minerals (ASX: LNQ) rose 40.5% to A$0.52 on turnover of A$3.0 million. At 4:52pm on Tuesday it reported what its geologists saw in the core from its first hole at Gidginbung South, at the Gilmore Project in New South Wales. These are visual observations, not laboratory assays, which it expects in six to eight weeks. The company said it believes the hole has discovered a potentially large high-sulphidation epithermal and porphyry system, two kinds of deposit that can carry gold and copper. Firebird Metals (ASX: FRB) rose 40.0% to A$0.14, Western Ridge Resources (ASX: WRX) 33.3% to A$0.06 and Critical Resources (ASX: CRR) 25.0% to A$0.01, from A$0.008. None of the three had an ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. At prices this low, a small move is a large percentage, and Critical Resources rose by 0.2 of a cent. Avecho Biotechnology (ASX: AVE) rose 21.4% to A$0.017. In reply to an ASX price query, a letter asking a company to explain an unusual price move, it said it was not aware of any information that could explain the trading. Fallers. Saluda Medical (ASX: SLD) fell 20.9% to A$0.265. It announced a voluntary field action, a notice to doctors about a possible fault in devices already supplied, for some Evoke spinal cord stimulators. It said 26 complaints had been reported among about 3,900 implanted devices over more than two years. It said it does not expect the action to have a material effect on its operations. Parkway Corporate (ASX: PWN) fell 15.8% to A$0.008, from A$0.0095, on the day it proposed a share consolidation, which combines existing shares into fewer shares. Felix Gold (ASX: FXG) fell 15.6% to A$0.135, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. InfraGreen Group (ASX: IFN) fell 14.4% to A$0.565 on the day of a buy-back update and an investor conference presentation. Apollo Minerals (ASX: AON) and Vanadium Resources (ASX: VR8) each fell 13.3% to A$0.039, with no ASX announcement since Tuesday afternoon. Commodities and Currency Prices were taken between 4:22pm and 4:33pm AEDT (Yahoo Finance data) and are compared with this morning's edition. December gold futures were at US$4,140.60 an ounce, down from US$4,142.50. December copper futures were at US$6.61 a pound, down from US$6.62. December Brent crude futures were at US$110.23 a barrel, up from US$109.12 and 1.3% above Tuesday's settlement of US$108.79. December West Texas Intermediate crude futures were at US$99.00 a barrel, up from US$98.18. Iron ore was at US$91.15 a tonne at about 3:35pm AEDT, up 0.05%, according to the ABC News market snapshot. The Australian dollar was buying 70.18 US cents at 4:33pm AEDT, up from 70.07 US cents at 8:45am AEDT. Samso Concluding Comments The ASX 200 rose 0.16% to 8,831.3, after a low of 8,795.9 at about 1:00pm. NEXTDC fell 41.7% on its first day of trading since its halt, and information technology was the weakest sector. Banks and Telstra rose, and BHP and Rio Tinto fell. Of the companies that traded, 591 fell and 514 rose. General information only. This is not financial advice. Samso Market Update | Wednesday, 21 October 2026 | Pre-market 9:45am AEDT Futures point to a higher open on the ASX today. ASX 200 futures were up 0.4% at 8,866 points at about 8:20am AEDT, according to the ABC News market snapshot. A futures contract is an agreement to buy or sell at a set price on a later date, and its price is used as a guide to where the index will open. The 0.4% rise is measured on the futures contract, not against Tuesday's index close. The ABC linked the expected rise to "a mostly positive finish for US stocks, with the Dow gaining 1%". The Australian dollar was buying approximately 70.1 US cents at 8:45am AEDT (Yahoo Finance data). The S&P/ASX 200 closed on Tuesday at 8,816.9, down 28.8 points or 0.33%. The All Ordinaries, which tracks the 500 largest listed companies, fell 0.35% to 8,944.2. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries, an index of the companies ranked 101 to 300 by size, fell 0.87% to 3,150.2. Tuesday's editions are at ASX today, Tuesday 20 October 2026, and Monday's are at ASX today, Monday 19 October 2026. ASX today: Key Highlights ASX 200 futures were up 0.4% at 8,866 at about 8:20am AEDT (ABC News). The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 1.02% on Tuesday and the S&P 500 rose 0.28%. The Nasdaq Composite was down 0.02%. NEXTDC told the ASX at 8:35am AEDT that it has cut its 2027 financial year guidance because of a delay to the power supply at its M3 Melbourne data centre. It had been in a trading halt since Monday. The Nikkei 225 fell 1.30% in Tokyo on Tuesday. Silver futures rose 2.05% and copper futures rose 1.19%. Gold futures fell 0.42%. Wall Street overnight Wall Street finished mostly higher on Tuesday. The Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 529.85 points or 1.02% to 52,495.88. The S&P 500 rose 21.84 points or 0.28% to 7,712.57. The Nasdaq Composite fell 6.07 points or 0.02% to 26,424.82. The Russell 2000, an index of smaller US companies, rose 1.65% to 2,773.42 (Yahoo Finance data). Reuters, in a report published at 4:30pm New York time, said investors were rotating out of technology shares into other parts of the market, with defensive sectors such as real estate and utilities outperforming. It reported that the S&P 500 healthcare sector reached a record high, with gains in Eli Lilly, UnitedHealth, Merck, Johnson & Johnson and Amgen. Reuters said 3M rose after it expanded a data centre partnership with Amazon and raised its full-year profit forecast. General Motors fell after it warned of pressure from higher commodity costs and lower truck sales. SpaceX and Netflix reported after the close. The ABC reported that SpaceX's third-quarter revenue rose 161% to US$14.58 billion, against an estimate of US$12.72 billion (LSEG data), and that its shares rose 2.5% in extended trading. Netflix shares were down approximately 6% in extended trading at about 5:45pm New York time (Yahoo Finance data). The US 10-year Treasury yield was at approximately 5.12% late in the New York session, down about 2 basis points from Monday (Yahoo Finance data). A Treasury is a US government bond. A bond yield is the yearly return from buying a government bond at today's price and holding it until it is repaid, and when yields rise, bond prices fall. A basis point is one hundredth of a percentage point. Japan and Asia The Nikkei 225 closed on Tuesday at 64,075.42, down 841.28 points or 1.30% (Yahoo Finance data). The US dollar was buying approximately 158.14 yen at 8:46am AEDT, down from approximately 158.45 yen at the same time on Tuesday. Hong Kong's Hang Seng closed at 23,867.74, down 1.32% from its previous session on Friday. The Shanghai Composite rose 0.12% to 3,735.37. London and Europe London's FTSE 100 closed on Tuesday at 10,733.00, down 31.70 points or 0.29% (Yahoo Finance data). Germany's DAX fell 0.06% to 25,304.42. France's CAC 40 fell 0.38% to 7,838.49. The UK releases its September consumer price inflation figures at 7:00am London time today, which is 5:00pm AEDT (Office for National Statistics). Currencies The Australian dollar was buying approximately 70.1 US cents at 8:45am AEDT, up from approximately 69.8 cents at the same time on Tuesday (Yahoo Finance data). The US dollar index, which measures the US dollar against six major currencies, was at approximately 101.71 at 8:36am AEDT, down 0.27% from Monday's close. The euro was at approximately US$1.124 and the British pound at approximately US$1.338. Commodities Brent crude futures for the front-month contract, the one that falls due soonest, were at US$109.12 a barrel late in the session, down 0.4% from Monday's settlement (Yahoo Finance data). Reuters reported that Brent touched a five-month high during the day, with traders weighing Houthi attacks on Saudi infrastructure and reports of attacks on vessels in the Gulf. West Texas Intermediate, the US oil benchmark, was at US$98.18 a barrel for December delivery, down 0.4%. The November WTI contract settled at US$101.09, down 2.5%. Gold futures for December were at US$4,142.50 an ounce, down 0.42% (Yahoo Finance data). Silver futures for December rose 2.05% to US$58.14 an ounce. Copper futures for December rose 1.19% to US$6.616 a pound. Iron ore was at approximately US$91.15 a tonne, up 0.1%, according to the ABC News market snapshot (prices at about 8:20am AEDT). Today's diary All times AEDT. 8:19am. Northern Star Resources reported September quarter gold sales of 363,891 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost, the full cost of producing gold and keeping the mines running, of A$3,217 an ounce, and kept its FY27 guidance unchanged. Its conference call is at 10:30am. 8:35am. NEXTDC cut its FY27 net revenue guidance to A$475 million to A$500 million, from A$615 million to A$640 million, and its underlying EBITDA guidance to A$245 million to A$265 million, from A$385 million to A$410 million. EBITDA is earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. The company said the electricity distributor Jemena has suspended parts of the network works that M3 needs, and that it now expects the next increase in grid supply during FY28. NEXTDC said it has removed the affected M3 contracts from guidance. It had A$8,675 million of liquidity at 30 September 2026. 8:36am. Telix Pharmaceuticals reported third-quarter group revenue of US$245 million, up 19% on the same quarter last year. Before the open. The ABC reported at 8:14am that Reserve Bank deputy governor Andrew Hauser was due to speak at a fireside chat in Sydney within the hour. 9:30am. NEXTDC holds an investor briefing on the guidance revision. 11:30am. The Australian Bureau of Statistics adds updated labour force microdata to its DataLab. It has no other releases scheduled today (ABS release calendar). 5:00pm. UK consumer price inflation for September. Samso Concluding Comments ASX 200 futures were up 0.4% at about 8:20am AEDT. On Tuesday the Dow rose 1.02% and the S&P 500 0.28%. NEXTDC returns from its trading halt today with lower FY27 guidance, and Northern Star and Telix have also reported this morning. Reserve Bank deputy governor Andrew Hauser was due to speak in Sydney before the open, the ABC reported. General information only. This is not financial advice.

Alice Queen Limited (ASX: AQX) is a gold company with a market value of about A$14 million. Its study values the Horn Island Gold Project in the Torres Strait at A$706 million before tax, at a gold price of A$6,000 an ounce [R1]. We are writing now because gold in Australian dollars is back at about that level, drilling has just finished, and on 6 October 2026 the company said its founder and managing director is leaving [R8]. This piece looks at why the market values it so far below its study. All prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 19 October 2026. Global prices for gold and the Australian dollar were updated at 2.55am Perth time on 20 October 2026. The Alice Queen Story and the Horn Island Gold Project Horn Island sits off the tip of Cape York in Far North Queensland (FIG. 01). The company says gold was mined there from 1894 to about 1920 and from an open pit in 1987 to 1989. The old site is now in the Queensland Government's abandoned mine lands program [R2][R1].

Blood tests that look for early signs of cancer are now on sale in Australia, paid for by the patient. This Samso Insight sets out how the tests work, what the largest trials have shown, and the evidence, sales and funding of BCAL Diagnostics (ASX: BDX), which sells them in Australia.

Part 1 set out why China's slowdown looks structural, not cyclical. Part 2 asks a narrower question. If that reading is right, where has the money already gone? The answer is not where most people look. Over the last two and a half years the commodity China buys has gone sideways, and the commodities China controls have repriced by between 60 per cent and nine times. This piece follows that split into the ASX and TSX companies on either side of it, and sets out what each of them has actually reported. Samso Insights Macro & Geopolitical China Critical Minerals READING THE SERIES This piece runs in two parts. Part 1. Sets out the macro case. Japan's precedent, China's property crisis, its debt structure, the population decline and the AI-jobs tension arriving at the same time. Part 2, this piece. Looks at where the capital is actually flowing. The tungsten, tin, copper and iron ore producers on either side of China's role in each market, measured against what they have actually reported. A note on the vocabulary and the sources. Technical and mining terms are explained in plain English where they first appear. All of them are also collected in one box near the back, under "The vocabulary, in plain English". Every source carries an identifier, from [R51] onward, continuing the numbering used in Part 1. The identifier appears in the body text at the point the source is used and again at the head of its entry in "References and sources" at the back. Clicking one takes you to the other. Two policies on numbers apply throughout. Where a company's own documents give two different figures for the same thing, this article quotes both as they were published and names the document each came from. It does not attempt to resolve them. Where this article builds a calculation from released data instead of repeating a company statement, it says so at that point and labels it as Samso's own arithmetic. Simple percentage shares worked out from published tonnages are Samso's arithmetic throughout and are not labelled separately each time. Commodity prices and share prices move daily. Every price below carries the date it was observed. There is a habit in resources investing of treating China as one thing. China slows, commodities fall. China recovers, commodities rise. That reading worked for most of the last twenty years because China's role in almost every commodity market was the same role, which was the buyer. That is no longer true across the board, and the price record shows it. Iron ore, where China is by far the largest buyer and mines only about a ninth of world output itself, fell about 29 per cent between January 2024 and August 2026, and almost all of that fall came in 2024. Since the start of 2025 it has moved about 3 per cent. Tin has roughly doubled since January 2024. The annual benchmark fee a copper smelter charges a miner has gone to zero, and spot terms have gone below it. Tungsten, where China mines about four-fifths of world supply, has repriced by close to nine times since the start of 2025, which is as far back as a dated price for it can be sourced. Those are not four different stories about Chinese demand. They are one story about who holds the supply. This article works through it commodity by commodity, then names the ASX and TSX-listed companies that are on the receiving end, and sets out what each of them has actually reported. WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS 1.00 THE QUESTION PART 1 LEAVES OPEN What the macro case does and does not tell an investor about where to look. 2.00 THE PRICE THAT DID NOT BREAK Iron ore over thirty-one months, and why China's slowdown did not show up in it. 3.00 THE PRICES THAT DID Tungsten, tin and copper, and the difference between being a buyer and being a supplier. 4.00 TUNGSTEN AND THE EXPORT LICENCE What China's February 2025 measure actually does, and the one ASX producer with two operating mines. 5.00 TIN AND A SUPPLY BASE THAT HAS NOT COME BACK Myanmar, Indonesia, and a Tasmanian mine that is half owned. 6.00 COPPER SMELTERS WITHOUT CONCENTRATE Why the processing fee went to zero, and a small producer in Oman. 7.00 THE OTHER KIND OF CHINA EXPOSURE A TSX-listed producer where the China link is on the share register, and where the auditor has flagged a going concern uncertainty. 8.00 IRON ORE AND THREE ANSWERS TO ONE PROBLEM What Fortescue, Rio Tinto and BHP are each spending money on. 9.00 WHAT AN INVESTOR IS ACTUALLY BUYING Samso's reading, and what would have to change for it to be wrong. 1.00 — THE QUESTION PART 1 LEAVES OPEN A macro case is not a shopping list Part 1 made an argument about the shape of China's next decade. It did not make an argument about any particular company, and that gap is deliberate. A macro case tells an investor which direction to face. It does not tell them what to own. The case in short. To the general public, China's property crisis has run since 2021 and is unresolved. Its local government debt is far harder to measure than Japan's ever was. Its population has peaked and its working-age population is falling. Beijing is already legislating against AI-driven job losses while Washington is still debating whether to. Japan took three decades to recover from a similar starting point, and Japan had advantages China does not have. While the property crisis hit the limelight in 2021, cracks in China's growth were already manifesting in the last decade. While it was not apparent to the mainstream audience, my communication with business associations in China had already told me that things were not going well. The first sign of economic tightness was the demise of the furniture manufacturing sector. There were mass reductions in factories and closures were more common than not. Even in 2025, associates were telling me that Chinese businesses were so competitive that margins were not sustainable. Chinese business was seeking to find markets outside of China to allow them to have margins that made sense. Suppose all of that is right. An investor still has to answer a second question, which is what any of it means for a listed company in Perth or Toronto. Answering that second question badly is a common way to lose money on a correct macro call. The method used here was to check the price record first, before choosing a single company or a sector. That produced a different list from the one a search for China-recovery or China-decline beneficiaries would have produced. 2.00 — THE PRICE THAT DID NOT BREAK Thirty-one months of iron ore China made 960.8 million tonnes of the world's 1,849.4 million tonnes of crude steel in 2025, which is 52 per cent[R81], and mined about eleven per cent of world usable iron ore output in the same year[R94]. It buys the difference, which makes it the dominant customer in the seaborne market. On a plain reading of Part 1, a China in structural difficulty should show up in the iron ore price before it shows up anywhere else. It has not, or at least not in the way that reading would predict. The World Bank publishes a monthly average for iron ore fines of 62 per cent iron content delivered to China, which is the benchmark most of the industry quotes[R80]. In January 2024 that average was US$135.82 a dry tonne. In August 2026 it was US$96.30. Between those two points the series never went below US$92.30, which was June 2025, and never went above US$135.82. FIG. 01 sets that move against three other commodities. It is drawn from the start of 2025 and not from January 2024, because that is the first date on which a dated price can be sourced for all four, and the start and end value of each series is printed beside its bar. FIG. 01 — Iron ore has fallen slightly since the start of 2025 while copper, tin and tungsten have risen, tungsten by close to nine times. The four are shown as percentage change and not price so they can be read on one scale. Measured from January 2024 instead, iron ore is down about 29 per cent. The start of 2025 is used here because it is the first date all four series can be sourced. Original Samso illustration of sourced data. Iron ore from World Bank monthly averages, copper and tin from London Metal Exchange cash settlements, tungsten from the United States Geological Survey and the China Tungsten Industry Association. A fall from roughly US$136 to roughly US$96 is a real fall and it should not be dismissed. What it is not is a collapse, and it is not the kind of move a market makes when it decides a structural buyer is in trouble. The Edge Singapore headlined "Iron ore tops US$100 on position unwinds and China buying hopes" on the 7th September 2026[R102]. Although this is only one case, this does feel that a structural demise in iron ore is not a simple process. China produced 960.8 million tonnes of crude steel in 2025, down 4.4 per cent on 2024, against a world total of 1,849.4 million tonnes [R81]. For January to July 2026 China produced 577.04 million tonnes, down 3.1 per cent on the same period a year earlier[R82]. So Chinese steel output is falling, at roughly three to four per cent a year. That is a decline, and it is a decline from a very high base. BHP's published view is that the level is the more important number. Section 8.00 sets out BHP's position and where it disagrees with Part 1. China's slowdown has shown up in iron ore as a soft price. The market has not broken. An investor who bought the iron ore trade as a way of expressing a view on China's economy has, over thirty-one months, been roughly right about the economy and roughly nowhere on the price. 3.00 — THE PRICES THAT DID What happens when China is the supplier and not the buyer Three other commodities moved a great deal over the same period, tin and copper from January 2024 and tungsten from January 2025, which is as far back as a dated tungsten price can be sourced. What they have in common is that China's weight in each of them is on the supply side. Tungsten Tungsten is a hard, very dense metal used mainly to make cutting tools, drill bits, mining and machining equipment, and armour-piercing ammunition. It is traded in a unit called the metric tonne unit, or mtu, which is ten kilograms of tungsten trioxide content. The most quoted product is ammonium paratungstate, or APT, which is the intermediate chemical that most tungsten metal is made from. China mined 67,000 tonnes of tungsten content in 2024 and an estimated 67,000 tonnes in 2025, against world totals of 82,000 and 85,000 tonnes[R51]. That is roughly 82 per cent of world mine supply in 2024 and roughly 79 per cent in 2025. China also holds about 2.5 million tonnes of the 4.7 million tonnes of world reserves. The US Geological Survey records the Rotterdam APT price rising from US$331 a metric tonne unit at the start of 2025 to US$675 by the end of it [R51]. The China Tungsten Industry Association, which publishes a weekly European APT assessment, had that price at US$1,890 to US$1,998 on 6 March 2026 and at US$2,900 to US$3,000 on 31 August 2026[R53]. Fastmarkets, a price reporting agency, assessed APT at US$900 to US$940 in early January 2026 and at US$1,650 to US$1,900 in mid-February 2026[R54]. FIG. 02 plots the APT price across 2025 and 2026 with the February 2025 export measure marked. FIG. 02 — The European ammonium paratungstate price from January 2025 to the end of August 2026, with the date of China's export licence measure marked. Where a source publishes a range, the midpoint is plotted. Original Samso illustration of sourced data, from the United States Geological Survey, the China Tungsten Industry Association and published Fastmarkets assessments. Taking the USGS figure at the start of 2025 and the CTIA figure at the end of August 2026, APT has gone from about US$331 to about US$2,950. That is roughly nine times. No verifiable dated APT price is available for calendar 2024, because the USGS publishes only the concentrate series for that year, so the comparison starts in January 2025 and no earlier. Tin Tin is used mostly as solder in electronics, and in tinplate and chemicals. China mined 71,000 tonnes of tin content in 2025 and Indonesia 61,000 tonnes, out of a world total of about 290,000 tonnes[R59]. Between them that is roughly 45 per cent of world mine supply. Five Chinese companies alone produced 152,600 tonnes of refined tin in 2025, which is 41 per cent of world refined output of 371,000 tonnes[R60]. That last percentage is Samso's arithmetic on the USGS figures. The London Metal Exchange cash settlement price for tin was US$25,150 a tonne on 2 January 2024. On 11 September 2026 it was US$53,755[R61]. The 2026 average to the end of August was US$51,355, against US$30,191 for 2024. Copper Copper is different again. China mines very little copper, about 1.8 million tonnes in 2025 against a world total of roughly 23 million tonnes, which is about eight per cent [R94]. But China smelts about half of the world's copper. The International Copper Study Group puts Chinese smelter production at 12 million tonnes in 2024, or 51 per cent of the global total, and refined production at 12.4 million tonnes, or 45 per cent[R68]. The International Energy Agency states the same thing in round terms, that China accounts for around 50 per cent of global copper smelting output, up from about 15 per cent in 2005[R69]. The USGS puts Chinese refinery production at 14,000 kilotonnes of a world total of 29,000 kilotonnes in 2025, which is about 48 per cent [R94]. Smelting and refining are different stages and the two shares are not interchangeable. LME copper cash settlement was US$8,430 a tonne on 2 January 2024 and US$14,238.50 on 11 September 2026[R67]. The 2026 average to the end of August was US$13,301, against US$9,147 for 2024. FIG. 03 sets China's share of mine supply against its share of smelting for each of these commodities. Each bar carries the year of the figure behind it, because they do not all come from the same year. FIG. 03 — China's estimated share of world supply in 2025. The two copper bars are the same metal at different stages, mining and refining, and the distance between them is what section 6.00 is about. Original Samso illustration of sourced data, from the United States Geological Survey and the International Copper Study Group. The percentages are Samso's arithmetic on the published tonnages. So one commodity where China is the buyer has gone sideways to slightly down, and three where China is either the dominant supplier or the dominant processor have gone up by between roughly 60 per cent and roughly nine times. SAMSO TAKE In my opinion this is the part that most commentary on China gets the wrong way round. The usual framing is that a slowing China is bad for Australian resources, full stop. That framing was built during the period when China's only role in these markets was to buy. It has not been updated for the period we are actually in, where China is also the chokepoint on the way in. What the last two and a half years appear to show is that the market has stopped pricing Chinese demand as the main variable and started pricing Chinese supply as the main variable. Those two things pull in opposite directions for an Australian investor. One of them argues for less exposure and the other argues for more. I am not saying the demand story has gone away. Iron ore is still the biggest export Australia has and China is still the customer. What I am saying is that a portfolio built only on the demand reading is missing the half of the market that has actually repriced. 4.00 — TUNGSTEN AND THE EXPORT LICENCE A measure from February 2025 that was never withdrawn On 4 February 2025 China's Ministry of Commerce and its General Administration of Customs issued Announcement No. 10 of 2025[R52]. It took effect the day it was released. The measure covers tungsten, tellurium, bismuth, molybdenum and indium, and on the tungsten side it covers APT, tungsten oxide, non-controlled tungsten carbide, certain solid tungsten shapes, two tungsten alloy families, and the production technology and data behind them. The measure requires an exporter to apply to the relevant commercial department for permission before shipping, and approval is granted case by case. There is no stated prohibition in the announcement itself and no country carve-out. A licence regime and a ban are different things, and the difference shows up in the trade data. Chinese tungsten product exports for January and February 2026 were 1,638.60 tonnes, down 34.33 per cent on the same two months a year earlier, while the value of those exports rose 62.76 per cent [R53]. Less material left China, at a much higher price. One further measure is an outright ban. On 6 January 2026 the Ministry of Commerce prohibited exports to Japan of dual-use items destined for military end use, expressly including APT, tungsten oxide and tungsten carbide. That was reported by Fastmarkets on 9 January 2026 [R54]. The reason to separate these two is that most of China's October 2025 export control package, including the extraterritorial rule on rare earth magnets, was suspended until 10 November 2026 following the Busan meeting between the two presidents. The February 2025 tungsten licence was not suspended. It is the standing regime[R95]. WHAT A METRIC TONNE UNIT IS Tungsten is priced in metric tonne units, written mtu. One mtu is ten kilograms of tungsten trioxide, WO₃, contained in the material being sold. So a price of US$3,000 per mtu is a price for ten kilograms of contained tungsten trioxide, not for a tonne of anything. A concentrate grading 65 per cent WO₃ contains 65 mtu in every tonne. Company production figures in this section are quoted in mtu because that is how the companies report them. The APT price in FIG. 02 and the realised price a producer reports are both quoted per mtu, and they are not the same thing. APT is a refined chemical. A mine sells concentrate, which is paid on its contained tungsten trioxide at a discount to the APT price and usually on a lagged pricing period. So a producer realising less per mtu than the APT assessment of the same week is normal, and the gap is not a shortfall against the market. THE OTHER EXPLANATION FOR THE TUNGSTEN PRICE Supply is not the only thing that could move tungsten nine times in twenty months. Tungsten goes into armour-piercing ammunition and into the machine tools that make almost everything else, and European and Asian defence budgets have been rising through the same period. A demand shock and a supply restriction would both produce the chart in FIG. 02. The difference matters to an investor because the two causes behave differently. A price held up by consumption lasts as long as the consumption does. A price held up by a restriction on supply lasts as long as the restriction does, and it can be undone by a change of policy that arrives without warning. Two things in the record point at supply as the larger part. The first is the shape of the export data. Chinese tungsten product exports for January and February 2026 were 1,638.60 tonnes, down 34.33 per cent on the same two months a year earlier, while the value of those exports rose 62.76 per cent [R53]. Set one against the other and the average price of a tonne of exported Chinese tungsten rose to roughly two and a half times its level a year earlier. That is Samso's arithmetic on the association's figures. Less material left China and buyers paid far more for what did leave. A demand boom on its own would not usually produce that. A higher price is an incentive to sell more, so a producer facing a surge in orders and no restriction would be expected to ship more tonnes, not fewer. The second is the gap between the price inside China and the price outside it, and the way that gap has widened. At the end of March 2026 the two were close. Chinese domestic APT was about RMB 1.48 million a tonne, renminbi being China's currency. European APT was US$2,800 to US$3,150 per mtu, which the China Tungsten Industry Association converts to RMB 1.713 million to RMB 1.927 million a tonne[R99]. The seaborne price stood above the domestic one by something like a sixth to a third. That is Samso's arithmetic on the association's published figures. Five months later they had come apart. At the end of August 2026 Chinese domestic APT was about RMB 600,000 a tonne, and European APT was US$2,900 to US$3,000 per mtu, which the same association converts to RMB 1.725 million to RMB 1.785 million a tonne[R100]. The seaborne price had barely moved over those five months, while the Chinese domestic price had fallen by about sixty per cent. Chinese high-grade tungsten concentrate fell on the same path, from above RMB 1 million a standard tonne in early March to about RMB 415,000 to RMB 420,000 at the end of August [R99][R100]. In a single connected market a gap of that size does not usually last. Material moves from the cheap side to the expensive side until the difference is no more than the cost of shipping it. A gap of roughly three times, held for months, is the mark of a market that material cannot move freely across. That is an argument about which cause is larger. It is not a claim that defence demand plays no part, and Samso has not seen a source that separates the two. FIG. 04 draws the two prices side by side at the two dates. The seaborne bar is the European assessment converted into renminbi by the association that publishes both series, so the two are on the same footing. FIG. 04 — Ammonium paratungstate inside China and outside it, at the end of March 2026 and the end of August 2026. The European price is converted into renminbi by the same association that publishes both series, and the band on each seaborne bar is the range it publishes. Original Samso illustration of sourced data, from the China Tungsten Industry Association monthly market reviews for March 2026 and August 2026. EQ Resources (ASX: EQR) EQ Resources Limited is the ASX-listed tungsten producer with two operating mines[R55]. Mt Carbine is in North Queensland, inland and north-west of Cairns, and is wholly owned. Barruecopardo is in Salamanca Province in Spain, held through a wholly owned subsidiary and acquired in January 2024. A third Queensland asset, Wolfram Camp, is at mining lease application and drilling stage and is not producing. FIG. 05 shows where the two mines are. FIG. 05 — The locations of EQ Resources' two operating mines. Mt Carbine is inland from Port Douglas and Cairns in North Queensland. Barruecopardo is in Salamanca Province in western Spain, near the Portuguese border. Other tungsten operations in each district are marked with their owners. Company maps reproduced from EQ Resources Limited, Investor Presentation, 14 July 2026, slide 8, with attribution [R96]. Two panels of that slide are shown side by side, and the accompanying photographs and data tables are not reproduced here. The company's reported numbers over the last five quarters show the price move arriving in a profit and loss account. For the March 2026 quarter EQR produced 23,505 mtu of tungsten trioxide across the two mines, sold 23,592 mtu, and realised an average price of US$962 per mtu sold, at a nominal cash cost of US$572 per mtu sold [R55]. For the June 2026 quarter it produced 28,315 mtu and realised an average of US$1,875 per mtu at a cost of US$711 per mtu. The realised price nearly doubled in one quarter. FIG. 06 sets those two quarters side by side. FIG. 06 — EQ Resources' realised tungsten price against its reported nominal cash cost, for the two most recent reported quarters, on a group basis covering both mines. Original Samso illustration of data reported by EQ Resources in its quarterly activities reports for the March and June 2026 quarters. PLATE 01 — The northern area of the Barruecopardo open pit and its temporary sump, with mining under way on Phase 6 at 645 metres elevation. The photograph was taken on 8 July 2026, days after the operation regained access to the flooded southern pit. Photograph reproduced from EQ Resources Limited, Quarterly Activities Report for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, page 4, with attribution [R55]. PLATE 01 is the company's photograph of the Barruecopardo pit in early July 2026, taken as the operation returned to full production after flooding earlier in the year. The revenue line follows. EQR reported statutory revenue of A$66,082,006 for the year ended 30 June 2025, with a loss after tax of A$39,307,079[R56]. For the half year ended 31 December 2025 it reported revenue of A$43,958,030 and a loss after tax of A$6,964,961. For the June 2026 quarter alone it reported revenue of about A$79 million [R55]. August 2026 was stronger again. For that single month the company reported A$55.1 million of revenue on group production of 19,068 mtu and group sales of 17,246 mtu, at an average realised price of US$2,269 per mtu[R57]. That is the second highest monthly production the company has recorded, behind 20,838 mtu in September 2024, and it is a realised price about 21 per cent above the June quarter's US$1,875. The release carries the company's own footnote that the figures are subject to final assays and reconciliation, and it was issued on the authority of the board by Craig Bradshaw, Managing Director. Several counterweights stand beside those figures. The quarterly and monthly revenue figures are unaudited. The June quarter carries the company's footnote that year-end procedures identified an administrative error in invoices to a specific customer, with the potential to increase revenue by US$12.2 million. The audited full-year result for the year ended 30 June 2026 had not been published as at 15 September 2026, so no audited figure yet covers the ramp-up. There is also a regulatory matter in Spain. On 10 July 2026 the Territorial Service of Industry, Commerce and Economy of Salamanca issued a notice of partial non-compliance with the restoration mining plan at Barruecopardo, relating to water management. Operations continued and the company assessed the risk of temporary suspension as low [R55]. There is also a discrepancy in the company's published resource figures, and Samso's policy is to state it and leave it there. Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves reported by ASX companies are governed by the JORC Code, which requires a stated effective date and a named Competent Person, so a figure quoted without one is not a JORC statement. On that test the company's published resource figures do not agree with each other. TABLE 01 sets out what each document says. TABLE 01 — EQ Resources Mineral Resource figures as published in each document. Every figure is quoted as released and none is reconciled here. Compiled by Samso from the documents named in the last column. Asset Tonnes Grade Effective date given Document Mt Carbine 41.4 Mt 0.23% WO₃ None Investor Presentation, 14 July 2026, footnoted to the 2025 Annual Report Mt Carbine 41.70 Mt 0.23% WO₃ 30 June 2024 Most recent figure carrying a stated date Barruecopardo 22.9 Mt 0.20% None Investor Presentation, 14 July 2026, slide 8 Barruecopardo 21.49 Mt Not stated None Investor Presentation, 14 July 2026, slide 14 Barruecopardo 24.37 Mt 0.195% 9 November 2023 Most recent figure carrying a stated date Both presentation figures are footnoted to the 2025 Annual Report [R96], and that Annual Report contains Ore Reserve tables and no Mineral Resource table [R56]. Slide 8 and slide 14 of the same deck also disagree with each other. All of it is quoted as published, and resolving the difference belongs to the company. The Ore Reserve position is clearer. Mt Carbine carried a Probable Ore Reserve of 14.80 Mt at 0.147 per cent WO₃ for 2,178,765 mtu at 30 June 2025 [R56]. Barruecopardo carried Proved and Probable Ore Reserves of 13.87 Mt at 0.136 per cent for 1,890,888 mtu effective 30 June 2025, a 39 per cent increase on the previous statement, estimated independently by Mining Sense Global SL at a US$450 per mtu price assumption[R58]. The realised price in the June 2026 quarter was US$1,875 per mtu, against that US$450 assumption. Ownership is simple at the project level and carries obligations at the sales level. EQR consolidated Mt Carbine to 100 per cent in July 2024 by acquiring CRONIMET's remaining 50 per cent of the retreatment joint venture, and in doing so assumed obligations under an offtake agreement covering 25,000 tonnes of tungsten concentrate [R56]. CRONIMET retains a marketing role for Barruecopardo production and takes a 1 per cent net marketing fee over five years, which is a direct deduction from the Spanish operation's proceeds. A five-year offtake with Elmet Technologies LLC was executed in November 2024. A prepayment facility of A$25 million with Traxys was opened in the March 2026 quarter [R55]. The company also has an expansion at Mt Carbine costing A$39 million, approved on 3 June 2026, which is intended to take crushing capacity from about 1 million tonnes a year to about 2 million, with full plant acceptance targeted for March 2027 [R55]. Cash on hand was A$28.0 million at 30 June 2026, against A$1.87 million at 30 June 2025. On 15 September 2026 EQR signed a binding agreement to take 10 per cent of a processing joint venture over the Springer Tungsten Complex in Nevada [R103]. The Elmet Group holds 70 per cent and operates it, and Blue Moon Metals holds 20 per cent and retains the mine and mill. The complex carries a 1,200 tonne per day mill and an APT plant designed for 4,000 tonnes a year. The package runs to between US$150 million and US$175 million, with Elmet contributing US$150 million and a further US$25 million standby facility supporting the restart. EQR has committed 4,000 tonnes of contained tungsten trioxide over eight years from commissioning, and takes 25 per cent of plant input capacity for the first five years, capped at 1,000 tonnes a year, falling to 10 per cent after that. APT is the point where China's February 2025 licence regime applies, and the Springer plant is designed to make APT in the United States with the US Department of War as sponsor. The mine and mill restart is targeted for the December 2027 quarter and the APT plant for the second half of 2028. Those are the company's targets and neither is built. 5.00 — TIN AND A SUPPLY BASE THAT HAS NOT COME BACK Myanmar, Indonesia and a Tasmanian mine that is half owned The tin price has roughly doubled since the start of 2024 and the reason appears to be principally on the supply side. Myanmar is the clearest case. The Man Maw mining district in Wa State was described by the International Tin Association as about ten per cent of world tin concentrate supply, and mining there was suspended from 1 August 2023[R62]. A partial resumption in January 2024 specifically excluded tin. In February 2024 the Wa authorities imposed a 30 per cent tax in kind on tin concentrate exports while the suspension stayed in place. The ban was lifted in March 2025, and restart has been slow. Contained tin output ran at about 630 tonnes a month from May to October 2025 and about 1,300 tonnes a month in November and December 2025. In February 2026 the authorities added a 5 per cent fee on concentrate from initial ore batches to cover dewatering costs, on top of the existing 30 per cent tax in kind [R62]. The USGS numbers show the result. Myanmar produced 20,000 tonnes of tin content in 2024 and an estimated 12,000 tonnes in 2025, a fall of 40 per cent [R59]. Indonesia has had its own disruption. A change in the export licensing regime in early 2024 left January 2024 Indonesian tin exports at 400 kilograms, a fall of about 99 per cent on January 2023, with only one company confirmed as approved [R62]. In October 2025 the Indonesian president formally handed six confiscated tin smelters, roughly half the country's refined capacity, to the state-owned producer PT Timah. Globally, refined tin production was 371,000 tonnes in 2025 against consumption of 389,000 tonnes, so the market ran an 18,000 tonne deficit, up 126 per cent on the 8,000 tonne deficit in 2024 [R60]. Excluding China, the balance flipped from a 2,100 tonne surplus in 2024 to a 6,700 tonne deficit in 2025. FIG. 07 plots the LME tin price with the Myanmar restart marked. FIG. 07 — London Metal Exchange tin, cash settlement, at selected dates from January 2024 to September 2026. The marker is the month the Wa State authorities lifted the Man Maw mining ban. Original Samso illustration of sourced data, from London Metal Exchange official cash settlement prices. Metals X (ASX: MLX) Metals X Limited holds a 50 per cent participating interest in the Renison tin operation in Tasmania, 15 kilometres north-east of Zeehan on the west coast[R64]. Metals X publishes Renison production figures on a 100 per cent basis, so its own share of any production number is half of the figure the quarterly report shows. The other 50 per cent is held by YT Parksong Australia Holdings Pty Ltd, which traces up through Yunnan Tin Hong Kong to Greentech Technology International Limited and Yunnan Tin Group. Greentech's Hong Kong listing was cancelled with effect from 24 August 2026 [R64]. Metals X separately holds about 3.11 per cent of Greentech, an investment it remeasured to nil at 31 December 2025 for want of observable market evidence of a recoverable value. FIG. 08 shows the Renison locality and the surrounding tenements. PLATE 02 shows the underground workings, which is where the ore comes from. FIG. 08 — The Renison tin operation on the west coast of Tasmania, with the Federal and Argent faults, the Ringrose deposit and the surrounding exploration licences marked. The inset locates Renison between Zeehan and Burnie. Company map reproduced from Metals X Limited, 2026 Annual General Meeting Presentation, 19 May 2026, slide 11, with attribution [R97]. Map panel only. The accompanying text panel is not shown. PLATE 02 — Underground development at Renison. Metals X presents this photograph on the slide describing the Renison tin operation. Renison is an underground mine, so the ore in the piece comes from workings like these and not from an open pit. Photograph reproduced from Metals X Limited, 2026 Annual General Meeting Presentation, 19 May 2026, slide 10, with attribution [R97]. Renison produced 2,809 tonnes of tin in concentrate in the June 2026 quarter on a 100 per cent basis, of which Metals X's share was 1,405 tonnes[R63]. Ore milled was 183,755 tonnes at 1.95 per cent tin with a mill recovery of 78.55 per cent. C1 cash cost was A$20,251 a tonne of tin and all-in sustaining cost was A$34,865 a tonne. Statutory revenue was A$204,729,000 for the half year ended 30 June 2026, up 38.76 per cent on the previous corresponding half, with profit after tax of A$103,905,000 [R64]. Metals X has a 31 December year end, so that is a half year. For the year ended 31 December 2025 revenue was A$284,999,000 with profit after tax of A$104,605,000[R65]. Metals X reports its pricing against the LME three-month price and not the cash settlement used elsewhere in this piece. On that basis the average over the June 2026 half was US$50,453 a tonne against US$32,194 in the previous corresponding half. THE NUMBER AN INVESTOR SHOULD NOT USE Metals X publishes a figure it calls "imputed revenue", which for the June 2026 quarter was A$207.40 million. That is not Metals X revenue. It is a notional 100 per cent-of-Renison figure, calculated as the imputed LME tin price applied to an assumption that all quarterly production was sold and paid for by quarter end. Metals X's own 50 per cent share of imputed revenue for that quarter was A$103.70 million [R63]. Imputed EBITDA and imputed net cash flow are constructed the same way. Quoting A$207.4 million as the company's quarterly revenue would overstate it by a factor of two. The statutory figures are A$204.7 million for the half year to 30 June 2026 and A$285.0 million for the year to 31 December 2025. Cash and cash equivalents were A$374.00 million at 30 June 2026, up A$14.92 million in the quarter after paying A$28.14 million of income tax and investing A$17.54 million in Stellar Resources and A$2.07 million in Tanami Gold [R63]. About A$285 million of that was in short-term deposits at roughly 4.85 per cent. The company describes itself as debt-free. Metals X has also been buying positions in other listed resource companies. It holds 29.95 per cent of the tin developers First Tin Plc, 16.39 per cent of Stellar Resources and 15.91 per cent of Elementos, and 7.43 per cent of the nickel and cobalt company NICO Resources, alongside A$36.00 million of Cyprium Metals convertible notes [R63]. On reserves, the 2025 Renison Ore Reserve update gave Proved and Probable reserves of 7.505 Mt at 1.37 per cent tin for 102,700 tonnes of contained tin, reported on a 100 per cent basis, of which Metals X's share is half, effective 31 March 2025, down 8.5 per cent in contained tin year on year [R63]. The 2026 Mineral Resource update, released on 29 June 2026 and using data to 31 March 2026, gave a total of 49.3 Mt at 0.85 per cent tin for 419,600 tonnes contained, on a 100 per cent basis[R66]. That total is two different things added together. Renison Bell, the underground mine, is 21.8 Mt at 1.38 per cent tin for 300,300 tonnes of contained tin. Rentails, the tailings retreatment resource, is 27.5 Mt at 0.43 per cent tin for 119,000 tonnes and is unchanged from the 2024 statement. The blended 0.85 per cent should not be read as a mine grade. “Renison is a world class tin deposit and Australia’s largest primary tin producer. The results from the 2026 Mineral Resource represent the ongoing definition and resource drilling and updated modelling assumptions. We have again been able to more than replenish what we have mined. This was achieved in spite of limited access to drilling platforms in the A5 and Leatherwood areas.” Brett Smith, Executive Director, Metals X Limited, ASX release of 29 June 2026 [R66] Two things in that statement are worth separating. Replenishing what has been mined is a claim the numbers support, since Measured and Indicated tin tonnes rose 7 per cent to 264,100 tonnes while Inferred tonnes fell 19 per cent to 36,000 tonnes [R66]. The limited access to drilling platforms is the company naming its own constraint, and it says the platforms are in this year's budget. Neither statement is a reserve, and the Ore Reserve update is the thing to wait for. There is currently no published Rentails Ore Reserve. Metals X withdrew it on 2 April 2024 pending completion of a definitive feasibility study update, stating at the time that a material change was not anticipated [R66]. Rentails requires unanimous joint venture approval for a final investment decision, expected in calendar 2027. An updated Renison life-of-mine plan and Ore Reserve were expected in the third quarter of calendar 2026 and had not been published as at 7 September 2026. 6.00 — COPPER SMELTERS WITHOUT CONCENTRATE The processing fee that went to zero Copper separates the two roles cleanly, because the Chinese buying and the Chinese processing can each be measured on their own. A copper miner sells concentrate, which is crushed and floated ore containing roughly 25 to 30 per cent copper. A smelter turns that concentrate into blister or anode copper. A refinery turns that into cathode metal. Each charges the miner a fee for its step. The smelter's fee is the treatment charge, or TC, quoted per dry tonne of concentrate. The refinery's is the refining charge, or RC, quoted per pound of payable copper. When concentrate is plentiful the fee is high, because miners compete for smelter capacity. When concentrate is scarce the fee falls, because smelters compete for material. The benchmark fee is negotiated annually between a large miner and a large smelter. For 2025 contracts Antofagasta and Jiangxi Copper settled at US$21.25 a tonne, a fall of about 73 per cent on the 2024 settlement of roughly US$80[R70]. On 19 December 2025 Antofagasta agreed a 2026 benchmark of US$0.00 a tonne with a Chinese smelter, which Reuters and the International Energy Agency both describe as the lowest ever agreed. The IEA records the same settlement [R69]. Spot terms have gone further. The Shanghai Metals Market imported copper concentrate index reached minus US$102.84 a dry metric tonne on 15 May 2026, reported on 19 May, the first time the index had gone below minus US$100[R71]. A negative treatment charge means the smelter pays the miner for the concentrate. The fee has reversed direction. FIG. 09 plots the benchmark treatment charge from 2024 to 2026 alongside the spot index. FIG. 09 — The annual benchmark copper treatment charge for 2024, 2025 and 2026, with the May 2026 spot index shown below the line. A negative figure means the smelter is paying the miner. Original Samso illustration of sourced data. Benchmark settlements as reported by S&P Global Commodity Insights and Reuters, spot index from Shanghai Metals Market. The cause is a mismatch between where copper is mined and where it is smelted. Global refinery capacity reached 32.6 million tonnes in 2024, a figure that includes electrowinning capacity taking no concentrate at all, while capacity utilisation ran at 84.3 per cent [R68]. China holds about half of the smelting and about eight per cent of the mining [R94]. A country that processes half the world's copper and digs up a twelfth of it has to buy the difference, and the price of buying it has now gone past the point where the processing itself is free. For a copper miner, a benchmark of zero is the lowest annual treatment charge ever agreed, which is how both Reuters and the IEA describe it, and spot terms have since gone further. It is also why an investor looking for the Chinese slowdown in the copper price will not find it. LME copper was US$14,238.50 a tonne on 11 September 2026 against US$8,430 on 2 January 2024 [R67]. One caution on a figure that circulates. The IEA states copper briefly exceeded US$14,500 a tonne intraday in January 2026 [R69]. The highest LME cash settlement in January 2026 was US$13,844, on 29 January [R67]. An intraday spike is not captured by settlement data, so the two are not necessarily in conflict, but the US$14,500 figure should be attributed to the IEA and not presented as a settlement price. Alara Resources (ASX: AUQ) Alara Resources Limited is a copper-gold producer in the Sultanate of Oman[R72]. Its producing asset is the Al Wash-hi Majaza mine and concentrator in the Al-Kharis area, in Wilayat Al-Mudhaibi. Alara holds 51 per cent of Al Hadeetha Resources LLC, and that company owns the mine. Al Hadeetha Investment Services LLC holds 30 per cent and Al Tasnim Infrastructure LLC holds 19 per cent. The subsidiary's cash is ring-fenced, and the company says so itself. Its Appendix 5B, the quarterly cash flow statement the ASX requires it to lodge, states for the June 2026 quarter that cash inflows are almost exclusively inflows into Al Hadeetha Resources, and that those inflows "are not available for use by Alara (as a separate entity) for its own purposes" [R72]. The company also states it will need to conduct one or more capital raisings before subsidiary dividends begin. PLATE 03 — The Al Wash-hi Majaza open pit in Oman at 30 June 2026, looking across the benches to the surrounding hills. Mining had reached the 365 metre level by the end of the financial year. Photograph reproduced from Alara Resources Limited, Quarterly Activities Report for the June 2026 quarter, page 4, with attribution [R72]. PLATE 03 is the company's photograph of the Al Wash-hi Majaza pit at the end of June 2026. Production has reached and passed nameplate. The company announced on 19 March 2026 that the mine was running 6.4 per cent and the concentrator 6.1 per cent above nameplate on a financial year to date basis [R72]. Its managing director put it this way. “Reaching and surpassing nameplate capacity is a testament to the dedication, expertise, and collaboration of our entire team. This milestone not only demonstrates the strength of our operations but also reinforces our confidence in the long-term potential of our flagship Al Wash-hi Majaza Copper project. We remain focused on maintaining consistent performance, optimizing efficiencies, and delivering sustainable value for our stakeholders.” Atmavireshwar Sthapak, Managing Director, Alara Resources Limited, ASX and media release of 19 March 2026 [R72] That statement carries no number in it, and the release's own numbers are on a financial year to date basis over a six-month average. On a single quarter the picture is tighter. In the June 2026 quarter mill feed reached 266,979 tonnes against a target of 272,000 tonnes, which the company reports as 98.2 per cent of its quarterly target [R72]. Running above nameplate across a financial year and running slightly under target in a quarter are both true, and they are different measures. For the June 2026 quarter it reported run-of-mine production of 293,611 wet tonnes. The head grade of 0.87 per cent copper the company gives alongside it is a full-year FY2026 average and not a quarterly figure, milled 266,979 tonnes and produced 10,902 wet metric tonnes of concentrate. It sold 11,169 wet metric tonnes containing about 2,077 tonnes of copper and 1,556 ounces of gold, which the company reports as its highest quarterly shipment. A further 4,399 wet metric tonnes were waiting at Sohar Port for vessel allocation at quarter end, because of shipping disruption in the region. Revenue was A$55,874,583 for the half year ended 31 December 2025, against A$19,005,668 in the previous corresponding half[R73]. For the year ended 30 June 2025 revenue was A$55,122,260 with a loss for the year of A$19,027,128[R74]. Receipts from customers for the twelve months to 30 June 2026 were A$119,220,000, which is cash received and not revenue. The statutory result for the year ended 30 June 2026 had not been lodged as at 7 September 2026. Several counterweights stand beside those production figures. Copper sales run under an offtake agreement with Trafigura covering the full copper and gold concentrate production of the mine for a term of eight years and two months from the start of concentrate production in May 2024 [R74]. Revenue is booked at 90 per cent of a provisional price. TABLE 02 sets out the borrowing position. TABLE 02 — Alara Resources group facilities, drawings and cash. Compiled by Samso from the June 2026 quarterly report and Appendix 5B and from the half-year financial report. Item Amount As at Facilities available A$145,275,000 30 June 2026 Drawn against them A$123,757,000 30 June 2026 Cash A$27,340,000 30 June 2026 Working capital Negative A$11,426,983 31 December 2025 The largest facility is a Sohar International Bank loan to Al Hadeetha Resources with a principal limit of about A$139.82 million, secured by mortgage over the subsidiary's plant, land and buildings [R72]. The facility and cash figures come from the June 2026 quarterly and its Appendix 5B, and the working capital figure from the half-year report [R73]. There is also unresolved litigation. Legal proceedings were served on the subsidiary by nearby residents in December 2025, seeking suspension of activities and invalidation of licences. The Primary Court of Ibra dismissed all substantive claims on 10 June 2026 with costs to the plaintiffs, and the claimants lodged an appeal on 3 July 2026, with a hearing scheduled for early November 2026 [R72]. Royalty rates for the mine are still under negotiation with the Omani mining authorities and are being provisioned for. On resources, the published estimate rests on work completed in 2016. Al Wash-hi Majaza carried Indicated and Inferred Mineral Resources of 13.80 Mt at 0.86 per cent copper and 0.21 grams per tonne gold effective 30 June 2025, with a Probable Ore Reserve of 8.38 Mt at 0.88 per cent copper [R74]. The company states that these estimates derive from technical work completed in 2016 and have been updated only for mining depletion since. An independent external audit, the first since those studies, was under way with revised statements expected by the end of the first quarter of financial year 2027. 7.00 — THE OTHER KIND OF CHINA EXPOSURE The China link is on the share register, and the going concern note is on the accounts Eastern Platinum Limited, which trades as Eastplats on the Toronto Stock Exchange under ELR and on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange under EPS, was researched for this article as a chrome-into-Chinese-stainless-steel story. The company's filings do not support that description. It stays in this piece because what its filings do show is a China exposure of a kind the market rarely prices. Chrome concentrate is smelted into ferrochrome, and ferrochrome is what goes into stainless steel. China is the dominant producer of both, so a chrome concentrate producer is, in principle, a way of holding Chinese industrial demand, at one remove and on the same mine-versus-smelter split this piece draws for copper. Eastplats does disclose a China link, in one sentence in its Annual Information Form. "The product is being exported, mostly to China"[R75]. The same sentence appears in the previous year's document. The Annual Information Form names no Chinese customer, carries no China-specific risk factor, and attaches no figure to that sentence. The larger point about the framing is that the chrome business has largely gone. Eastplats splits its revenue between chrome concentrate and platinum group metal concentrate, and the split has moved a long way in three years[R76]. TABLE 03 gives that split. TABLE 03 — Eastplats revenue by product, in US dollars, as reported in the company's audited financial statements and its half-year statements. Compiled by Samso from the filings cited in this section. Period Chrome concentrate PGM concentrate Total Year to 31 December 2023 101,752,000 (95.1%) 5,192,000 (4.9%) 106,944,000 Year to 31 December 2024 54,459,000 (87%) 8,048,000 (13%) 62,507,000 Year to 31 December 2025 21,652,000 (35%) 39,934,000 (65%) 61,586,000 Six months to 30 June 2026 4,425,000 (20%) 17,331,000 (80%) 21,756,000 FIG. 10 draws the same four periods as a single picture. The chrome share falls away and the platinum group metal share replaces it. FIG. 10 — Eastplats revenue by product across three full years and the most recent half year. The final bar covers six months and is not comparable in size with the three years above it. The China story in this company turned out not to be in its revenue mix. Chrome did not fall because Chinese demand fell, it fell because the tailings ran out. Original Samso illustration of data reported by Eastern Platinum Limited in its audited financial statements and its half-year statements. The percentages are Samso's arithmetic. The reason for the change is not Chinese demand. It is that the material ran out. Eastplats produced its chrome by re-mining an old tailings storage facility at the Crocodile River Mine, which is on the western limb of the Bushveld Complex about eight kilometres south of Brits in North West Province, South Africa [R75]. A tailings storage facility is where the finely ground waste from earlier processing was dumped, and modern equipment can recover metal from it that the original plant missed. That facility was fully processed and the retreatment operation ceased on 17 March 2025. Chrome is now a by-product of the underground ore being mined for platinum group metals. Eastplats today sells 80 per cent of its revenue as platinum group metal concentrate, and it sells all of it to Impala Platinum Limited in South Africa under an evergreen offtake agreement entered into on 30 April 2006 [R75]. PLATE 04 — The Zandfontein plant at the Crocodile River Mine from the air, with the company's own labels on each part of the circuit. The two large thickeners at left and the milling and flotation buildings in the centre handle the underground ore that now supplies most of the company's revenue. Annotated aerial photograph reproduced from Eastern Platinum Limited, Investor Presentation, April 2026, slide 16, with attribution [R98]. PLATE 04 shows the Zandfontein plant at the Crocodile River Mine, with the processing circuits labelled by the company. The China link in this company is on the share register and in the loan book. Ka An Development Co. Limited holds 100,421,000 shares, or 49.0 per cent of the 204,941,426 shares outstanding, as at the date of the Annual Information Form of 31 March 2026[R78]. Changyu Liu, of Tianjin, is chairman of Ka An and has been chairman of Eastplats since June 2022. On 6 August 2026 the company announced that Mr Liu would become interim president and chief executive with effect from 13 August 2026[R79]. Ka An is also the lender, holding two secured credit facilities with a combined maximum limit of C$2.0 million, each secured by a charge over the company's chrome production and related proceeds [R76]. Mr Liu holds four positions at once. Mr Liu chairs Eastplats, chairs its largest shareholder, runs the company as interim chief executive, and controls the entity lending it money against its own production. Each of those appointments is disclosed. On Samso's reading, the effect of them together is that the parties on both sides of those loan agreements are no longer independent of each other. That is control and financing, and it carries different risks from a customer relationship. Eastplats was not approached for comment, and this account rests on the company's own filings and its June 2026 information circular. WHAT THE AUDITOR SAID Eastplats' financial statements for the year ended 31 December 2025 carry a material uncertainty related to going concern. The auditor, Davidson & Company LLP, records cash of US$177,000, a working capital deficit of US$56,936,000, an operating loss of US$21,555,000 and cash used in operations of US$5,542,000 [R76]. The audit opinion itself was not modified. By 30 June 2026 cash was US$362,000 and the working capital deficit had widened to US$67,981,000, against total current liabilities of US$114,445,000[R77]. The largest single item in those liabilities is US$53,711,000 of contracts payable to Union Goal Offshore Solutions Limited, the former chrome offtaker, which is in arbitration. The underground restart is also behind its own plan. Run-of-mine production for 2025 was 283,365 tonnes against a plan of 713,400 tonnes, which is 40 per cent of target [R75]. The stated goal is 70,000 tonnes a month by the end of 2026, a figure that appears in the company's April 2026 investor presentation. The Annual Information Form's own 2026 plan is up to 514,363 tonnes of underground ore for the year, which is about 43,000 tonnes a month. Both are quoted as published. The first half of 2026 delivered 106,798 tonnes, or about 17,800 tonnes a month. Two further items are quoted as published, following Samso's policy on discrepancies. The company's own management discussion for 2025 gives an operating loss of US$24,478,000 in its narrative and US$21,555,000 in its tables, the latter agreeing with the audited statements and the results release. And the corporate presentation of 22 April 2026 gives a Proved and Probable split of 3.95 Mt at 3.58 grams per tonne and 10.63 Mt at 3.72 grams per tonne, where the Annual Information Form gives 2.282 Mt at 4.75 grams per tonne and 12.298 Mt at 3.48 grams per tonne [R98]. The totals agree at 14.58 Mt and 1.72 million ounces. The splits do not. 8.00 — IRON ORE AND THREE ANSWERS TO ONE PROBLEM What Fortescue, Rio Tinto and BHP are each spending money on Iron ore is the one commodity here where China is still purely the buyer, and its price has not moved. So the question for the three majors is not what China does next. It is where each of them is putting money, and on what belief. Part 1 set out the grade problem. Standard Pilbara ore runs about 56 to 62 per cent iron. The direct reduction route to steelmaking, which is the lower-emissions route when the reductant is hydrogen made with low-carbon power, has conventionally needed a pellet feed of roughly 67 per cent iron. That figure and its sources are set out in Part 1 and are not repeated here. Simandou in Guinea, which began shipping in December 2025, carries Ore Reserves of 0.2 billion tonnes at 66.4 per cent iron and 1.3 billion tonnes at 65.0 per cent, and its first half 2026 sales averaged 65.8 per cent iron[R87]. One thing has changed since Part 1 was written. On 12 June 2026 Rio Tinto and China Baowu published the results of completed industrial-scale trials, concluding that "typical mid-grade ores mined in Western Australia's Pilbara region can be used as hydrogen-based direct reduction feedstock"[R88]. The route ran through a 5 million tonne a year grate-kiln for pelletising and then a 1 million tonne a year hydrogen-based shaft furnace, with a smelting test in a 500 kilogram electric furnace. That does not retire the 67 per cent figure, which remains the conventional direct reduction pellet feed specification. What it does is move the argument from chemistry to cost. Pilbara ore can be fed into a direct reduction furnace. The question is what the extra steps cost and who pays for them. Mid-grade ore has to be pelletised first, and the reduced iron it makes then has to be melted in an electric smelting furnace rather than the electric arc furnace that higher-grade feed allows. FIG. 11 sets the grades against that specification. FIG. 11 — Iron content for standard Pilbara ore and for Simandou, against the roughly 67 per cent pellet feed specification the direct reduction route has conventionally needed. The dashed line is the specification, not a measurement. The Pilbara and Simandou sales figures are shipped product grades, the Simandou reserve figures are in-situ grades. Grade is what decides whether Pilbara ore can go into a low-emissions furnace at all, and so what the three majors have to spend on. Original Samso illustration of sourced data. Pilbara and direct reduction grades are as set out in Part 1 of this series. Simandou grades from Rio Tinto's disclosure. Each of the three majors has answered the same problem differently, and the capital they have each committed says more than the language in their sustainability reports. TABLE 04 sets the three approaches side by side, with each company's position on Scope 3 emissions, which for an iron ore miner means the carbon released when a customer turns its ore into steel and is by far the largest part of its footprint. Most Pilbara ore is hematite, which is mined and shipped much as it comes out of the ground. Magnetite is a different iron mineral, usually in lower-grade rock, which has to be concentrated first in a step called beneficiation. Beneficiation costs money and uses power, and it lifts the iron content of what is shipped. TABLE 04 — How each of the three iron ore majors is answering the grade problem. Compiled by Samso from the company documents cited in this section. Company What it is changing Capital committed Scope 3 position Fortescue The ore and the reductant, through magnetite concentrate and hydrogen About US$3.9 billion at Iron Bridge, US$50 million at Christmas Creek Net zero by 2040, stated as a target Rio Tinto The furnace, and buying higher-grade ore in Guinea US$6.2 billion Simandou share, more than A$35 million to the Calix plant No Scope 3 reduction target BHP Piloting a furnace jointly with Rio Tinto, after halting its own beneficiation plant US$1.2 billion Jimblebar plant halted at about 80 per cent design, NeoSmelt pilot at final investment decision stage Net zero Scope 3 by 2050, classified by BHP as a goal rather than a target Fortescue (ASX: FMG) is changing the ore and the reductant Its Iron Bridge magnetite operation was commissioned to produce high-grade concentrate at a nameplate of 22 million tonnes a year on a 100 per cent basis, at an original product specification above 68 per cent iron, for a total project cost of about US$3.9 billion[R83]. In the year ended 30 June 2026 it produced 9.1 million tonnes, which is about 41 per cent of nameplate, and the company booked a US$750 million pre-tax impairment against it, citing a revised ramp-up schedule and a range of production scenarios. Separately, its Christmas Creek green metal plant, announced in August 2024 at a cost of US$50 million with a stated capacity of more than 1,500 tonnes a year of green iron and a target of first production in 2025, announced first hot metal on 19 August 2026[R85]. That is about a year later than planned, and no cumulative tonnage has been disclosed. Fortescue Metals chief executive officer Dino Otranto said on 19 August 2026 that "nobody has solved green metal production using Pilbara ore at commercial scale yet. That's the challenge we're taking on" [R85]. Fortescue's 2040 Scope 3 target is intact. Its climate documents released on 20 August 2026 restate the target of net zero Scope 3 emissions by 2040[R84]. Samso has not been able to open the FY26 Climate Transition Plan itself, so the exact wording of the 2040 commitment in that document is unverified here and the target is described in the terms Fortescue has used in its earlier published statements. The green energy division has been cut back all the same. Research and development spend on the green energy pipeline fell from US$483 million in the year to June 2025 to US$232 million in the year to June 2026 [R83]. Fortescue shipped a record 201.3 million tonnes of iron ore in that year, on revenue of US$16,966 million and underlying net profit after tax of US$3.5 billion, at a hematite cash cost of US$18.74 a wet tonne and a realised price of US$91 a dry tonne. Those two are on different moisture bases and cannot be subtracted, and the cost covers hematite only while the shipment figure includes Iron Bridge. PLATE 05 is the Iron Bridge plant. The tanks and thickeners in it are the beneficiation step, which is the part that turns Pilbara ore into a concentrate a direct reduction furnace can take. PLATE 05 — The Iron Bridge magnetite plant in the Pilbara from the air. The circular thickeners at the top left, the tank cells in the centre and the conveyors at the right are the beneficiation circuit, which is the step that lifts ore to a concentrate grade a direct reduction furnace can take. Photograph reproduced from Fortescue Ltd, "Fortescue's Iron Bridge commences high grade magnetite production", company website, with attribution [R101]. Rio Tinto (ASX: RIO) is changing the furnace, and buying grade elsewhere Its Simandou share cost US$6.2 billion, of which US$1.7 billion remained at the half year to 30 June 2026 [R87]. Rio holds 53 per cent of SimFer Jersey, which holds 85 per cent of the mine company, and states an attributable capacity of about 27 million dry tonnes a year out of SimFer's roughly 60 million. Sales guidance for 2026 is 5 to 10 million tonnes on a 100 per cent basis, and actual first-half sales were 0.4 million tonnes on the same basis. At home Rio has gone the other way. On 17 November 2025 it paused its own BioIron technology, stating that "the current furnace design for BioIron requires additional development to minimise technical risks and optimise its performance", and committed more than A$35 million to Calix's demonstration plant at Kwinana instead, supplying up to 10,000 tonnes of Pilbara ore[R89]. The stated attraction of the Calix process is "elimination of ore pelletisation, and enabling the use of fines and lower-grade iron ores". Rio Tinto has no Scope 3 reduction target. Its 2025 Annual Report contains none, and its climate change page offers briefing papers and no commitment[R86]. Its Scope 1 and 2 target is to "reduce our net Scope 1 and 2 emissions by 50%" by 2030 against a 2018 baseline, and it reported 31.5 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent for 2025, which is 14 per cent below that baseline. BHP (ASX: BHP) has tried both, stopped one, and says the problem is smaller than the other two think BHP produced 265 million tonnes of iron ore on its own share basis in the year to 30 June 2026, on iron ore segment revenue of US$23,883 million and a Western Australia unit cost of US$19.66 a tonne[R90]. It plans to increase production to more than 305 million tonnes a year on a 100 per cent basis by the fourth quarter of financial year 2028. The two figures are on different bases and should not be subtracted, since the 265 million tonnes is BHP's own share and the 305 million tonne target is the joint ventures' full output. BHP has no magnetite or beneficiation project in Western Australia. It halted a US$1.2 billion beneficiation plant at Jimblebar in May 2025 after design reached about 80 per cent completion, on the grounds that the project was not well placed to compete for funding and had marginal economics. That decision was not disclosed in a BHP results release and was reported a year later, by ABC News on 26 May 2026 [R90]. BHP's remaining position on the grade problem is NeoSmelt, a pilot electric smelting furnace at Kwinana with BlueScope, Rio Tinto, Woodside and Mitsui, at 30,000 to 40,000 tonnes a year of molten iron, with a final investment decision expected in 2026[R93]. Its stated purpose is to "prove Pilbara iron ore can be used to produce lower-carbon emissions molten iron using a direct reduced iron - electric smelting furnace (DRI-ESF) pathway". BHP publishes definitions of the two words it uses for its commitments. It defines a target as "an intended outcome in relation to which we have identified one or more pathways for delivery of that outcome, subject to certain assumptions or conditions" and a goal as "an ambition to seek an outcome for which there is no current pathway(s), but for which efforts are being or will be pursued towards addressing that challenge, subject to certain assumptions or conditions"[R92]. BHP classifies its steelmaking Scope 3 commitments as goals, not targets. On its own published definition that means no current pathway has been identified, while efforts are being or will be pursued. FIG. 12 compares capital expenditure and the disclosed decarbonisation share for the three companies. FIG. 12 — Capital expenditure for each of the three iron ore majors in its most recently reported period, with the portion each company discloses as directed to decarbonisation. Ten per cent, about 1.6 per cent, and not disclosed. The periods and the scopes differ, since Fortescue's year ended 30 June 2026 and is almost all iron ore while Rio Tinto's ended 31 December 2025 and covers every commodity it mines. Original Samso illustration of data reported by Fortescue, Rio Tinto and BHP in the results releases and climate documents cited in this section. The capital figures give the clearest comparison of the three. In its most recently reported period Fortescue directed US$368 million of US$3.6 billion of capital expenditure to decarbonisation, which is about 10.2 per cent [R83]. Rio Tinto directed about US$0.2 billion of US$12,335 million, which is about 1.6 per cent [R86]. BHP does not disclose an annual decarbonisation split at all. It gives a decade-long envelope of "up to US$4 billion" of spend and commitments to financial year 2030 and folds decarbonisation into sustaining capital in period reporting [R92]. That is a disclosure gap. BHP'S PUBLISHED VIEW DISAGREES WITH PART 1 Part 1 of this series argued that China's structural position is deteriorating and that the effects are already showing. BHP's published house view says something different about steel specifically, and it is quoted here in its own words. BHP's Economic and Commodity Outlook of 18 August 2026 states that "despite the ongoing weakness in China's property market, China's steel production has remained resilient at around one billion tonnes for seven consecutive years", and that advanced manufacturing and industrial upgrading are "expected to support crude steel at roughly this level for the remainder of the decade"[R91]. The two positions can be tested against the same data. The World Steel Association has Chinese crude steel at 960.8 million tonnes in 2025, down 4.4 per cent [R81]. China's National Bureau of Statistics has January to July 2026 at 577.04 million tonnes, down 3.1 per cent [R82]. So output is falling at roughly three to four per cent a year, and it is falling from a level that is still close to a billion tonnes. Both descriptions are accurate. BHP is describing the level and this series is describing the direction. Which of the two carries more weight depends on how long a position is held, and that is a judgement each investor makes for themselves. 9.00 — WHAT AN INVESTOR IS ACTUALLY BUYING Three bets, and four companies that are neither Pulled together, the seven companies are not variations on a single theme, and treating them as one China trade would be a mistake. TABLE 05 sets out what each one rests on. TABLE 05 — The commodities in this piece, China's role in each, and the listed companies on the receiving end. Price changes are measured from the start of 2025 to the latest observation, the same basis as FIG. 01. Compiled by Samso from the sources cited in the sections above. Commodity China's role Price, start of 2025 to latest Companies in this piece Tungsten Mines about 79 per cent of world supply and licenses its export Up close to nine times EQ Resources (ASX: EQR) Tin Mines about 24 per cent, and five Chinese refiners make 41 per cent of refined output Up about 90 per cent Metals X (ASX: MLX) Copper Mines about 8 per cent and smelts about 51 per cent Up about 63 per cent, with the treatment charge at zero Alara Resources (ASX: AUQ) Chrome and platinum group metals Buyer of chrome, and in this case also the largest shareholder and the lender Not the driver here, see section 7.00 Eastern Platinum (TSX: ELR) Iron ore The buyer, and mines about 11 per cent Down about 3 per cent Fortescue (ASX: FMG), Rio Tinto (ASX: RIO), BHP (ASX: BHP) The first bet is on Chinese export policy staying where it is. That is the tungsten bet, and EQ Resources is an ASX way of holding it. The February 2025 licence regime was never suspended when the October 2025 package was, and the export and price-gap data since then point at that measure as the larger part of the cause, though no source separates it from defence demand. If that measure is relaxed, the case weakens quickly. EQ Resources realised US$962 per mtu as recently as the March 2026 quarter. Every revenue figure the company has published since its last audited accounts is unaudited, and it has an open regulatory notice in Spain. The second bet is on a supply base that is shrinking for reasons that have nothing to do with China. That is the tin bet, and Metals X is an ASX way of holding it. Myanmar, Indonesia and a global refined deficit did that, not Beijing. It is also the bet with the strongest balance sheet behind it, at A$374 million of cash and no debt, and an ownership position that gives it only half of one mine's output. The third bet is on the mismatch between where copper is dug and where it is smelted. A benchmark treatment charge of zero is the plainest of these signals to read, because it is a single negotiated number rather than an inference drawn from a price. Alara Resources is a way of holding it, with the significant qualifications that the company owns 51 per cent of the operating subsidiary, that the subsidiary's cash is not available to the parent, that A$123.76 million of debt is drawn against the subsidiary's assets, that the resource estimate rests on technical work completed in 2016, and that an appeal against the dismissal of a local legal challenge is listed for early November 2026. Iron ore is the exception in this list. It is the one commodity here where China is purely the buyer, and it is the one that has not moved. The three majors are not really a bet on the China thesis at all. They are a bet on which of three approaches to the grade problem turns out to be cheapest, and on that question BHP has committed the least capital and classifies its steelmaking commitments as goals, not targets, which on its own published definition means no pathway has yet been identified. Eastplats is in this list for a different reason. The chrome-into-China description of it was a reasonable thing to expect, and the filings do not support it. Reading the filings instead of the reputation is what caught it. It is also the company on this list carrying a going concern material uncertainty, with US$362,000 of cash against a working capital deficit of US$67.98 million at 30 June 2026. SAMSO TAKE If I had to put the whole of Part 2 into one sentence, it would be this. The market has spent two and a half years repricing who controls supply, while most of the commentary has been arguing about Chinese demand. I do not know how long that lasts. A tungsten price that has gone up nine times in twenty months is not a normal thing and I would not assume it holds. Export licensing is a policy, and policies get changed, sometimes quickly and sometimes as part of a negotiation about something else entirely. Part of what an investor is buying in EQ Resources is a bet that a Chinese ministry does not change its mind. The tin and copper positions look more durable to me, because they do not depend on a single ministry in a single country. Wa State, Jakarta and a global smelter fleet would all have to change direction at once. A mining district in Wa State that is still being dewatered and charged for the privilege, and a smelter fleet that is too large for the world's concentrate supply, are not problems that a single announcement fixes. What I keep coming back to is the question Part 1 finished on, which was whether China has a working route back and how long it takes. Nothing in the last two and a half years of price data answers that. What the price data does say is that an investor does not have to answer it in order to be positioned. The supply side has been repricing regardless. So the question I would put to a reader is this. If you have been waiting for a view on China before deciding what to do, is the thing you have actually been waiting for already priced somewhere you were not looking? The vocabulary, in plain English All-in sustaining cost (AISC). A broader cost measure than cash cost. It adds the capital needed to keep an existing mine running, so it is closer to what the operation really costs. Ammonium paratungstate (APT). The intermediate chemical that most tungsten metal is made from, and the product whose price is most often quoted for tungsten. Appendix 4C and Appendix 5B. Quarterly cash flow reports that ASX-listed companies of certain types must lodge. They show actual cash received from customers, which can differ from accounting revenue. C1 cash cost. The direct cash cost of producing a unit of metal, before capital, financing and corporate overheads. Concentrate. Crushed and processed ore with the waste rock largely removed, sold to a smelter or refinery for final processing. It is not metal. Direct reduction (DR, DRI). A way of making iron without a blast furnace, using gas or hydrogen instead of coke. It conventionally needs a higher-grade iron feed than a blast furnace does. Going concern material uncertainty. A statement in an audit report that events or conditions exist which may cast significant doubt on a company's ability to continue operating. It is not the same as an adverse audit opinion. Grade. How much of the wanted metal is in a tonne of rock, given as a percentage or in grams per tonne. JORC Code. The Australasian reporting standard for Mineral Resources and Ore Reserves. NI 43-101 is the equivalent Canadian standard. LME cash settlement. The London Metal Exchange's official daily price for immediate delivery of a metal. It is the price most commonly quoted for copper and tin. Measured, Indicated and Inferred. Confidence categories for a Mineral Resource, from highest to lowest. Only Measured and Indicated material can be converted into an Ore Reserve. Metric tonne unit (mtu). The pricing unit for tungsten. One mtu is ten kilograms of contained tungsten trioxide. Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve. A Mineral Resource is mineralisation that could reasonably be expected to become economic. An Ore Reserve is the part of it that studies have shown is economic to mine now. Magnetite and hematite. Two iron minerals. Hematite is the higher-grade ore that makes up most Pilbara production and is shipped much as it is mined. Magnetite occurs in lower-grade rock and has to be concentrated first, which costs money but produces a higher-grade product. Beneficiation. The processing step that removes waste minerals and lifts the metal or iron content of what is sold. For magnetite it is what turns a low-grade ore into a high-grade concentrate. Standard tonne. The Chinese pricing unit for tungsten concentrate. It is a tonne of material at a reference grade, not a tonne of contained metal, so a price per standard tonne is not comparable with a price per tonne of concentrate at another grade. Nominal cash cost. EQ Resources' own term, which the company defines as cost of goods sold after inventory movement. It is struck against tonnes sold and not tonnes produced, it is narrower than C1 cash cost and much narrower than all-in sustaining cost, and it is not a standard measure, so two companies using it may not mean the same thing. Provisional price. Concentrate is often invoiced before its final metal content and price are settled, so the seller books a provisional amount, here 90 per cent, and adjusts later. Run-of-mine (ROM). Ore as it comes out of the mine, before any processing, usually reported as tonnes delivered to the plant or to a stockpile. Shaft furnace and grate-kiln. A shaft furnace is the vessel in which iron ore is reduced to iron by gas or hydrogen. A grate-kiln is the equipment that turns fine ore into the pellets a shaft furnace needs. Nameplate capacity. The output a plant was designed to achieve. Actual output can run above or below it. Offtake agreement. A contract to sell future production to a named buyer, usually on agreed pricing terms and often signed before a mine is built. PGM (platinum group metals). Platinum, palladium, rhodium and related metals, usually reported together as 4E or 6E ounces. Proved and Probable. Confidence categories for an Ore Reserve, from higher to lower. Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions. Scope 1 is emissions a company produces directly. Scope 2 is from the energy it buys. Scope 3 is everything else in its value chain, including what customers do with its product. For an iron ore miner, Scope 3 is by far the largest. Tailings storage facility. Where the finely ground waste from earlier processing was dumped. Modern equipment can sometimes recover metal from it that the original plant missed. Treatment charge and refining charge (TC and RC). The fee a smelter charges a miner for turning concentrate into metal. It falls when concentrate is scarce. Wet metric tonne and dry metric tonne. Concentrate is sold with moisture in it. A wet tonne includes that moisture, a dry tonne does not, so the two are not interchangeable. References and sources Numbering continues from Part 1 of this series, which used [R1] to [R50]. Each entry carries an identifier, and the same identifier appears in the body text at the point that source is used. Clicking a marker in the body takes you to the entry, and every entry is cited at least once. Photographs reproduced here are company images from public releases and presentations, credited to the company, the document and its release date. Figures labelled FIG are Samso's own charts of data drawn from the sources named in each caption, except where a caption states that the figure is reproduced, in which case the source is credited there. Tables are compiled by Samso from the company filings cited in the surrounding text. Commodity prices, share prices and cash balances change daily and are stated as at the dates given. Every price was rechecked on 14 September 2026. The London Metal Exchange settlements for tin and copper are as at 11 September 2026, the last settlement before that date. The tungsten and iron ore series are published monthly rather than daily, so the most recent figures available are the China Tungsten Industry Association's review of 31 August 2026 and the World Bank's monthly average for August 2026. Company figures carry the date of the document they came from and do not move. Where a company's own documents give two different figures for the same thing, both are quoted as published and the document each came from is named. Resolving such differences belongs to the company and not to this article. [R51] United States Geological Survey, "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Tungsten", published 6 February 2026. [R52] Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs of the People's Republic of China, Announcement No. 10 of 2025, "Decision on Implementing Export Controls on Items Related to Tungsten, Tellurium, Bismuth, Molybdenum and Indium", 4 February 2025, as reproduced by the International Energy Agency policies database and by Shanghai Metals Market. [R53] China Tungsten Industry Association, weekly European APT price assessments and monthly export statistics compiled from China's General Administration of Customs data, 2026. [R54] Fastmarkets, published price assessments and market commentary on ammonium paratungstate, January to June 2026, including the report of 9 January 2026 on China's export prohibition to Japan. [R55] EQ Resources Limited, Quarterly Activities Report and Appendix 5B for the quarters ended 31 March 2026 and 30 June 2026. [R56] EQ Resources Limited, Annual Report 2025, released 30 September 2025. [R57] EQ Resources Limited, "Record A$55m Revenue As Production Ramp Up Continues", 2 September 2026. Gives August 2026 group production of 19,068 mtu, group sales of 17,246 mtu, revenue of A$55.1 million and an average realised price of US$2,269 per mtu, all subject to the company's footnote that the figures are subject to final assays and reconciliation. [R58] EQ Resources Limited, "Barruecopardo Mine Increases Ore Reserves By 39%", 22 October 2025. [R59] United States Geological Survey, "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Tin", published 6 February 2026. [R60] United States Geological Survey, Mineral Industry Surveys, "Tin in December 2025", published April 2026, sourcing CRU. [R61] London Metal Exchange official cash settlement prices for tin, as republished in the Westmetall price history, observed 11 September 2026. [R62] International Tin Association, reports on the Man Maw suspension and restart in Wa State and on Indonesian licensing, February 2024 to March 2026. [R63] Metals X Limited, Quarterly Report for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, released 27 July 2026. [R64] Metals X Limited, Appendix 4D and Half Year Report and Accounts for the half year ended 30 June 2026, released 28 August 2026. [R65] Metals X Limited, Annual Report for the year ended 31 December 2025, released 25 March 2026. [R66] Metals X Limited, "2026 Renison Mineral Resource Update", 29 June 2026. [R67] London Metal Exchange official cash settlement prices for copper, as republished in the Westmetall price history, observed 11 September 2026. [R68] International Copper Study Group, "The World Copper Factbook 2025". [R69] International Energy Agency, "Copper prices have hit record highs, but smelters face mounting strategic pressures", commentary, 2 March 2026. [R70] S&P Global Commodity Insights, report of the Antofagasta and Jiangxi Copper 2025 term settlement, 6 December 2024, and Reuters, report of the Antofagasta 2026 benchmark settlement, 19 December 2025. [R71] Shanghai Metals Market, Imported Copper Concentrate Index, reported 19 May 2026. [R72] Alara Resources Limited, Quarterly Activities Report and Appendix 5B for the quarter ended 30 June 2026, lodged 31 July 2026, together with the announcements of 19 March 2026, 10 June 2026 and 3 July 2026. [R73] Alara Resources Limited, Half-Year Financial Report for the half year ended 31 December 2025, lodged 16 March 2026. [R74] Alara Resources Limited, revised Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2025, re-lodged 14 November 2025. [R75] Eastern Platinum Limited, Annual Information Form for the year ended 31 December 2025, dated 31 March 2026. [R76] Eastern Platinum Limited, audited consolidated financial statements and management's discussion and analysis for the year ended 31 December 2025, dated 31 March 2026. [R77] Eastern Platinum Limited, condensed interim financial statements for the six months ended 30 June 2026, released 13 August 2026. [R78] Eastern Platinum Limited, Notice of Meeting and Management Information Circular for the annual meeting of 17 June 2026, dated May 2026. [R79] Eastern Platinum Limited, "Eastern Platinum Limited Announces CEO Transition", 6 August 2026. [R80] World Bank, Commodity Price Data, monthly prices, iron ore fines 62 per cent iron content cost and freight to China, updated 2 September 2026. [R81] World Steel Association, "December 2025 crude steel production and 2025 global crude steel production", press release, 23 January 2026. [R82] National Bureau of Statistics of China, crude steel output for January to July 2026, released 17 August 2026, as reported by Mysteel. [R83] Fortescue Ltd, FY26 Full Year Results Presentation and FY26 Annual Report and Appendix 4E, both released 20 August 2026. [R84] Fortescue Ltd, Climate Transition Plan 2026 and FY26 Sustainability Report, both released 20 August 2026. [R85] Fortescue Ltd, "Fortescue produces first hot metal in milestone towards Australian green iron", 19 August 2026, and "Fortescue starts works on Green Metal Project", 15 August 2024. [R86] Rio Tinto, 2025 Annual Results release of 19 February 2026 and 2025 Annual Report, together with the company's published climate change disclosures. [R87] Rio Tinto, 2026 Half Year Results, 29 July 2026, second quarter 2026 production results, 15 July 2026, and the Simandou Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve statement of 6 December 2023. [R88] Rio Tinto, "China Baowu and Rio Tinto complete Pilbara Blend iron ore pelletisation and direct reduction trials", 12 June 2026. [R89] Rio Tinto, "Rio Tinto partners with Calix to test low emissions steel making in Western Australia, pauses BioIron", 17 November 2025. [R90] BHP Group, results for the year ended 30 June 2026, exchange release and results presentation, 18 August 2026. The Jimblebar beneficiation plant decision is as reported by ABC News on 26 May 2026 and is not disclosed in a BHP results release. [R91] BHP Group, Economic and Commodity Outlook, 18 August 2026. [R92] BHP Group, Climate Transition Action Plan 2024, released August 2024, including its published definitions of "target" and "goal". [R93] BHP Group, "BlueScope, BHP and Rio Tinto select WA for Australia's largest ironmaking electric smelting furnace", 17 December 2024, and "NeoSmelt welcomes federal government support and signs two new participants", 17 June 2025. [R94] United States Geological Survey, "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Copper" and "Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Iron Ore", published 6 February 2026. [R95] Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman, register of Chinese export control announcements and their suspension status, and White & Case, "China imposes extraterritorial jurisdiction and a 50% Rule in export controls on rare earths", 2025 to 2026. [R96] EQ Resources Limited, Investor Presentation, 14 July 2026, slides 8 and 14. Locality maps in FIG. 05 reproduced from slide 8 of that presentation. [R97] Metals X Limited, 2026 Annual General Meeting Presentation, 19 May 2026. The Renison locality map in FIG. 08 is reproduced from slide 11 of that presentation. [R98] Eastern Platinum Limited, Investor Presentation, April 2026. PLATE 04 is reproduced from slide 16 of that presentation. [R99] China Tungsten Industry Association, "Tungsten Market in March 2026: Initial Rise Followed by Decline", monthly market review, March 2026. Gives the domestic APT peak of about RMB 1.5 million a tonne in the first half of March, the month-end price of about RMB 1.48 million, the European APT range of US$2,800 to US$3,150 per mtu with the association's own conversion to renminbi, and tungsten concentrate above RMB 1 million a standard tonne in early March. [R100] China Tungsten Industry Association, "Tungsten concentrate Prices Rise, APT Prices Fall in August 2026", monthly market review, August 2026. Gives domestic APT at about RMB 600,000 a tonne at 31 August 2026, high-grade concentrate at about RMB 415,000 to RMB 420,000 a standard tonne, and European APT at US$2,900 to US$3,000 per mtu with the association's own conversion to renminbi. [R101] Fortescue Ltd, "Fortescue's Iron Bridge commences high grade magnetite production", company website article and accompanying photograph, accessed 7 September 2026. [R102] The Edge Singapore, "Iron ore tops US$100 on position unwinds and China buying hopes", 7 September 2026. The report originates with Bloomberg under the same headline and the same date. [R103] EQ Resources Limited, "EQR Signs Binding Agreement For US APT Plant JV", 15 September 2026. Joint venture over the Springer Tungsten Complex, Nevada, with The Elmet Group on 70 per cent as operator, Blue Moon Metals on 20 per cent and EQ Resources on 10 per cent. Cover photo: Rare earth oxides, Peggy Greb, USDA Agricultural Research Service. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Rareearthoxides.jpg). Reproduced photograph, shown faded under a navy overlay on the article thumbnail. The Samso Way – Seek the Research Here at Samso, we pride ourselves on delivering content for investors that is independent and informed by over three decades of experience in the industry. Our content is well-researched and is only created if I see merit in discussing the company's story. Our mission is simple: cut through the noise and spotlight what matters—genuine stories, grounded insights, and real opportunity. Investors can explore our four core platforms: Coffee with Samso Samso Insights Samso News Samso Research There may be numerous paths to success in investing, but the common thread among successful individuals is that they remain committed to making informed decisions. Equip yourself with the right knowledge and tools, and you will be well on your way to achieving your financial goals. Most importantly, investors need to be absolutely diligent in understanding their own risk-reward tolerance and capabilities. Never bite off more than you can chew. As they say, Rome wasn't built in a day, and the Great Wall stood because it took centuries to complete. The Samso Philosophy: Stay curious. Stay sharp. And remember—digging deeper always uncovers the real value. In Life, there is no such thing as a Free Lunch. 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Brent crude has climbed above US$105 a barrel as Middle East supply disruptions, tanker attacks, shrinking inventories and limited spare capacity collide. Samso examines what is driving oil, what could reverse the rally and the ASX companies exposed to the move. Samso News · 11 September 2026 · Concluding comments by Noel Ong Samso News oil story asx news series samso investment strategy THE DOCUMENTS BEHIND THIS PIECE This is a market piece rather than a review of a single company release. The physical-market figures come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook of September 2026, whose modelling was completed on 3 September 2026 and therefore closed before the escalation of 9 September. Price settlements, shipping estimates and the OPEC+ decision of 6 September come from the wire reports and the OPEC statement listed in Sources at the back. Company figures come from each company's own reports, also listed there. Oil is back above US$105 Brent crude has crossed one of the commodity market’s most psychologically important thresholds again. Brent crude has pushed decisively beyond the US$100-a-barrel threshold, extending its rally as escalating Middle East tensions intensified concerns over global oil supplies. At the Thursday, September 10, 2026 settlement, front-month Brent jumped US$6.42, or 6.34%, to US$107.63 a barrel after reaching an intraday high of US$108.42. West Texas Intermediate climbed US$6.43, or 6.69%, to US$102.48. Both benchmarks recorded their highest closes since May 19 and their steepest one-day gains in nearly two months. The distinction matters: it is Brent - the global seaborne benchmark - that has moved above US$100. WTI, the principal US benchmark, remains below that level (FIG. 02). Yet the direction of travel is clear. Brent had climbed roughly 25% since early August, and the market has again moved into territory that carries implications well beyond oil producers. Oil above US$100 filters into diesel, petrol, aviation fuel, freight, chemicals and manufacturing costs. It can lift inflation expectations, push bond yields higher and complicate central-bank decisions. On September 9, the S&P 500 fell 0.48% while energy was the only major S&P sector to finish higher, gaining about 1.1%, as markets weighed the inflationary consequences of the latest oil shock. For Australian investors, the immediate question is not simply whether Brent has crossed US$100. The more useful questions are why the oil price is rising, how much of the rally is structural rather than geopolitical, how long the squeeze could last and which ASX oil stocks have genuine exposure to higher realised prices. Why is the oil price rising? The oil rally is being driven by a combination of physical supply disruption, shrinking inventories and an unusually small safety margin in the global production system. The trigger for the September 9 move was another escalation in the US-Iran conflict, including the largest wave of attacks on commercial shipping since the war began. Iran said it attacked 10 ships near the Strait of Hormuz after the United States sank five Iranian oil tankers. Shipping risk quickly translated into an oil-price risk premium. That would matter in any oil market, but the current market is already fragile. The Strait of Hormuz was carrying around one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption before the conflict. It is the narrow outlet from the Persian Gulf for major exporters including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Alternative pipelines exist, but they cannot replace all of the lost waterborne capacity (FIG. 04). The US Energy Information Administration’s Short-Term Energy Outlook estimates that crude production shut-ins across the Middle East averaged 6.7 million barrels per day in August, up from 5.0 million barrels per day in July (FIG. 03). The EIA assumes an average 5.7 million barrels per day remains shut in through the fourth quarter of 2026, although the agency expects exporters to keep finding workarounds through pipelines, overland routes and ship-to-ship transfers. The Strait of Hormuz remains the centre of the oil market The scale of the disruption is easier to understand through the shipping data. The EIA estimates total crude and petroleum liquids flowing through Hormuz averaged 21.6 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025. That fell to 14.9 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026 and just 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter. Those numbers should not be treated as a perfect real-time measure. One of the unusual features of the 2026 crisis is the rise of so-called “dark crossings”, where tankers switch off or manipulate tracking signals. Reuters reported on September 9 that industry estimates placed total Gulf oil exports, including clandestine movements and alternative routes, at roughly 15–16 million barrels per day - about two-thirds of pre-war volumes. Vortexa estimated August exports were still around 10 million barrels per day below pre-war levels. That uncertainty is itself bullish. Commodity markets normally price a relatively transparent balance between production, consumption and visible inventories. In the Gulf, traders are now trying to estimate how much oil is moving through a conflict zone where vessels may disappear from conventional tracking for days or weeks. The result is a persistent risk premium because the market is not only short of barrels; it is short of reliable information. Why bypass routes cannot replace Hormuz The second problem: inventories have been drained Oil can absorb a short production disruption when commercial inventories and strategic reserves are full. That cushion is much thinner in September 2026. The EIA estimates global oil inventories have fallen by roughly 400 million barrels so far this year. Its September forecast puts the average draw at 3.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter, followed by a further 3.0 million barrels per day in the third quarter and 1.7 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter. This is why the latest tanker attacks have had an outsized effect. The market is not reacting to a hypothetical threat against a well-supplied system. It is reacting to renewed disruption after months of inventory depletion (FIG. 05). The United States also has less emergency oil available than it did in earlier crises. Department of Energy data reported by Reuters showed the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell by another 1.2 million barrels in the latest week to 285.4 million barrels — its lowest level since November 1982. The SPR still represents a significant emergency buffer, but repeated drawdowns have reduced the flexibility policymakers once had to respond to a prolonged global supply shock. SAMSO ACCESS Some of the work does not appear here Samso holds back a set of Insights for members. Same method as this piece, the same sourcing and the same counterweights, on companies and sectors that do not make the public feed. A$20 a month, cancel any time. SEE WHAT IS INSIDE → OPEC has very little spare capacity left A third reason the oil price has become so sensitive is that the world has lost much of its traditional production safety valve. The EIA’s September 2026 outlook puts OPEC surplus crude production capacity at only about 0.4 million barrels per day this year, compared with an average of roughly 2.6 million barrels per day between 2016 and 2025 (FIG. 06). That does not mean OPEC+ has no influence. Seven core OPEC+ producers agreed on September 6 to keep October output policy unchanged after completing the phased rollback of a 1.65 million-barrel-per-day voluntary cut in September. But Reuters noted that actual output remains well below targets because conflict has disrupted production and exports. Production quotas on paper are not the same thing as barrels that can physically reach refiners. This is the important distinction. In a normal price spike, Saudi Arabia and other producers can increase output and calm the market. In 2026, the bottleneck is not simply how much oil could theoretically be produced. It is whether fields are operating, whether export infrastructure is available, whether ships can safely load and whether cargoes can transit the relevant waterways. Why oil is not even higher If such a large volume of Middle Eastern oil has been disrupted, a reasonable question is why Brent is only around US$100 rather than US$150 or US$200. The answer is that several counterweights are preventing the supply shock from becoming a full-scale shortage. First, Gulf producers have adapted. Saudi Arabia has redirected barrels through its East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals, exporters have used ship-to-ship transfers, and tankers have increasingly made dark crossings. Second, non-OPEC supply from countries such as the United States, Canada and Guyana has helped offset part of the Middle Eastern loss. Third, high prices themselves weaken demand. China is an important example. Research from Sinopec’s Economics & Development Research Institute published on September 9 forecasts Chinese oil demand falling by about 600,000 barrels per day, or 8.9%, in 2026 — a third consecutive annual decline. Gasoline demand is forecast to fall 8.7% and diesel 11.4%, while jet fuel demand is expected to rise modestly. Weak Chinese consumption is a major reason oil has not risen as dramatically as the physical disruption might otherwise suggest. This creates an unusual market: supply conditions are extremely tight, but demand is not universally strong. That tension is central to the oil price outlook (FIG. 07). Could oil reach US$120 - or return to US$70? Both outcomes are plausible because oil has already demonstrated that range during 2026. Brent traded as high as roughly US$126 per barrel in late April during an earlier phase of the conflict, then fell back sharply as flows improved and geopolitical risk eased. The September move above US$100 is therefore not the first oil-price shock of the year; it is the latest stage of an exceptionally volatile market. The bullish scenario is straightforward. Further attacks on tankers, damage to Saudi or Gulf infrastructure, renewed disruption at Bab el-Mandeb, or another sharp fall in Hormuz traffic could push physical premiums and futures higher. With inventories already depleted and OPEC spare capacity low, another major supply loss would have relatively little immediate buffer. The bearish scenario is equally important. If Gulf shipping stabilises, diplomatic pressure produces a durable de-escalation, bypass capacity expands and shut-in production returns, the current risk premium can disappear quickly. The EIA’s forecast — completed before the latest escalation, on September 3 - assumes Middle Eastern flows gradually improve. Under that scenario, the agency expects Brent to average around US$90 in the second half of 2026, fall to around US$77 by the second quarter of 2027 and average about US$67 in the second half of 2027. The point is not that the EIA must be right. The agency explicitly warns that short-term volatility is likely to be greater than its forecast captures. The more useful lesson is that US$100 oil is not automatically a permanent new equilibrium. A large part of the current premium depends on a geopolitical bottleneck that could either worsen or partially unwind. COFFEE WITH SAMSO The same companies, on the record Coffee with Samso is the interview series. The management teams behind the names Samso writes about, answering questions on camera. WATCH THE INTERVIEWS → What US$100 oil means for ASX oil stocks For an oil producer, a higher benchmark price can translate rapidly into higher revenue — but never on a one-for-one basis. Realised prices depend on crude quality, benchmark differentials, freight, royalties, taxes, hedging and contractual terms. Operating costs can also rise during an energy shock, particularly where diesel, marine logistics or services become more expensive. For developers, US$100 oil can improve project economics by lifting projected revenue and potentially expanding debt capacity. But boards and lenders rarely finance a long-life project on the assumption that the current spot price lasts forever. Long-term price assumptions remain more conservative. For explorers, the link is weaker again. Higher oil prices can improve the theoretical value of a discovery, but they do not turn prospective resources into reserves and they do not eliminate geological, appraisal or funding risk. That is why “ASX oil stocks” should be separated by stage rather than treated as a single trade. ASX oil stocks to watch in 2026 The following list is not a ranking or a recommendation. It is designed to show the different ways investors can obtain oil exposure on the ASX, from large diversified producers to small exploration companies (TABLE 01). For Samso readers interested in small and mid-cap resources, the most direct names are not necessarily the largest companies. Karoon Energy - one of the cleaner ASX oil exposures Karoon Energy (ASX: KAR) is particularly relevant to an oil-price discussion because a large share of its production is liquids. Karoon produced 10.3 million barrels of oil equivalent on a net revenue interest basis in 2025. The 100%-owned Baúna Project offshore Brazil contributed 7.7 million barrels of oil, produced at an average rate of about 21,000 barrels per day, and represented roughly 75% of group production (FIG. 08). At December 31, 2025, Karoon reported 61.8 million barrels of 2P oil and condensate reserves across Baúna and Who Dat, with total 2P reserves of 72.8 MMboe after including gas and natural gas liquids. The company has also been working through operational issues at Baúna in 2026, including production restarts at PRA-2 and SPS-92. That is an important reminder that commodity leverage only matters when wells and facilities are operating reliably. Horizon Oil — smaller-scale producing exposure Horizon Oil (ASX: HZN) offers a smaller-cap producing alternative. Horizon reported record FY26 net production of 2.15 MMboe. Following the acquisition of a controlling interest in Cue Energy, the company says current production is around 7,300 barrels of oil equivalent per day across a five-country Asia-Pacific portfolio. Its reserve and resource position at June 30, 2026 included 13.6 MMboe of 2P reserves and 19.8 MMboe of 2C contingent resources. The portfolio includes established oil production as well as oil-linked and fixed-price gas, so HZN is not a pure Brent proxy. Nevertheless, it sits closer to current cash-flow exposure than most junior oil explorers. Bass Oil — micro-cap production leverage Bass Oil (ASX: BAS) is much smaller. Its June 2026 operations update reported group production of 6,746 barrels for the month, averaging 225 barrels per day. That comprised Cooper Basin production and Indonesian production. The scale is modest, but the relationship between realised oil price and revenue is more immediate than it is for a pre-drill explorer. The trade-off is obvious: small operating bases can be highly sensitive to individual wells, field decline, maintenance, funding and liquidity. A strong Brent price is supportive, but operational execution can overwhelm the commodity benefit at this scale. Carnarvon Energy — development leverage through Dorado Carnarvon Energy (ASX: CVN) sits in a different category. The company holds a 10% interest in Dorado offshore Western Australia, operated by Santos. Dorado is estimated to contain approximately 162 million barrels of light oil and condensate on a gross 2C contingent-resource basis, together with a substantial gas resource. The optimised development concept has been designed around an initial oil production rate of about 60,000 barrels per day and could deliver first oil roughly three years after a final investment decision. The joint venture is currently reviewing the project timeline. Higher long-term oil assumptions could strengthen the economics, but CVN investors remain exposed to the central developer risks: FID timing, capital cost, financing, partner decisions and execution. 88 Energy and Melbana — higher-risk exploration and appraisal exposure 88 Energy (ASX: 88E) provides much higher-risk exposure through Project Phoenix on Alaska’s North Slope. The company reports 239 MMboe of net 2C contingent resources at Phoenix, where Hickory-1 testing demonstrated hydrocarbon flow to surface. These are contingent resources, not reserves, and further appraisal, commercial studies, funding and development work are required before any production case can be established. Melbana Energy (ASX: MAY) is another high-risk example. Melbana holds a 30% participating interest and operatorship of Block 9 in Cuba. Its 2025 annual report cites an independently assessed 46 million barrels of 2C contingent resources in Unit 1B of the Amistad sheet, alongside larger prospective resources. The company also produced and stored modest quantities of crude from appraisal activity, but the project remains a very different proposition from an established producer such as Karoon or Horizon. This distinction matters for SEO-driven “oil stocks to watch” lists because a large resource number can look more impressive than production, but the categories measure different things. Reserves support an approved or commercial development case at defined confidence levels. Contingent resources require one or more contingencies to be resolved. Prospective resources relate to undiscovered accumulations and carry both discovery and development risk (FIG. 09). Large-cap context: Woodside, Santos and Beach Woodside Energy (ASX: WDS), Santos (ASX: STO) and Beach Energy (ASX: BPT) provide the scale end of Australian-listed upstream energy. They are not small-cap oil stocks and none is a pure Brent trade because LNG and domestic gas are important parts of their businesses. They are nevertheless useful benchmarks for how higher oil prices translate into larger operating portfolios. Woodside’s Sangomar field in Senegal averaged about 99,000 barrels per day gross during the first quarter of 2026, equivalent to around 80,000 barrels per day net to Woodside, while its Gulf of Mexico portfolio provides additional liquids exposure. Santos reported first-half 2026 production of 45.6 MMboe and achieved first oil from Pikka in Alaska in May, with the project ramping towards a targeted gross plateau of approximately 80,000 barrels per day. Beach reported FY26 production of 19.4 MMboe and an average realised oil price of A$126 per barrel, although the company’s revenue mix remains heavily influenced by gas. For investors, the large-cap names generally provide stronger balance sheets and diversified cash flow, while the small-cap names can offer more concentrated commodity or project leverage — and considerably greater risk. Oil stocks still carry substantial risks at US$100 Brent A higher oil price can improve the backdrop, but it does not eliminate the principal risks in upstream energy. Producing fields decline naturally. Facilities fail. Wells can underperform. Governments change fiscal terms. Hedging can limit upside. Exploration wells can be dry, and development projects can suffer cost inflation precisely when commodity prices are high. Small-cap companies face an additional funding problem. A junior developer may hold a valuable discovery but still need hundreds of millions or billions of dollars of capital before first production. If financing is unavailable, a high spot oil price does not solve the problem by itself. Equity raisings can also dilute existing shareholders. Geopolitical risk cuts both ways. The current Middle East conflict is supporting Brent, but a meaningful de-escalation could remove a large risk premium quickly. Conversely, further escalation can increase realised prices while simultaneously raising shipping, insurance and operating costs. The relationship between war and producer value is therefore not as simple as “higher oil equals higher share price”. What oil investors should watch next Strait of Hormuz traffic: sustained improvement would ease the physical squeeze; another collapse would tighten it. Middle East production shut-ins: the EIA currently assumes 5.7 million b/d remains shut in on average during 4Q26. OPEC+ policy: the next core producer meeting is scheduled for October 4, with 2027 production baselines becoming increasingly important. Global inventories: continued draws would make the system even more sensitive to supply shocks. US Strategic Petroleum Reserve: the emergency buffer is already at its lowest level since 1982. China demand: Sinopec’s forecast of an 8.9% 2026 decline is a major bearish counterweight. Inflation and interest rates: US$100+ oil can keep transport and goods inflation elevated and complicate central-bank policy. Company-specific milestones: production reliability at Karoon, integration and growth at Horizon, Dorado timing at Carnarvon, and appraisal/development progress at 88 Energy and Melbana. THE COUNTERARGUMENT The case against a sustained US$100 oil price is strong enough to set out on its own terms. The EIA’s forecast was completed on 3 September, before the latest escalation, and it has Brent averaging around US$90 in the second half of 2026 and about US$67 in the second half of 2027. That is the agency’s base case rather than its bear case. Most of the current premium rests on one bottleneck. If Gulf shipping stabilises and shut-in production returns, that premium can come out of the price quickly. Brent has already done this once in 2026, falling from roughly US$126 in late April to the mid-eighties in early August. The demand side is softening at the same time. Sinopec’s research institute expects Chinese consumption to fall again in 2026. A supply shock arriving into weakening demand does not price the same way as one arriving into growth. For the ASX names, a lower oil price does not take away what a higher one never gave them. A developer still needs its final investment decision and its funding. An appraisal company still needs to show its resource is commercial. Neither of those jobs changes at US$67 or at US$101. Samso Concluding Comments SAMSO TAKE What I find most interesting about oil above US$100 in September 2026 is that this is not simply another speculative commodity spike. There is a genuine physical-market problem underneath the price. Middle Eastern production has been shut in, the Strait of Hormuz has carried a fraction of its pre-war volume, global inventories have been drawn down and OPEC’s spare capacity is unusually small. But there is another side to the argument. The world has adapted more effectively than many people expected. Gulf exporters are finding alternative routes, ships are making dark crossings, non-OPEC producers are supplying additional barrels and Chinese demand is weakening. Those forces are why Brent is around US$100 rather than dramatically higher despite an extraordinary geopolitical disruption. For me, that makes the oil price outlook less about calling a single number and more about understanding the range of outcomes. If shipping through Hormuz deteriorates again, there is very little cushion and the market has already shown in 2026 that Brent can trade above US$120. If flows normalise, the EIA’s much lower 2027 price path becomes entirely plausible. The same discipline applies to ASX oil stocks. The companies selling barrels now have the clearest near-term exposure. Developers can benefit if stronger long-term oil assumptions improve project economics. Explorers have potentially large upside, but the oil price cannot remove geological risk or turn a prospective resource into a reserve. The key is to understand exactly what investors own: producing barrels, reserves, contingent resources or exploration potential. They are not the same thing, even when the headline commodity price is the same. SUPPORT SAMSO Independent, organic, and free to read Samso does not promote. If the research is useful to you, the Support page lists the ways you can give the platform a hand. SUPPORT THE WORK → Previous Samso Coverage of Oil and Energy Samso has written on oil, gas and energy security before. The pieces below are the relevant thread, newest first, together with the companion article on copper published the day before this one. 10 SEP 2026 Why is the Copper Price Rising? ASX Copper Stocks to Watch in 2026 The companion piece to this one. Copper above US$14,700 a tonne on mine-supply constraints, tariff stockpiling and electricity demand, then the ASX copper names sorted by development stage. 23 APR 2026 Beyond Oil: What the Strait of Hormuz Really Means for Australia Samso’s earlier read on the same chokepoint, arguing the Australian exposure runs through ammonia and sulphur feeding mining and agriculture costs rather than through the petroleum headline. 3 NOV 2025 Xstate Resources – Diona-1 Operations Update – All About the Gas Diona-1 in the Surat-Bowen Basin, around 181 metres of hydrocarbon-prone Permian section with 23 metres of net gas pay and an overpressured gas column. 3 APR 2024 D3 Energy targets A$10 million in ASX debut for South African gas play An IPO write-up on a natural gas and helium explorer raising A$10 million at 20 cents for Free State assets in South Africa. 31 JAN 2019 Doriemus PLC (ASX: DOR) – Another Woodside? Whether the Butler prospect in the Canning Basin could be a company-maker, working through the prospective gas and condensate numbers. 3 JAN 2019 Doriemus PLC (ASX: DOR) – Fishbones Stimulation Technology The EP487 acquisition, and Fishbones titanium-tube stimulation as a way for a small-cap oil producer to make marginal barrels work in a weak crude price. SAMSO ACCESS The Insights we hold back are behind here A$20 a month, cancel any time. SEE WHAT IS INSIDE → THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH BRENT CRUDE The seaborne benchmark grade used to price most internationally traded oil. When a headline says oil is above US$100, it usually means Brent. WTI West Texas Intermediate, the main United States benchmark grade. It normally trades a few dollars below Brent because it is landlocked and priced inland. BARREL AND B/D A barrel is 159 litres. Barrels per day, written b/d or bbl/d, is the standard rate measure for production and for flows through a waterway. BOE AND MMBOE Barrel of oil equivalent. Gas and liquids converted to a common unit so a mixed portfolio can be added up. MMboe is a million of them. A boe of gas is not worth the same money as a barrel of oil. 2P RESERVES Proved plus probable reserves. Oil a company expects to produce commercially from an approved or committed development, at a defined confidence level. 2C CONTINGENT RESOURCES Oil that has been discovered but cannot yet be called a reserve, because something still has to be resolved. Funding, approvals, a development decision or further appraisal. PROSPECTIVE RESOURCES Oil thought to exist in accumulations nobody has drilled yet. It carries both the risk of not finding it and the risk of not being able to develop it. SPARE CAPACITY Production that a country could bring on quickly and hold. It is the market’s shock absorber. When it is small, a supply loss moves the price further. SHUT-IN PRODUCTION Wells or fields that could produce but are not producing, usually because of conflict, damage or a lack of a route to market. STRAIT OF HORMUZ The narrow sea passage out of the Persian Gulf. Tankers loading in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have to pass through it. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE Crude oil the United States government stores underground for use in an emergency. Drawing it down adds supply, and refilling it takes years. DARK CROSSING A tanker voyage made with the vessel’s tracking transponder switched off or falsified, so the cargo does not appear in normal shipping data. FID Final investment decision. The board and joint-venture partners formally commit the capital to build a project. Before FID, a development is a study. REALISED PRICE What a producer is actually paid per barrel, after quality differences, freight, benchmark differentials and hedging. It is never the headline benchmark price. Sources Figures are drawn from the primary documents below, as published at their stated dates. Market-sensitive numbers change daily and were current at 11 September 2026. Where a Samso figure is calculated from a published number rather than reproduced from one, the editorial notes for this piece say so. [R1] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026 (modelling completed 3 September 2026). https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php [R2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Energy Security Data, Strait of Hormuz flows. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php [R3] U.S. Energy Information Administration, press release, 9 September 2026. https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press592.php [R4] Reuters, oil market wrap reporting the 9 September 2026 Brent and WTI settlements. https://www.brecorder.com/news/40438774/brent-settles-at-over-usd100 [R5] Reuters, One third of Gulf oil is still missing despite dark crossings, 9 September 2026, carrying the Goldman Sachs and Vortexa export estimates. https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/one-third-of-gulf-oil-is-still-missing-despite-dark-crossings-data-shows-4894113 [R6] OPEC, statement of the eight participating countries, 6 September 2026. https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/1835613-6-september-2026.html [R7] Report of the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve falling to 285.4 million barrels, 8 September 2026. https://energynow.com/2026/09/oil-stocks-in-us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-fall-by-1-2-million-barrels-to-lowest-level-since-1982/ [R8] Sinopec Economics & Development Research Institute, China oil demand forecast, 9 September 2026. https://energynow.com/2026/09/china-oil-demand-to-fall-8-9-in-2026-sinopec-research-says/ [R9] Karoon Energy, reserves and resources statement as at 31 December 2025. https://www.karoonenergy.com.au/project/reserves-and-resources/ [R10] Horizon Oil, FY26 Annual Report. https://horizonoil.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Horizon-FY26-Annual-Report-FINAL.pdf [R11] Carnarvon Energy, Dorado project page. https://carnarvon.com.au/projects/project/dorado/ [R12] 88 Energy, June 2026 quarterly report, Project Phoenix contingent resources. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/88-energy-limited-di---88e/quarterly-report-and-appendix-5b-/9681434 [R13] Melbana Energy, Annual Report 2025, Block 9 contingent resources. https://www.melbana.com/annualreport/2025/6/ [R14] Woodside Energy, first quarter 2026 report. https://www.woodside.com/docs/default-source/investor-documents/quarterly-and-half-yearly-pdfs-and-data-tables/2026/030-first-quarter-2026-report.pdf [R15] Santos, 2026 half-year results. https://www.santos.com/news/2026-half-year-results/ [R16] Beach Energy, FY26 fourth quarter activities report, 22 July 2026. https://beachenergy.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/BPT_FY26_Fourth_Quarter_Activities_Report.pdf Cover photo: Oil Platform Crew Transfer, GuavaTrain. 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Eleven companies, three years of price action, and one pattern. The market paid for signatures, not for gigawatts. Samso Insights Media & Technology Data Centres AI Infrastructure 1.00 —A real industry, with a forecasting problem Australia's data centre industry is large and growing quickly. Property advisory firm CBRE puts live national capacity at approximately 1.3 gigawatts in 2025, rising toward 1.8GW within three years, against demand that would support between 0.7GW and 1.7GW more than that. CBRE sizes the current investable universe at roughly A$30 billion, growing toward A$46 billion by 2029. The demand side is not in dispute. The Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), which runs the national electricity system, now forecasts data centres as a category in their own right. Its 2025 assumptions report has data centre electricity consumption growing at approximately 25 per cent a year to reach 12 terawatt hours by the 2030 financial year, about 6 per cent of grid-supplied electricity in the National Electricity Market. That is up from 3.9 terawatt hours, or roughly 2 per cent, in 2024-25. Then there is the number that should temper everything else in this piece. Research commissioned by AEMO from Oxford Economics found Australia had received connection requests totalling 44GW. Of that, the researchers estimated six in every seven megawatts to be phantom demand, meaning applications that will never be built. They put actual required prospective capacity at approximately 6GW under AEMO's central scenario. That finding changes how a gigawatt figure in a headline should be read. Applying to connect to the grid is not the same as building anything. A company can lodge an application, announce the megawatts, and never proceed. Roughly 85 per cent of what has been asked for is not expected to happen. No announcement says whether the project it is describing is in the 15 per cent that will proceed or the 85 per cent that will not. 2.00 —Power is the constraint, and Canberra just priced it What limits Australian data centre construction is not customers. It is deliverable, grid-connected electricity. Connection queues in the main markets can run beyond eight years. At the end of March 2026, AEMO had 11 large projects totalling 5.4GW of maximum demand progressing through transmission connection, roughly 60 per cent in New South Wales and 40 per cent in Victoria, and warned its own forecasts would likely need to rise. On 15 July 2026 the federal government introduced legislation requiring large data centres to be net generators of the power they use, meaning they must generate on site at least as much electricity as they draw from the shared grid. They must also pay for new renewable generation to be built, cover the full cost of connecting themselves to the grid, and cut their electricity use when the grid comes under strain. The Energy and Climate Change Ministerial Council endorsed national standards along these lines on 28 July 2026, with Queensland and the Northern Territory the only states opposed. The effect is to raise the cost of any proposal that assumed it could simply plug into the existing network. It rewards whoever already controls generation. That is part of why operators have started describing themselves in units of secured power rather than floor space. 3.00 —The operators, where the business actually is Four ASX companies own or operate data centres directly. TABLE 01 sets out the full company set covered here, what each one actually does, and what the market currently values it at. The market cap column covers a wide range. Goodman is worth about A$62.9 billion and DXN about A$57 million. That difference is worth carrying into the sections below, because an A$8.8 million contract does not mean the same thing to both companies. Market capitalisation does not tell us whether a company is well run. It does tell us the scale it is operating at. NEXTDC (ASX:NXT) is Australia's largest listed pure-play data centre operator, running 17 or more facilities across the mainland capitals plus a Kuala Lumpur site opened in May 2026. Shares were around A$13.98 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$10.8 billion. The company reports its business in megawatts, and the three figures it discloses are worth separating. Contracted utilisation, meaning capacity customers have signed up for, reached 740MW at 30 June 2026. The forward order book, meaning capacity customers are expected to take but have not yet signed for, stood at 565MW. Billing utilisation, meaning the capacity actually earning money today, was 175MW. So roughly three quarters of what NEXTDC has signed up customers for is not yet earning it any money. That is not unusual, because a data centre takes years to build and customers sign well before the building opens. It is also where things can go wrong. Every megawatt in that gap depends on NEXTDC finishing the building on time, and on the customer still wanting it when the building is ready. PLATE 01 shows what that build looks like on the ground. PLATE 01 NEXTDC's M3 Melbourne facility under construction. The rows of rooftop cooling units on the completed building, and the partially built structure beside it, show the physical form that contracted megawatts take. NEXTDC had approximately 435MW under construction across its S4 and M3 sites at the time of this presentation. Source: NEXTDC Limited (ASX:NXT), 1H26 Results Presentation, 25 February 2026, page 28 of 38. Reproduced with the company's copyright notice intact. NEXTDC (ASX:NXT). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 01 shows NEXTDC's three-year price action against four announcements. The most instructive pair is markers 1 and 2. On 4 December 2025 the company announced a memorandum of understanding with OpenAI naming it as foundational customer for a proposed A$7 billion, roughly 550MW campus at Eastern Creek in western Sydney. The stock rose 3.1 per cent that day, reached A$14.15, and was lower a week later. On 20 April 2026 the company announced a binding 250MW contract at its S4 facility alongside an A$1.5 billion entitlement offer, which is an issue of new shares offered to existing holders in proportion to what they already own. That move held, and the stock later traded above A$15. Those two events are the clearest illustration of the pattern this piece describes. A memorandum with a very well known AI company produced a brief move. A signed contract with an unnamed customer produced a lasting one. Macquarie Technology Group (ASX:MAQ) operates Macquarie Data Centres, focused on government and sovereign workloads, and reports housing approximately 42 per cent of the Australian federal government. Shares were around A$63.58 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$1.7 billion. Its principal project is IC3 Super West at Macquarie Park in Sydney, an approximately A$350 million investment with 47MW of end-state power secured, taking the campus toward roughly 65MW of total IT load. Construction is contracted to FDC Construction, with initial commissioning targeted for around September 2026. Macquarie Technology Group (ASX:MAQ). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 02 covers Macquarie Technology. The clearest catalyst is marker 2, an A$200 million hybrid investment from the National Reconstruction Fund Corporation announced on 11 March 2026. It was the largest single technology-sector investment by that body. Importantly for existing shareholders, the money did not come from issuing new shares. It was raised through a security that sits somewhere between debt and equity, so nobody's stake in the company was made smaller to pay for the build. The market responded positively. DigiCo Infrastructure REIT (ASX:DGT) owns 13 data centres across Australia and North America, seeded with assets including Global Switch Australia and iSeek. It is externally managed by HMC Capital. Shares were around A$2.76 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$1.5 billion, against a A$5.00 offer price at listing. DigiCo Infrastructure REIT (ASX:DGT). Weekly closing price since listing in December 2024. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 03 covers DigiCo, which raised approximately A$2.0 billion in the largest ASX listing of 2024. It opened at A$4.98 against that A$5.00 offer on 12 December 2024, closed the day at A$4.55, and has not returned to its issue price since. Marker 3 is the March 2026 departure of a chief executive who had started in January and resigned by June. Marker 4, the US$750 million sale of its Chicago facility, produced the strongest rally in its listed history. A data centre REIT is not the same investment as a data centre operator. DigiCo owns the assets and collects the rent. Whether that is a good business depends entirely on what was paid for the assets, and the market's answer to that question has been consistent since listing. HMC Capital (ASX:HMC) requires care, because it is not a data centre business. It is an alternative asset manager, and its data centre exposure is indirect. It manages DigiCo externally and holds approximately 21 per cent of it, partly through management fees paid in DigiCo securities. That stake, plus the fee stream attached to managing the REIT, is the entirety of the connection. Shares were around A$3.12 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$1.3 billion, down roughly two thirds over twelve months. HMC Capital (ASX:HMC). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 04 shows why HMC is included with that caveat attached. Its decline over the period is far larger than DigiCo's and reflects concerns about its broader funds management model, not data centres specifically. A reader buying HMC for data centre exposure would be buying a fund manager with a 21 per cent holding in a REIT, wrapped inside a business doing several other things. That is a legitimate investment. It is not a data centre investment, and the chart should not be read as one. SAMSO ACCESS Some of the work does not appear here Samso holds back a set of Insights for members. Same method as this piece, the same sourcing and the same counterweights, on companies and sectors that do not make the public feed. Every member-only Samso Insight unlocked Full access to the gated Insights archive New member-only pieces included as they publish Samso News and Research Workups will join the gated set, with Research Workups also available on their own tier. A$20 a month · cancel any time See what is inside → 4.00 —The landlord, and what secured electricity is worth Goodman Group (ASX:GMG) builds and owns industrial property, mostly warehouses and logistics estates, and has turned a large part of that business toward building data centres. Shares were around A$30.40 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$62.9 billion, the largest company in this piece by a wide margin. The figures Goodman discloses are large. Its total property portfolio is worth A$87.1 billion. Development work in progress, meaning projects it has started but not finished, A$14.5 billion, of which data centres are 73 per cent, up from roughly 40 per cent eighteen months earlier. A global electricity holding of 6.4GW, of which 3.6GW is secured. Goodman calls this its power bank. That power bank figure needs some explanation. It describes electricity capacity Goodman has identified or secured across its sites. It does not describe signed leases with paying tenants. As at the March 2026 quarter, Goodman had not signed up the big cloud and AI companies as tenants across most of those sites, with completions weighted toward 2028 and 2029. Goodman Group (ASX:GMG). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 05 shows that the pivot has not been a share price event. Goodman is down over twelve months, having lifted data centres from 40 per cent to 73 per cent of its development pipeline and quadrupled its disclosed power bank over the same period. Marker 1 is the February 2025 institutional placement of A$4.0 billion at A$33.50, struck against a close of A$35.98. The shares fell below the offer price within days. The companion retail offer, seeking A$400 million, raised A$5.1 million, because by the time it closed the market price sat below what retail holders were being asked to pay. 5.00 —The suppliers DXN Limited (ASX:DXN) builds modular and prefabricated data centres from a facility at Welshpool in Western Australia. It is very small. Before 3 June 2026 its market capitalisation was approximately A$6.6 million. After the contract and the placement that followed it, the company was worth approximately A$57 million as at 6 August 2026, still the smallest company in this piece by a wide margin. On that day it announced a binding A$8.8 million contract to design, build and commission a 1.36MW AI high performance computing modular data centre, using direct-to-chip liquid cooling with GPU racks up to 150kW, for an unnamed United States listed operator. The contract exceeded the entire value of the company. PLATE 02 shows the inside of one of these units. PLATE 02 Inside one of DXN's prefabricated modular data centres, showing server racks, switchgear and overhead cable trays within a factory-built unit. DXN manufactures these at Welshpool in Western Australia and ships them to site, which is the approach behind the A$8.8 million contract described above. Source: DXN Limited (ASX:DXN), company website, dxn.solutions. FIG. 06 DXN Limited (ASX:DXN). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 06 shows the result. The shares closed up 590 per cent at A$0.145, the largest single-day move of any company covered here. Marker 2 is the A$7.0 million placement at A$0.13 six days later, funding delivery and diluting holders. Management flagged potential follow-on work exceeding A$278 million within one to two years. That figure is a projection, not an order, and the gap between the two is wider here than anywhere else in this piece given the size of the company against the size of the number. DUG Technology (ASX:DUG) operates its own high performance computing data centres, originally for oil and gas seismic processing and increasingly for AI workloads. It sells computing capacity as a service and markets an immersion cooling system, DUG Cool, which it reports cuts power use by up to approximately 51 per cent against air cooling. Shares were around A$2.02 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$275 million. FIG. 07 DUG Technology (ASX:DUG). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 07 covers DUG. The company deployed 82 NVIDIA H200 machines in January 2026, adding 41 petaflops of capacity, and reported third quarter revenue of US$22.4 million, up 35 per cent, with high performance computing revenue up sharply from a small base. DUG is the one company here that both owns data centre infrastructure and sells a technology into the sector. Megaport (ASX:MP1) is the genuine connectivity name. Its entire business is interconnection, providing network-as-a-service links between enterprises, cloud providers and data centres. It reported reaching its 1,000th enabled location in August 2025, giving it access to approximately 10 per cent of the world's public data centres. Shares were around A$20.04 as at 6 August 2026, giving a market capitalisation of approximately A$4.6 billion, making it the second largest company in this piece. FIG. 08 Megaport (ASX:MP1). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 08 contains a useful exception to this piece's own argument. In June 2026 Megaport raised approximately A$827 million by issuing new shares to existing holders at A$14.30, funding acquisitions that push it toward AI compute. Raisings of this kind make each existing share a smaller slice of the company, and across this sector they have generally been punished, as Goodman's experience shows. This one was not. The stock was halted at A$16.04 and reopened at A$18.48, up roughly 15 per cent. The market endorsed what the money was for. That endorsement carries its own risk. Megaport built its reputation on a capital-light interconnection model. Buying into AI compute is a capital-heavy business with a different return profile, and the FY26 results are the first real test of whether that shift is working. COFFEE WITH SAMSO The same companies, on the record Coffee with Samso is the interview series. Management answering questions in long form, so the people behind a project can be judged alongside the numbers in a piece like this one. Free to watch. Companies commission an interview, and it stays free to everyone, permanently. Watch the interviews → 6.00 —What the market actually paid for Reading FIG. 01 through FIG. 08 together, a consistent pattern emerges across three years. Binding contracts were rewarded and the gains held. NEXTDC's 250MW S4 contract lifted the share price and the gain held. DXN's binding A$8.8 million order produced a 590 per cent day. In both cases there was a contract the customer could be held to, rather than a statement of intent. Non-binding documents produced short moves that faded. NEXTDC's OpenAI memorandum is the cleanest example, given it involved the best-known name in artificial intelligence and still finished the following week lower than where it started. The market read it as an option on 2027, not as revenue. Announcing more capacity, without a customer attached, moved share prices very little. Goodman's secured electricity grew to 6.4GW while its shares fell over twelve months. The capacity NEXTDC had signed customers for grew from 316MW to 740MW across the period, and its share price is roughly where it was a year ago. Capacity announcements appear to be treated as necessary rather than sufficient. Capital raisings were judged on purpose, not on structure. Goodman's A$4.0 billion placement fell below its offer price and its retail component effectively failed. Megaport's A$827 million raise saw the stock reopen 15 per cent higher. Raisings that did not issue new shares, and so did not shrink anybody's existing stake, were received well. Macquarie Technology's government-backed funding and NEXTDC's La Caisse funding were both of this kind. Governance and execution events were punished quickly. DigiCo fell on a chief executive taking extended leave. NEXTDC took a first strike against its remuneration report at the November 2025 annual meeting. 7.00 —The company that is not what it is called Superloop (ASX:SLC) appears in a good deal of thematic commentary as an ASX data centre play. Its own disclosures do not support that description, and the reasons are worth setting out, because they double as a test any reader can apply to the next company described this way. Superloop is a telecommunications company, worth approximately A$1.7 billion as at 6 August 2026. It reports three segments, being consumer, business and wholesale. In the 2025 financial year it generated A$546 million of revenue, of which consumer broadband was A$363.7 million. There is no data centre revenue category in its accounts. Data centres are not identified as a growth driver in its results materials. In its June 2026 investor day strategy, none of the five stated pillars concerns data centre connectivity. The company's network reaches more than 2,400 on-net sites, a figure that appears in an appendix as a footprint metric. The data centre association comes mainly from its December 2024 acquisition of Uecomm from Optus for approximately A$17.5 million, which added more than 2,000km of metro fibre and, in the company's words, access to approximately 50 data centres. Access means its fibre reaches those buildings. It does not mean the operators of those buildings are customers. Having a network presence inside data centres is ordinary for any carrier. FIG. 09 Superloop (ASX:SLC). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 09 shows where the value came from. Superloop's shares rose from approximately A$0.69 to approximately A$3.22 over three years, so an investor who bought at the start would have roughly four and a half times their money. The catalysts were a wholesale broadband contract with Origin Energy in March 2024, which produced the largest single-day gain in the company's history, the acquisition of Lightning Broadband alongside a strong first half result in February 2026, and successive guidance upgrades. No data centre announcement produced a noticeable move in the share price at any point in the period. None of this is a criticism of Superloop, which has performed well at what it actually does. It is a narrower observation. A company can hold real infrastructure that touches data centres, be described by others as a data centre play, and still have no disclosed data centre business. The test is not whether the fibre reaches the building. It is whether the company names a customer, books the revenue, and tells its shareholders about it. SUPPORT SAMSO Independent, organic, and free to read We produce independent organic content and need your support to keep that going. Every contribution covers the cost of research, keeps the site running, and buys the time to write the next piece. A$10, A$20, A$30 or an amount you choose One time, weekly, monthly or yearly A donation buys nothing and unlocks nothing. It keeps the work going. Support Samso → 8.00 —Could an ASX company move into this business The obvious question for an ASX investor is whether a company holding suitable assets, meaning land, power, grid access or fibre, could enter this business. There is precedent for the ambition. During the dot-com period around 2000, listed mining shells were routinely acquired by technology start-ups and renamed, a transaction known as a back door listing, where a company obtains a listing by merging into an already-listed vehicle rather than applying for admission itself. The regime was loose, and after the bubble burst ASX tightened it considerably. That tightened regime still applies. Under ASX Listing Rule 11.1 a company proposing a significant change to the nature or scale of its activities must notify ASX. ASX may then require shareholder approval under Rule 11.1.2, and may require the company to re-comply with Chapters 1 and 2 of the Listing Rules under Rule 11.1.3, meaning it must pass the same admission tests as a company listing for the first time. ASX guidance states it will invariably use this discretion where a transaction amounts to a back door listing. The practical effect is that a full pivot is close to an initial public offering in weight. There is one real advantage. A company re-complying already has a share register. Where no new shares are issued, ASX may accept an information memorandum rather than a full prospectus, and capital can be sought from existing holders rather than a cold public offer. The admission bar is the same. The path to it is shorter. Two ASX companies are currently attempting something along these lines, and both are earlier stage than anything in Sections 3.00 through 5.00. PLATE 03 Aurora Energy Precinct location and existing infrastructure corridor: the 275kV transmission line, water, 33kV distribution line, fibre routes and the planned 330 to 500kV Northern Connector (2030), relative to Port Augusta. Source: 1414 Degrees Limited (ASX:14D), “Investor Presentation AGM 2025”, 19 November 2025, page 11 of 15. 1414 Degrees (ASX:14D) holds the Aurora Energy Precinct, a Crown lease of approximately 1,580 hectares near Port Augusta in South Australia. The company was worth approximately A$36 million as at 6 August 2026. PLATE 03, from the company's own investor presentation, shows why the site is credible. It sits against an existing 275kV transmission line, a 33kV distribution line, water and fibre routes. On 27 July 2026 the company signed a heads of agreement with an unnamed Australian data centre operator covering up to 1GW in stages, granting exclusivity over an initial 40-hectare parcel. The company's own release says almost none of the agreement is binding. The two parts that are: the operator has that 40 hectares to itself for the term, and it gets first claim on any electricity 1414 Degrees generates there. Everything else, including the gigawatt, is an intention rather than a commitment. FIG. 10 1414 Degrees (ASX:14D). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. Beetaloo Energy Australia (ASX:BTL) holds 28.9 million acres of gas tenements in the Northern Territory, and was worth approximately A$354 million as at 6 August 2026. In July 2026 the Territory government granted its subsidiary exclusive rights over 185 hectares at Weddell, roughly 30km from Darwin, for one year, within which it must complete studies and secure investors for a proposed gas-fired power and data centre campus of up to 2GW. The company has said it expects to attract A$40 billion at full development. That is a company estimate, and it is roughly one hundred and thirteen times the company's own market value. FIG. 11 Beetaloo Energy Australia (ASX:BTL). Weekly closing price, three years to 6 August 2026. Numbered markers correspond to the announcements listed in the key beneath the chart. Where a marker is tagged “date as reported”, the announcement date is taken from secondary reporting and was not independently confirmed against the price action. Samso’s own chart, built from weekly closing price data. FIG. 10 and FIG. 11 show both companies. Both sit in the category described in Section 6.00, being non-binding documents and government allocations, which the market has historically discounted. Neither company has a signed, binding, priced agreement with a named data centre operator. 9.00 —Closing The Australian data centre industry is real, large, and constrained by electricity rather than by demand. A small number of ASX companies are actually in it. Four own or run the buildings themselves. One builds them and rents them out. Three sell into the industry, supplying factory-built units, computing capacity for hire, or the network links between sites. The price history suggests a pattern, though it is worth being careful about how far to take it. Over the three years covered here, the companies whose gains lasted were generally the ones that had signed a contract committing a named or unnamed customer to pay them. NEXTDC's 250MW agreement is one example. Announcements that described an intention rather than an obligation, including the memorandum with OpenAI, more often moved the price for a few days and then gave the move back. That is an observation drawn from eleven companies over three years. It is not a rule, and it may not hold. A company that discloses capacity today could convert it into signed leases next year, and the market might then start paying for the disclosure in advance. The three years covered here also sit almost entirely inside a single period of heavy spending on AI. Nobody has yet seen how these companies trade through a downturn in that spending, so the pattern has not been tested against harder conditions. So what does this mean for an investor looking at one of these companies? It means there are a few questions worth asking before buying, because the answers change what you are actually paying for. Ask whether the company has named its customer. If it will not say who the customer is, you are relying on the company's word that a customer exists at all, and you cannot judge whether that customer is good for the money or how long it has committed for. Ask whether the company has signed a contract, or only a memorandum of understanding. A memorandum sets out what two companies intend to do together. It does not require either of them to actually do it, and either one can change its mind later with nothing owed to the other. If a memorandum is all that has been signed, the revenue investors are already pricing into the share price is revenue that nobody has yet promised to pay. Ask whether the capacity is contracted to a paying customer, or whether it is land and power the company hopes to fill later. Both get announced in megawatts and both sound impressive. Only one of them has somebody committed to paying for it. Ask what any money being raised is for. If the company is issuing new shares to fund it, your existing holding becomes a smaller slice of the company, so you are paying for that build twice over, once in cash and once in ownership. There is a difference between raising money to build something a customer has already agreed to pay for, and raising money to build something first and look for a customer afterwards. The first has revenue attached to it. The second does not, yet. None of these questions requires a view on whether AI demand holds up over the next decade. They are narrower than that, and they are answerable from what the company has already disclosed. Without them, an investor can end up paying today for revenue that nobody has yet agreed to pay the company, on a timetable nobody has committed to. This piece is analysis rather than a recommendation. The figures in it were current on 6 August 2026 and will not stay that way, particularly for the smaller companies. Anyone acting on any of it should check the current share price and the company's own announcements first. SAMSO ACCESS Some of the work does not appear here Samso holds back a set of Insights for members. Same method as this piece, the same sourcing and the same counterweights, on companies and sectors that do not make the public feed. A$20 a month · cancel any time See what is inside → References and sources Share price and market capitalisation data throughout: weekly and daily closing prices to 6 August 2026, retrieved from public market data feeds. All charts are Samso’s own construction from that data. NEXTDC Limited (ASX:NXT), 1H26 Results Presentation, 25 February 2026 (primary source for PLATE 01). DXN Limited (ASX:DXN), company website dxn.solutions (primary source for PLATE 02). 1414 Degrees Limited (ASX:14D), “Investor Presentation AGM 2025”, 19 November 2025 (primary source for PLATE 03). CBRE, “Why Australia for Data Centres”, on national live capacity, the 2028 supply gap and the size of the investable universe. AEMO, 2025 Inputs, Assumptions and Scenarios Report, on data centre electricity demand growth to FY2030, and AEMO connection-queue data to March 2026. Oxford Economics research commissioned by AEMO, November 2025, on the 44GW of connection requests and the phantom-demand estimate. NEXTDC ASX releases and quarterly updates, on the OpenAI memorandum (December 2025), the 250MW S4 contract and entitlement offer (April 2026), the La Caisse hybrid, and contracted, forward-order and billing utilisation to 30 June 2026. Macquarie Technology Group disclosures on IC3 Super West and the National Reconstruction Fund Corporation hybrid investment, March 2026. DigiCo Infrastructure REIT listing documents and subsequent results and announcements, including the Chicago disposal. Goodman Group 1H FY26 results and Q3 FY26 update (26 May 2026), on portfolio value, development work in progress, the power bank, and the February 2025 placement and retail offer. DXN Limited ASX announcements, 3 June 2026 (binding contract) and 9 June 2026 (placement). DUG Technology results materials and the January 2026 NVIDIA H200 deployment announcement. Megaport announcements on enabled locations (August 2025) and the June 2026 entitlement offer and acquisitions. Superloop FY24 and FY25 annual results, H1 FY26 results, the December 2024 Uecomm acquisition announcement, and the June 2026 investor day strategy materials. ASX, Listing Rules Chapter 11 and Guidance Note 12 (Significant Changes to Activities), on the re-compliance regime under Listing Rules 11.1 to 11.1.3. Beetaloo Energy Australia announcements and Northern Territory government statements on the Weddell land allocation, July 2026. Sourcing note: FIG. 01 through FIG. 11 are Samso’s own charts, built from weekly closing price data, with event markers placed by Samso. PLATE 01, PLATE 02 and PLATE 03 are reproduced from NEXTDC’s, DXN’s and 1414 Degrees’ own published material respectively, each credited in its caption with the company, document, date and page, and each carrying the source company’s copyright notice where one appears in the original. TABLE 01 is Samso’s own compilation. Company facts are drawn from company disclosures and from financial media reporting of those disclosures. Where an event date could not be independently confirmed against price action, the chart key marks it as reported. 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Five mines produce gold in Western Australia's East Murchison Mineral Field, and three ASX companies with projects in the field are working toward first gold, one of them at a plant in another field. This Insight sets out the geology, the mining history, who owns each mine on 11 October 2026, and the dates that come next. The cover photograph is of construction at Youanmi and is reproduced from Rox Resources [R53] READING THE SERIES Gold Regions Series, Release 1 Samso News. Gold price and the gold regions. Samso Insights. East Murchison Mineral Field. This page. Samso Insights. Yalgoo Mineral Field. Samso Research. Rox Resources (ASX: RXL), Youanmi. Samso Research. Horizon Gold (ASX: HRN), Gum Creek. Samso Research. Brightstar Resources (ASX: BTR), Sandstone, in three parts. Samso Research. Capricorn Metals (ASX: CMM), Mt Gibson. Samso Research. Rumble Resources (ASX: RTR), Western Queen. A page with no link is not yet published. That includes the Samso News piece, so this page carries no link back to it. A NOTE ON THE VOCABULARY AND THE SOURCES Technical terms are explained where they first appear and are collected in a vocabulary box at the end. A marker such as [R1] points to the numbered source in the reference list. Where two sources give different figures for the same thing, both are quoted with their source and neither is preferred. Gold is measured in troy ounces. Neither Noel Ong, who writes for Samso, nor Samso holds shares in any company named in this Insight. The tables shorten ounces to oz, thousand ounces to koz, million ounces to Moz, million tonnes to Mt, grams a tonne to g/t and million tonnes a year to Mtpa. The East Murchison Mineral Field is one of the areas the Western Australian Government uses to administer mining titles. It covers the country around Wiluna, Leinster and Sandstone, in the northern part of the State's goldfields (Fig 1). It was proclaimed as a goldfield in 1895 [R2]. Five mines in the field produce gold today. Jundee and Thunderbox belong to Northern Star Resources (ASX: NST). Bellevue belongs to Bellevue Gold (ASX: BGL). Penny belongs to Ramelius Resources (ASX: RMS). Agnew belongs to Gold Fields, which is not listed on the ASX, so it is named here for context only. Three more companies are each the subject of a Samso Research workup, which is Samso's long study of a single company. They are Rox Resources (ASX: RXL) at Youanmi, Horizon Gold (ASX: HRN) at Gum Creek and Brightstar Resources (ASX: BTR) at Sandstone. This series labels each of them a near-term producer, meaning a company with a published feasibility study, the engineering and cost study for a proposed mine, and a stated date for first gold. Brightstar's label rests on a project outside this field. Section 6.00 sets out what each label rests on. This Insight is the East Murchison page of Samso's Gold Regions Series. It covers what the field is, the rocks that hold the gold, what was mined and when, who owns each mine on 11 October 2026, and the dates each company has given for what comes next. All prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 9 October 2026. Global prices for gold and the Australian dollar are taken at the same time. WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS 1.00 THE EAST MURCHISON MINERAL FIELD AND ITS DISTRICTS What a mineral field is, where this one is, and how it relates to the Murchison. 2.00 THE ROCKS THAT HOLD THE GOLD The geology in plain English, and why some of the ore is hard to treat. 3.00 GOLD MINING HISTORY OF THE EAST MURCHISON What was found, what was mined, and why most mines stopped at least once. 4.00 WHO PRODUCES GOLD IN THE EAST MURCHISON TODAY Northern Star, Bellevue Gold and Ramelius, with Gold Fields named for context. 5.00 WILUNA MINING AND WESTERN GOLD RESOURCES A plant that is suspended, a float in progress, and a small project waiting on a mill. 6.00 THE NEAR-TERM RULE AND THE THREE COMPANIES How Samso labels a company, and the three companies side by side. 7.00 ROX RESOURCES AND YOUANMI The study, the money, the build, and the risks the workup lists. 8.00 HORIZON GOLD AND GUM CREEK The study, the decision due in 2027, and the going concern note. 9.00 BRIGHTSTAR RESOURCES AND SANDSTONE Why the label rests on Laverton, and what Sandstone still needs. 10.00 THE GOLD PRICE AND INTEREST RATES The price in two currencies, the bank targets, Samso's view and the rate rises. 11.00 WHAT TO WATCH Each company's stated timing, and the risks. 1.00 — THE EAST MURCHISON MINERAL FIELD AND ITS DISTRICTS An administrative area declared beside the Murchison Goldfield in 1895 A mineral field is an area declared by the Western Australian Government for administering mining titles. The State is divided into these fields. The name East Murchison Mineral Field is the department's, and this Insight uses it [R1]. The field began as the East Murchison Goldfield. The proclamation was signed on 29 May 1895 and was printed in the Government Gazette of 5 July 1895 [R2]. Its boundary description starts from the southernmost corner of the Murchison Goldfield and runs along that goldfield's eastern side. The Murchison Goldfield was the older one, and the East Murchison was declared on its eastern edge. The name Murchison still causes confusion for that reason. Today's Murchison Mineral Field is a separate field to the west. The department's boundary file gives it districts at Meekatharra, Cue, Day Dawn and Mount Magnet [R1]. Investors and companies often say the Murchison for the whole region, and several companies in this Insight describe their projects that way. Samso plans to cover the Murchison Mineral Field itself in a later release. The East Murchison has three districts. A proclamation of 1 June 1904 created the Black Range District and the Lawlers District from 1 July 1904 [R3]. The Wiluna District is not in that proclamation, and Samso did not find the date it was created. Black Range is the western district and holds Sandstone and Youanmi. Gum Creek is at its northern edge, on the boundary with the Wiluna District. Lawlers is the eastern district and holds Agnew, Bellevue and Thunderbox. Wiluna is the northern district and holds Wiluna and Jundee. Fig 1 is Samso's map of the field. It was compiled from the department's boundary file and from MINEDEX, the department's database of mines and mineral deposits, which lists 2,073 gold sites inside the boundary [R1]. The dots on Fig 1 show that those sites are not spread evenly. They follow the narrow greenstone belts described in section 2.00. 2.00 — THE ROCKS THAT HOLD THE GOLD Two blocks of old crust and the greenstone belts on them The field is on the Yilgarn Craton. A craton is a piece of continental crust that has been stable for billions of years. The Geological Survey of Western Australia (GSWA), the State's geological agency, divides the craton into large blocks called terranes, and groups of terranes called superterranes [R4]. A terrane and a superterrane meet inside the East Murchison. The western block is the Youanmi Terrane. The eastern block is the Eastern Goldfields Superterrane, the same block that holds Kalgoorlie further south. GSWA puts the boundary between them at the Ida Fault [R4]. In Samso's reading of the maps, the Black Range District in the west is on one block, and most of the Lawlers and Wiluna districts in the east are on the other. The gold is in greenstone belts on both blocks. A greenstone belt is a strip of old volcanic and sedimentary rock that has been folded and altered, with granite on either side. In the east, Geoscience Australia names the Agnew-Wiluna belt and the Yandal belt [R5]. Agnew, Bellevue and Wiluna are on the first. Jundee is at the northern end of the second, and Northern Star uses the name Yandal for its Jundee and Thunderbox business. In the west the belts are the Sandstone, Gum Creek and Youanmi greenstone belts, and each project takes the name of its belt [R6] [R7]. Fig 2 shows how narrow the belts are [R8]. Most of the gold is tied to faults and shear zones. A shear zone is a band of rock that has been smeared out, and in places broken, by movement in the crust. Geoscience Australia describes the gold of the Sir Samuel map area, which covers Agnew and Bellevue, as “structurally controlled and associated with brittle-ductile shear zones and quartz veins” [R5]. Geologists call deposits of this kind orogenic gold. Hot fluids carrying gold moved along the breaks and left it there. Why some of this ore is hard to treat The geology affects how the ore is processed. Much Western Australian gold ore is free-milling, meaning the gold can be recovered by grinding the ore and dissolving the gold in a cyanide solution. Some ore in the East Murchison is refractory. In refractory ore, part of the gold is locked inside sulphide minerals, which are minerals of metal and sulphur, and cyanide cannot reach it until those minerals are broken down. Three of the companies in this Insight deal with refractory ore. Wiluna Mining says of Wiluna that gold is “locked within the sulphide crystal lattice” [R9]. Rox's study says that “Up to 25% of the gold in the ore is refractory and locked in solid solution in arsenopyrite”, arsenopyrite being a sulphide of iron and arsenic [R6]. Horizon has 698,000 ounces of gold in sulphide ore at Gum Creek that is outside its feasibility study, because the study covers free-milling ore only [R10]. Refractory ore can be mined at a profit. It needs an extra processing step, and that step costs money to build and to run. Readers should ask of any project in this field whether its ore is free-milling or refractory, and which part of the deposit the study is built on. 3.00 — GOLD MINING HISTORY OF THE EAST MURCHISON From the 1890s rushes to the open pits of the 1980s and 1990s Gold was found at Agnew and Wiluna in the 1890s. Youanmi and Gum Creek came later. Gold Fields's history of Agnew records that Patrick Lawlers' prospecting party found gold there in 1894, and that the Waroonga mine opened in 1904 [R11]. The Shire of Wiluna records that the prospectors Woodley, Wotten and Lennon found gold at Wiluna on St Patrick's Day in 1896 [R12]. Rox dates the start of mining at Youanmi to 1908 [R6]. Horizon dates the discovery of gold at Gum Creek to 1926, at a place called Jonesville [R10]. The early mines were underground. The larger tonnages came later. From the 1980s companies went back to most of the old centres, many of them with open pits. The Shire records that mining at Wiluna restarted in 1981 [R12]. Bellevue last operated between 1986 and 1997 [R13]. Gum Creek was mined from the 1980s until 2005 [R10]. Jundee and Thunderbox were new finds of that later period. Exploration at Jundee began in 1978, mining began in late 1995 and the first gold was poured on 27 December 1995 [R14]. Thunderbox was found in 1999 [R15]. No source Samso read gives a production total for the whole field. Fig 3 charts what the owners have published for eight centres. The figures end on different dates, and they leave out the gold produced since, which is large at Jundee, Agnew and Thunderbox. They are company figures and have not been reconciled with State records. The largest is Agnew and Lawlers. Gold Fields gave the production of those mines from 1894 to 2013, under all their owners, as 7.23 million ounces, from 46.2 million tonnes at 4.9 g/t [R11]. Grade is the amount of gold in each tonne of ore, measured in grams a tonne (g/t). Jundee poured its six millionth ounce in September 2013 [R14]. Wiluna Mining says Wiluna has “Historically produced 4.7Moz Au” [R16]. The three workup projects are smaller. Brightstar gives past production at Sandstone as more than 1.3 million ounces and says there has been no mining there since 2010 [R17]. Horizon says Gum Creek produced “more than one million ounces” [R10]. Rox gives Youanmi's production as 666,995 ounces, from 3.83 million tonnes at 5.4 g/t, mined in several periods between 1908 and 1997 [R6]. Thunderbox had produced 805,000 ounces when processing stopped in September 2007 [R15]. Bellevue produced about 800,000 ounces at about 15 g/t in its last period [R13]. Most of these mines stopped at least once Youanmi closed in November 1997, and Rox's study gives the reason as “failure to meet production targets and a declining gold price” [R6]. Bellevue closed in the same year [R13]. Gum Creek stopped in 2005 and, in Horizon's words, was “placed on care and maintenance amid lower gold prices” [R10]. Care and maintenance means a mine or plant is shut but kept in working order. Horizon's Annual Report says mining “ceased in 2005 when the gold price was approximately A$560/oz” [R8]. Its documents give more than one account of the closure, and the workup quotes each. Thunderbox stopped in 2007 [R15]. In Samso's reading, these mines closed because the gold price no longer covered the cost of mining at those grades. Gold remained in the ground. Several have since reopened under new owners. Northern Star bought Jundee in 2014 for A$82.5 million [R14]. Saracen Mineral Holdings bought Thunderbox in the same year [R15], and Thunderbox is now a Northern Star mine. Bellevue has treated ore on site since November 2023 [R18]. Samso wrote about the exploration at Bellevue in 2018 [R19]. Youanmi, Gum Creek and Sandstone are the three large centres in the west of the field that have not yet reopened. Each has an ASX company working to change that. 4.00 — WHO PRODUCES GOLD IN THE EAST MURCHISON TODAY Four owners and five East Murchison gold mines Four companies produce gold in the field. Samso has not written a workup on any of them. Three are established ASX producers and are noted here from their latest reports. The fourth, Gold Fields, is not ASX-listed. Table 1 at the end of this section lists the mines, and Fig 4 sets their output beside the two study forecasts covered later. Northern Star Resources, Jundee and Thunderbox Northern Star Resources reports Jundee, Thunderbox and Bronzewing together as its Yandal production centre. It reports Thunderbox and Bronzewing as one operation, so this Insight counts Bronzewing with Thunderbox. In the year to 30 June 2026 Jundee sold 201,600 ounces and Thunderbox with Bronzewing sold 232,168 ounces, for 433,768 ounces across Yandal [R20]. In the June 2026 quarter Yandal sold 123,937 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of A$3,228 an ounce [R20]. All-in sustaining cost, or AISC, is the industry's measure of what it costs to produce an ounce at a working mine, including the spending needed to keep the mine going. It leaves out the cost of building the mine, interest and tax, and companies do not all calculate it the same way. Northern Star's guidance for Yandal in the year to June 2027 is 400,000 to 420,000 ounces at an AISC of A$3,900 to A$4,200 an ounce [R21]. Guidance is a company's forecast. That is fewer ounces than the year just finished, and a higher cost than the June quarter. Thunderbox has a 7 million tonne a year plant, and Yandal's Ore Reserves were 2.6 million ounces within Mineral Resources of 10.7 million ounces at 31 March 2026 [R22]. A Mineral Resource is an estimate of the gold in the ground, and an Ore Reserve is the part of it that a study has shown can be mined at a profit. Section 6.00 has the full definitions. On 28 September 2026 Northern Star announced that its Board had “received, considered and rejected” a “confidential, opportunistic, unsolicited and conditional non-binding indicative proposal” from Gold Fields [R23]. A non-binding proposal is an offer the bidder is not yet bound to make. The proposal was received on 14 September 2026. It offered 0.3125 new Gold Fields shares plus A$7.25 in cash for each Northern Star share, which the announcement said implied A$27.00 a share at the price of 11 September 2026. The Board rejected it unanimously. Northern Star had made no further announcement on it by the close of 9 October 2026. Gold Fields owns Agnew, so the proposal would have put Agnew, Jundee and Thunderbox under one owner. Bellevue Gold, Bellevue Bellevue Gold produced 143,539 ounces in the year to 30 June 2026 at an AISC of A$2,827 an ounce [R24]. Guidance for the year to June 2027 is 150,000 to 170,000 ounces [R24]. The mine is underground and high grade, and its plant treats 1.35 million tonnes a year [R18]. The September 2026 update lowered both the reserve and the resource. Ore Reserves are now 1.0 million ounces at 4.5 g/t, against 1.3 million ounces at 4.7 g/t a year earlier. Mineral Resources are 2.7 million ounces at 8.6 g/t, against 3.1 million ounces at 8.9 g/t [R18]. Mining removes ounces each year, so some fall is expected, and Samso has not separated mining depletion from other changes. Ramelius Resources, Penny Penny is a small, high-grade underground mine south of Youanmi. Ramelius Resources trucks its ore to the Mount Magnet mill, which is outside the field, and reports Penny inside its Mt Magnet operation [R25]. In the June 2026 quarter 69,000 tonnes of Penny ore were processed at 8.08 g/t for 17,819 recovered ounces [R25]. Ramelius has given two end dates for Penny. Its June quarterly of 29 July 2026 said “Operationally the Penny mine will extend into the December 2026 Quarter” [R25]. Its outlook of 21 September 2026 listed “Extension of the Penny underground mine to December 2027 (previously June 2026)” [R26]. Both are quoted as published, and the later document is the outlook. The update of 8 October 2026 said wet weather had disrupted haulage from Penny, leaving a stockpile of 27,680 tonnes at 4.78 g/t at the mine [R27]. Gold Fields, Agnew Agnew is a wholly owned underground mine with a 1.35 million tonne a year plant [R28]. Gold Fields reported production of 230,000 ounces in calendar 2024, down from 245,000 ounces in 2023 [R28]. That is the latest full-year figure Samso read. Agnew is in this Insight because it is one of the largest mines in the field and because its owner made the proposal to Northern Star. SAMSO TAKE Table 1 tells me the east of this field is already consolidated. Two large companies own three of the four mines in the east, and one of them has just tried to buy the other. The west is different. Its one producing mine sends its ore out of the field, and its three large old centres are in the hands of smaller companies. That is why the three workups are all in the west. When you look at a gold district, do you look first at who is producing, or at who owns the centres that have not yet reopened? 5.00 — WILUNA MINING AND WESTERN GOLD RESOURCES Two companies at Wiluna that are not producing gold today Two more companies have projects at Wiluna. Neither is producing gold today. Wiluna Mining Wiluna Mining owns the Wiluna gold operation, the centre that gives the northern district its name. The company is not listed today. Its presentation says it entered administration, where an outside administrator runs a company that cannot pay its debts, in July 2022 and has since exited [R16]. It has lodged a prospectus, the document a company issues to sell shares to the public, to raise A$180 million and list on the ASX, which is called a float [R29]. It describes a resource of 7.1 million ounces in that announcement, and its August presentation gives 91.5 million tonnes at 2.38 g/t for 7 million ounces [R16] [R29]. Both are quoted as published. The site has a 2.1 million tonne a year leaching plant, which dissolves gold out of ground ore with cyanide, and a 750,000 tonne a year flotation plant, which is the kind of plant that separates sulphide minerals from the rest of the ore [R16]. Until July 2026 the company was producing gold by reprocessing old tailings, the ground waste left after earlier ore was processed. On 25 July 2026 a leach tank ruptured and processing was suspended [R30]. On 24 August 2026 the company said it had decided to suspend all surface and tailings reprocessing operations and to defer processing ore for other companies [R30]. The company lodged a supplementary prospectus, which adds to or corrects the prospectus, on 3 October 2026 [R29]. Samso News has covered the Wiluna Mining float [R31]. Wiluna is therefore a large resource with a plant that is not running, owned by a company that is raising A$180 million through a float. Its presentation describes the resource as 15 per cent free-milling and 85 per cent refractory [R16]. Western Gold Resources Western Gold Resources (ASX: WGR) owns the Gold Duke project near Wiluna. Its resource is 4.84 million tonnes at 1.8 g/t for about 277,000 ounces [R32]. The company's plan was to mine Gold Duke and have the ore processed at the Wiluna plant under a toll milling agreement, a contract to have ore processed at another owner's plant for a fee. That plan is on hold for two reasons the company gives in its Annual Report. Heritage consultation “has extended the timetable for commencement of mining”. And Wiluna Mining has “deferred third-party toll milling activities” at the Wiluna plant “until further notice” [R32]. The company says the agreement remains in place and that it is evaluating other processing options. Western Gold Resources is still preparing to mine. Gold Duke's plan was built on the Wiluna plant, and that plant is shut. 6.00 — THE NEAR-TERM RULE AND THE THREE COMPANIES A published study and a stated date for first gold This series gives each workup company a label, and the labels are fixed by the series plan so that every page uses the same words. Near-term producer has a set meaning. A company meets Samso's near-term rule when it has a published feasibility study, either pre-feasibility or definitive, and has stated a date for first gold. Four terms are needed to read the rest of this Insight. A Mineral Resource is an estimate of the gold in the ground that has reasonable prospects of eventually being mined at a profit. Its confidence levels, from lowest to highest, are Inferred, Indicated and Measured. An Ore Reserve is the part of the Indicated and Measured resource that a study has shown can be mined at a profit, and its levels are Probable and Proved. Inferred material cannot be counted in a reserve. A pre-feasibility study, or PFS, is the middle of three study stages. A definitive feasibility study, or DFS, is the detailed version a lender usually wants. The label describes how far the paperwork has gone. It says nothing about the quality of a deposit, and it is no forecast that a mine will be built on time. Table 2 sets the three companies side by side. Table 2 shows three companies with the same label at three different stages. Rox is building. Horizon has finished its study and has to fund it. Brightstar is building a mill in another field and is still drilling and studying at Sandstone. The next three sections take them in that order. Each agrees with its workup, and each workup has more detail than there is room for here. 7.00 — ROX RESOURCES AND YOUANMI An underground mine under construction, with A$350 million of debt in place Rox Resources owns 100 per cent of the Youanmi Gold Project, about 480 kilometres north-east of Perth. The study gives the distance as 470 kilometres in some places and 480 in others [R6]. This series classes Rox as “Near-term producer”. Youanmi meets both parts of the rule. The DFS was published on 13 November 2025 [R6]. The Board approved a final investment decision, its formal commitment to build, on 17 March 2026 [R33]. The company's construction update of 7 September 2026 said the project was “on schedule for gold in mid-CY2027” [R34]. What the study says The plan is an underground mine and a new plant. The study forecasts an average of 117,000 ounces a year over an initial seven-year mine life, with a peak of 176,000 ounces. AISC is estimated at A$1,978 an ounce and capital before production at A$383 million. Those figures were modelled at a gold price of A$5,200 an ounce [R6]. They are the study's forecasts. The grade is the highest of the three projects. The Mineral Resource at 30 June 2026 is 12.4 million tonnes at 5.5 g/t for 2,195,000 ounces, of which 1,606,000 ounces are Indicated. The Ore Reserve is 4.8 million tonnes at 4.7 g/t for 727,000 ounces, all Probable. The reserve was estimated using a gold price of A$3,200 an ounce, which is lower than the A$5,200 used for the study's financial forecasts [R35]. In Samso's reading, the reserve counts only ore that pays at the lower price. Youanmi's ore is partly refractory, as section 2.00 noted. The plant will float the sulphides into a concentrate, the small sulphide-rich part of the ore. The Albion Process then grinds the concentrate very finely and oxidises it in tanks. The gold is leached after that. The study estimates recovery of 90.8 per cent [R6]. Recovery is the share of the gold in the ore that the plant gets out. Where the build stands Plate 1 shows the site as published on 7 September 2026. Interquip is building a 1.0 million tonne a year plant under a contract that covers the design, the purchasing and the construction. A 351-room camp is complete [R34]. On 5 October 2026 Rox announced financial close, the point where the loans became available to draw, on A$350 million of debt facilities and a first drawdown of A$90.2 million. The company says Youanmi “remains fully funded to production” [R36]. On 7 October 2026 it said the United North area of the mine was ready for production stoping, which is the mining of the ore itself after the access tunnels are built. The same update said the first two development levels, the tunnels driven along the ore, had extended about 125 metres beyond the study's mine plan, and repeated an aspiration of 150,000 ounces a year [R37]. An aspiration is the company's aim. It is outside the study. What the workup flags The Samso Research workup on Rox Resources sets out the risks in detail [R38]. The study's 2025 recovery test work used two composite samples, which are samples blended from drill core, with six variability samples in the flotation tests, and the study does not report a pilot plant, a small-scale trial plant, for the new process [R6]. The lodes, the bands of rock that carry the gold, are narrow, which makes dilution, the waste rock mined along with the ore, harder to control. The study's production target includes 20 per cent Inferred ounces [R6]. Inferred is the lowest confidence level, so a fifth of the planned ounces rest on the least certain part of the resource. And three shareholders hold about 44 to 45 per cent of the company between them. The workup gives holdings that add to 44.4 per cent at 14 September 2026, and the roadshow presentation shows 45.4 per cent [R38] [R33]. Youanmi also closed in 1997 on “failure to meet production targets and a declining gold price” [R6]. The plant of the 1990s floated its sulphide ore and used bacteria to break the sulphides down [R6]. The new plan is at the same mine, with a different oxidation process and a much higher gold price. 8.00 — HORIZON GOLD AND GUM CREEK A feasibility study, with the funding still to come Horizon Gold owns the Gum Creek Gold Project, about 640 kilometres north-east of Perth and 90 kilometres north of Sandstone [R10]. This series classes Horizon as “Near-term producer”. Gum Creek meets both parts of the rule. The DFS was published on 22 July 2026 and gives first gold in the second half of 2028 [R10]. The study says the company will consider a final investment decision alongside project financing and approvals, and targets that decision for Q2 2027, which Samso reads as the June quarter. What the study says The plan is a series of open pits feeding a new 2.4 million tonne a year plant at the old Gidgee mill site [R8]. The study forecasts 880,100 ounces recovered over 10 years, an average of 88,000 ounces a year, with 98,000 ounces a year in the first five. AISC is estimated at A$2,995 an ounce and capital before production at A$350.4 million. The study was modelled at a gold price of A$5,500 an ounce, and estimates recovery of 91.5 per cent [R10]. The Ore Reserve is 18.2 million tonnes at 1.24 g/t for 728,400 ounces, all Probable. The reserve was estimated using a gold price of A$4,500 an ounce, which is lower than the A$5,500 used for the study's financial forecasts [R10]. As at Youanmi, the reserve counts only ore that pays at the lower price. The 880,100 ounces in the study is more than the reserve holds. The study says its production target is 76 per cent Probable Ore Reserve ounces, 18 per cent Indicated ounces and 6 per cent Inferred ounces [R10]. About a quarter of the planned ounces are outside the reserve. The Mineral Resource is 37.97 million tonnes at 1.89 g/t for 2.30 million ounces [R8]. The reserve is about a third of the resource. Part of the difference is the 698,000 ounce sulphide resource, including the Wilsons deposit, which is outside the study. The study says refractory processing options will be evaluated for it [R10]. Gum Creek and Youanmi have reserves of almost the same size, 728,400 and 727,000 ounces. They are different kinds of mine. Youanmi is underground at 4.7 g/t. Gum Creek is open pit at 1.24 g/t and needs a plant more than twice the size to produce fewer ounces a year. Its estimated AISC is about A$1,000 an ounce higher. The two studies are dated November 2025 and July 2026, so their costs are not on the same date. Gum Creek's study has the longer life, 10 years against seven, and it covers free-milling ore only, so it does not need the extra processing step Youanmi does. The comparison is Samso's, from the two studies. The funding The study is complete and the money is not yet in place. Horizon had cash of A$24.0 million at 30 June 2026. Its Annual Report of 23 September 2026 carries a going concern note that says “the Group will require additional funding in the next 12 months” [R8]. A going concern note is the directors' statement on whether the company can pay its way for the next year. The auditor drew attention to it under the heading “Material Uncertainty Related to Going Concern”. The same note says the directors are satisfied “there are reasonable grounds to believe that the Group will be able to raise additional funding” [R8]. Zeta Resources held 65.10 per cent of Horizon at 30 June 2026 [R8]. In Samso's reading, a shareholder at that level can support a funding or limit the choices, and what it does can affect the terms for other shareholders. What the workup flags The Samso Research workup on Horizon Gold covers these points and others [R39]. It sets out the funding gap, the going concern note and the size of the largest shareholding. It records that the company's documents give more than one account of why Gum Creek closed in 2005, and it quotes each with its source. It also sets the study against the gold price, which section 10.00 of this Insight repeats with today's numbers. 9.00 — BRIGHTSTAR RESOURCES AND SANDSTONE A large resource with no study yet Brightstar Resources owns the Sandstone project, about 600 kilometres north-east of Perth [R17]. This series classes Brightstar as “Near-term producer”. The label needs more explanation here than for the other two, because it does not rest on Sandstone. What the label rests on Brightstar has two groups of projects. The first is its Goldfields project, which is outside this field. That project has a definitive feasibility study, which the company updated in January 2026 and calls DFS 2.0. A 1.5 million tonne a year plant is under construction at Laverton, and the company says the project is “due to commence gold production in June 2027” [R40]. A published study and a stated first-gold date meet the near-term rule. Both are at Laverton. This Insight does not assess the Laverton build, and its funding and risks are in the workup. The second group is Sandstone, and Sandstone is at resource stage. Brightstar is drilling there and preparing a pre-feasibility study. The project has a resource and does not yet have a reserve or a published study. The pre-feasibility study is due in the December quarter of 2026. The company's announcement of 5 October 2026 said release was “targeted before the end of 2026” [R41]. The workup records that the study was first targeted for mid-2026 and then for the September quarter [R42]. The company's recent announcements describe the December quarter date as on track [R43]. The company has made aspirational statements about Sandstone, which it says are not production targets. Its presentation of 28 September 2026 gives first production in the second half of 2028 [R44], and its website gives 2029 [R17]. Both are quoted as published. Brightstar is a near-term producer because of Laverton. Its project in the East Murchison is earlier in its life than Youanmi or Gum Creek. The Sandstone resource Sandstone is the largest resource of the three. On 28 September 2026 Brightstar reported 79 million tonnes at 1.4 g/t for 3.6 million ounces, of which 30.4 million tonnes at 1.5 g/t for 1.5 million ounces is Indicated. The rest is Inferred. The company's total resource across all projects is 110 million tonnes at 1.5 g/t for 5.2 million ounces [R7]. Fig 5 shows the central part of the project. The largest deposit area is Two Mile Hill and Shillington, about 10 kilometres south-west of the Sandstone townsite, at 24.6 million tonnes at 1.8 g/t for 1.45 million ounces [R7]. Plate 2 is a photograph of drill core from Two Mile Hill [R44]. Two recent results bear on the study. Laboratory tests of how much gold can be extracted, reported on 24 September 2026, gave average recoveries of 94 per cent across oxide, transitional and fresh ore, which are weathered, part-weathered and unweathered rock. The announcement reports no refractory behaviour in the samples tested. The company said its engineer had provided designs and costings, at pre-feasibility level, for a plant of five million tonnes a year [R43]. On 5 October 2026 the company reported a drill intersection, a length of gold-bearing rock cut by a drill hole, at Bull Oak of 167 metres at 2.07 g/t from 104 metres down the hole [R41]. The 167 metres is measured along the hole and is not the true width of the gold zone. The Bull Oak resource grades 1.0 g/t, so that hole is well above the deposit's average, and one hole does not change a resource. What the workup flags The Samso Research workup on Brightstar Resources is in three parts, and the link goes to Part 1 [R42]. It records that Sandstone has a resource and no reserve, and that the Sandstone study was first targeted for mid-2026 and then for the September quarter. It was first released in three parts on 24 September, 29 September and 1 October 2026, and it was updated on 6 October 2026. The update re-dated its share prices and peer table to 5 October 2026, so the link opens the updated version. SAMSO TAKE I see three versions of the same job in the west of this field. Each company has an old mining centre with more than half a million ounces of past production, and each is trying to bring it back. Rox has the grade and its debt in place, and still has to build the mine and prove the recovery. Horizon has the study and needs the money. Brightstar has the ounces and needs the study. None of them is producing gold in this field today. If you were ranking the three, would you rank them by how many ounces they have, or by how many steps they have left? 10.00 — THE GOLD PRICE AND INTEREST RATES Gold is above both study prices and a fifth below its January high Gold mined in Australia is sold in Australian dollars, so the Australian dollar price is the one that applies to these mines and studies. The prices below are futures prices. A futures contract is an agreement to buy gold at a set price on a later date, and the nearest contract trades close to the spot price, the price for immediate delivery. The price now Gold last traded at US$4,218 an ounce at the close of ASX trading on 9 October 2026. That is the price of the most actively traded gold futures contract on the COMEX exchange in New York, and it is the same price the Horizon Gold workup uses. At 69.8 US cents to the Australian dollar, that is about A$6,040 [R45]. The highest close of this cycle was US$5,318 on 29 January 2026, and A$7,581 on 28 January 2026. Gold is 20.7 per cent below that high in US dollars and 20.3 per cent below it in Australian dollars. Fig 6 shows both. Over a year the gold price has moved differently in the two currencies. A year earlier gold closed at US$3,973, or about A$6,030. The US dollar price is about 6 per cent higher than that, and the Australian dollar price is about level [R45]. The difference comes from the exchange rate. The Australian dollar has risen against the US dollar over the year, and a stronger Australian dollar lowers the local gold price. At today's levels a move of one US cent in the exchange rate changes the Australian dollar gold price by about A$85 an ounce. These comparisons are Samso arithmetic. What the banks and the World Gold Council say London Gold Exchange compiles the published gold targets of the large banks. Its list of 1 October 2026 has nine targets for late 2026, from US$4,450 at the low end to a range of US$4,900 to US$5,100 at the high end. One of the nine is Citi's three-month view. All nine are above US$4,218. Most also give a later figure, for 2027 or for the next 6 to 12 months, and those run from US$5,000 to a range of US$5,400 to US$5,600 [R46]. Fig 7 charts them with the date each was issued. A tenth bank on the list gives an average for 2026 and is left off the chart. Samso has read the compilation and has not read the bank notes behind it. The World Gold Council, the industry's association, reported total gold demand of 1,269 tonnes in the June 2026 quarter, unchanged from a year earlier. Central banks bought 289 tonnes, up 62 per cent. Gold exchange-traded funds, which hold gold on behalf of share market investors, sold 45 tonnes. Jewellery demand fell 17 per cent to 278 tonnes [R47]. In that quarter, stronger central bank buying was set against weaker jewellery and fund demand. What Samso has published Samso's current view is in “The Big Consolidation” of 8 July 2026, which followed “The Gold Question” of 21 June 2026 [R48] [R49]. It gave a range of US$3,900 to US$4,500 for the second half of 2026, with a centre of US$4,100 to US$4,300. It gave that base case a weight of about 55 per cent, a higher case about 25 per cent and a lower case, of US$3,200 to US$3,600, about 20 per cent. It also set an objective of US$5,000 to US$5,500 over two years, tied to the US central bank changing course in 2027. From 8 July to 8 October 2026 there were 66 trading days. Gold closed inside US$3,900 to US$4,500 on 57 of them and above it on 9, all between 19 August and 3 September 2026. It has not closed below US$3,900. Those counts use daily closes. The price of US$4,218 on 9 October is inside the centre of that range. Samso has not published a change to the view. At today's exchange rate the range is about A$5,580 to A$6,440. The count and the conversion are Samso arithmetic. Interest rates Both central banks that matter to these companies have raised rates. The US Federal Reserve lifted its target range on 16 September 2026 to 3.75 to 4.00 per cent, its first rise since July 2023, after three cuts late in 2025. Its statement said “Inflation remains elevated” [R50]. The Reserve Bank of Australia has raised its cash rate target, the rate it sets for overnight lending between banks, four times in 2026, from 3.60 per cent to 4.60 per cent. The latest rise was decided on 29 September 2026, and the statement referred to “increasing the cash rate target further if needed” [R51]. Higher rates work against gold through the real yield, which is the interest on a government bond after expected inflation. Gold pays no interest, so a higher real yield raises the cost of holding it. The US 10-year real yield was 1.89 per cent on the day of gold's highest close and 2.87 per cent on 8 October 2026 [R52]. Fig 8 shows gold lower and the real yield higher than in January. The two did not move opposite each other in every month. What it means for the three companies The Australian dollar price of about A$6,040 is 16 per cent above the A$5,200 used in the Youanmi study and 10 per cent above the A$5,500 used in the Gum Creek study. Both comparisons are Samso arithmetic. The Youanmi study estimates AISC at A$1,978 an ounce and the Gum Creek study estimates A$2,995 [R6] [R10]. The Gum Creek estimate is closer to the gold price, so its study has less room for a fall in the price. Both are study figures, and AISC leaves out the capital to build. The bottom of Samso's range, US$3,900, converts to about A$5,580 at today's exchange rate. That is about A$80 above the Gum Creek study price and about A$380 above the Youanmi study price. At today's exchange rate the lower case of US$3,200 to US$3,600 is below both study prices. Interest rates reach the three companies in different ways. Rox has arranged its debt. Samso has not read whether its interest rate is fixed or moves with the market. Horizon has not arranged its funding. Any debt would be priced at the rates that apply when it is signed. Brightstar has not published a Sandstone study. The gold price in its pre-feasibility study can be set beside the two above when it is released. 11.00 — WHAT TO WATCH Dates from now to 2028 Table 3 lists the dates the companies have given. Each is the company's statement, and several depend on funding, approvals or other parties. Two things are not in Table 3 because they have no date. One is whether Gold Fields returns with a new proposal for Northern Star. The other is the restart of the Wiluna plant. THE RISKS Most of the mines in this field have closed at least once. Youanmi and Bellevue closed in 1997 and Gum Creek in 2005. Gold is more than a fifth below its January high, and both central banks have just raised rates. Northern Star's guidance for Yandal is for fewer ounces at a higher cost. Bellevue's reserve and resource both fell in September. Penny has a stated end date. The three workup projects are not yet mines in this field. Youanmi's 2025 recovery tests used two composite samples, the study reports no pilot plant, and its ore is partly refractory. Gum Creek's project funding is not yet arranged. Horizon's Annual Report carries a going concern note, and one shareholder holds 65 per cent. Sandstone has no reserve or published study yet, and the workup records two earlier target dates for the study. Wiluna has a published resource of about 7 million ounces and a plant that is shut. These points come from the companies' documents and the price data above. SAMSO TAKE I read the East Murchison as a field that has always had the gold and has not always had the price. The east is in the hands of large producers. The west is where the smaller companies are, and the next 18 months put a date on each of them. Rox is due to pour first gold in mid-2027. Horizon has targeted its investment decision for the June quarter of 2027. Brightstar's study is due to say what Sandstone costs. Which of those three dates would tell you the most about the field as a whole? The vocabulary, in plain English Mineral field An area declared by the Western Australian Government for administering mining titles. Craton A piece of continental crust that has been stable for billions of years. Terrane One of the large blocks of crust that make up a craton. Greenstone belt A strip of old volcanic and sedimentary rock, folded and altered, with granite on either side. Most Western Australian gold is in greenstone belts. Shear zone A band of rock smeared out, and in places broken, by movement in the crust. Gold-bearing fluids often moved along shear zones. Orogenic gold Gold deposited from hot fluids along faults and shear zones while the crust was being deformed. Grade, g/t The amount of gold in ore, in grams for each tonne. Free-milling Ore from which gold can be recovered by grinding and cyanide leaching with no treatment beforehand. Refractory Ore in which part of the gold is locked inside sulphide minerals and needs an extra processing step before leaching. Flotation A process that separates sulphide minerals from the rest of the ore to make a concentrate. Recovery The share of the gold in the ore that the plant gets out. Mineral Resource An estimate of the metal in the ground that has reasonable prospects of eventually being mined at a profit. Its confidence levels, lowest to highest, are Inferred, Indicated and Measured. Ore Reserve The part of a resource that a study of at least pre-feasibility level has shown can be mined at a profit. Its confidence levels are Probable and Proved. PFS and DFS Pre-feasibility study and definitive feasibility study. The second and third of the three stages of mine study. Near-term rule Samso's rule for this series. A company is near-term when it has a published PFS or DFS and a stated date for first gold. AISC All-in sustaining cost. What it costs to produce an ounce at a working mine, including the spending needed to keep the mine going. It leaves out the cost of building the mine, interest and tax. Guidance A company's forecast of its production and costs. Workup Samso Research's long study of a single company. Mtpa Million tonnes a year, the usual measure of a mill's capacity. Care and maintenance A mine or plant that is shut but kept in working order. Tailings The ground waste left after ore has been processed. Toll milling Having ore processed at another owner's plant for a fee. Stoping Mining the ore itself underground, after the access tunnels are built. Dilution Waste rock mined along with the ore, which lowers the grade sent to the plant. Final investment decision A board's formal commitment to build a project. Going concern note The statement in a company's accounts on whether it can pay its way for the next year. Futures contract An agreement to buy or sell gold at a set price on a later date. Real yield The interest on a government bond after expected inflation. Cash rate target The rate the Reserve Bank of Australia sets for overnight lending between banks. References and sources Each source below has an identifier, and the same identifier appears in the text where the source is used. Figures 2 and 5 and Plates 1 and 2 are reproduced from company documents, each credited in its caption. Figure 1 and Figures 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 were drawn by Samso from the data named in their captions. ASX announcements link to the company's announcements page on the ASX website. Government and survey publications carry no link here. [R1] Department of Mines, Petroleum and Exploration, Western Australia. Mineral Field Boundaries (DMIRS-005) and MINEDEX (DMIRS-001) datasets. Gold sites downloaded 5 October 2026 and boundaries read 11 October 2026. Map compiled by Samso. [R2] Government Gazette of Western Australia, 5 July 1895, page 934. Proclamation No. 6147 of the East Murchison Goldfield, signed 29 May 1895. [R3] Government Gazette of Western Australia, 3 June 1904, page 1468. Proclamation of 1 June 1904 dividing the East Murchison Goldfield into the Black Range District and the Lawlers District from 1 July 1904. [R4] Geological Survey of Western Australia, Record 2010/26. Description of the Youanmi Terrane and the Eastern Goldfields Superterrane, and the Ida Fault between them. [R5] Geoscience Australia, Record 2002/14. “Geology of the Sir Samuel 1:250 000 sheet area, Western Australia”. [R6] Rox Resources Limited, 13 November 2025. Youanmi Gold Project Definitive Feasibility Study. ASX announcement. Link [R7] Brightstar Resources Limited, 28 September 2026. “Two Mile Hill Mineral Resource Doubles to 1.45 Million Ounces”, with the Sandstone and group Mineral Resource update. ASX announcement. Link [R8] Horizon Gold Limited, 23 September 2026. Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2026. Link [R9] Wiluna Mining Corporation, 16 February 2024. Pre-feasibility study, geology and metallurgy sections. Link [R10] Horizon Gold Limited, 22 July 2026. Gum Creek Gold Project Definitive Feasibility Study. ASX announcement. Link [R11] Gold Fields Australia, July 2014. Site visit presentation, Agnew/Lawlers Gold Mine, including the history and production of the Lawlers district from 1894 to 2013. Link [R12] Shire of Wiluna. History of Wiluna, council website, read October 2026. Link [R13] Bellevue Gold Limited, 2 September 2021. Bellevue Gold Project feasibility study announcement. Link [R14] Northern Star Resources Limited, May 2014. Jundee fact sheet and the announcement of 13 May 2014 on the purchase of Jundee. Link [R15] Saracen Mineral Holdings Limited, 7 May 2014. Announcement of the purchase of the Thunderbox operations. [R16] Wiluna Mining Corporation, August 2026. Company overview presentation. Link [R17] Brightstar Resources Limited. Sandstone Hub page, company website, read 11 October 2026. Link [R18] Bellevue Gold Limited, 21 September 2026. Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve update. Link [R19] Samso Insights, 2018. Bellevue Gold Project, an exploration success. Link [R20] Northern Star Resources Limited, 29 July 2026. Quarterly Activities Report for the period ended 30 June 2026. Link [R21] Northern Star Resources Limited, 20 August 2026. Financial results for the year ended 30 June 2026, with guidance for the year to June 2027. Link [R22] Northern Star Resources Limited, 3 June 2026. Resources, Reserves and Exploration Update at 31 March 2026. Link [R23] Northern Star Resources Limited, 28 September 2026. Announcement that the Board rejected a non-binding indicative proposal from Gold Fields Limited. Link [R24] Bellevue Gold Limited, 28 July 2026. Quarterly Activities Report for the June 2026 quarter. Link [R25] Ramelius Resources Limited, 29 July 2026. “June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report”. ASX announcement. Link [R26] Ramelius Resources Limited, 21 September 2026. “4-Year Outlook & FY27 Guidance”. ASX announcement. Link [R27] Ramelius Resources Limited, 8 October 2026. “September 2026 Quarter Update”. ASX announcement. Link [R28] Gold Fields Limited. Integrated Annual Report 2024, Agnew operating review, company website, read October 2026. Link [R29] Wiluna Mining Corporation, 11 September 2026. Announcement of its prospectus and A$180 million initial public offering, and the supplementary prospectus notice of 4 October 2026. Link [R30] Wiluna Mining Corporation, 27 July 2026 and 24 August 2026. Announcements on the tank rupture of 25 July 2026 and the suspension of surface and tailings reprocessing operations. Link [R31] Samso News. Wiluna Mining and its initial public offering. Link [R32] Western Gold Resources Limited, 30 September 2026. Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2026. Link [R33] Rox Resources Limited, 22 September 2026. Investor roadshow presentation. Link [R34] Rox Resources Limited, 7 September 2026. “Youanmi Construction and Mining Update”. ASX announcement. Link [R35] Rox Resources Limited, 9 September 2026. Youanmi Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve statement at 30 June 2026. ASX announcement. Link [R36] Rox Resources Limited, 5 October 2026. Announcement of financial close on its A$350 million debt facilities. ASX announcement. Link [R37] Rox Resources Limited, 7 October 2026. United North mining and drilling update. ASX announcement. Link [R38] Samso Research, 11 October 2026. “Rox Resources (ASX: RXL), Youanmi Gold Project Workup”. Link [R39] Samso Research, 11 October 2026. Horizon Gold Limited (ASX: HRN), Gum Creek Gold Project workup. Link [R40] Brightstar Resources Limited, 30 July 2026. Quarterly Activities Report for the June 2026 quarter. Link [R41] Brightstar Resources Limited, 5 October 2026. Bull Oak drilling results. ASX announcement. Link [R42] Samso Research. Brightstar Resources Limited (ASX: BTR) workup, in three parts, first released on 24 September, 29 September and 1 October 2026 and updated 6 October 2026. Link [R43] Brightstar Resources Limited, 24 September 2026. Sandstone metallurgical test work results. ASX announcement. Link [R44] Brightstar Resources Limited, 28 September 2026. North American conference presentation. Slide 6. Link [R45] Yahoo Finance. COMEX gold futures, nearest contract (GC=F), and the Australian dollar against the US dollar (AUDUSD=X), daily closes from October 2023, and the last traded price of each at the close of ASX trading on 9 October 2026, as read for the Horizon Gold workup. Australian dollar gold prices, percentage changes and day counts are Samso arithmetic. Link [R46] London Gold Exchange. Gold price outlook for 2026 and 2027, a compilation of published bank targets, updated 1 October 2026. Read 11 October 2026. Samso has not read the bank notes. Link [R47] World Gold Council. Gold Demand Trends, Q2 2026, executive summary. Data as of 30 June 2026. Link [R48] Samso Insights, 8 July 2026. “The Big Consolidation, Where the Gold Price Settles Before Its Next Move”. Link [R49] Samso Insights, 21 June 2026. “The Gold Question, Which Way for the Gold Price From Here”. Link [R50] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 16 September 2026. Federal Open Market Committee statement, and the Open Market Operations page for the history of the target range. Link [R51] Reserve Bank of Australia, 29 September 2026. Statement by the Monetary Policy Board, and statistical table A2 for the history of the cash rate target. Link [R52] US Department of the Treasury. Daily par real yield curve rates, 10-year. Link [R53] Cover photo. Construction at the Youanmi Gold Project, looking south. Rox Resources Limited, “Youanmi Construction and Mining Update”, 7 September 2026, Figure 1. 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Four mines produce gold in Western Australia's Yalgoo Mineral Field, and two more projects have published studies. This Insight sets out the geology, the mining history, who owns each mine and mill on 11 October 2026, and the dates that come next. The Yalgoo Mineral Field is one of the districts the Western Australian Government uses to administer mining titles. It covers a block of the Murchison region around the town of Yalgoo. Its gold projects run from Mt Gibson in the south to Western Queen in the north-east (Fig 1, in section 1.00). It was proclaimed as a goldfield in 1895 [R1]. Four mines in the field produce gold today. The Deflector gold mine and the Rothsay mine belong to Vault Minerals (ASX: VAU). Dalgaranga belongs to Ramelius Resources (ASX: RMS). Golden Grove, owned by 29Metals (ASX: 29M), is a copper and zinc mine that recovers gold as a by-product, which is a metal sold alongside the main product. Two more projects are each the subject of a Samso Research workup, which is Samso's long study of a single company. They are the Mt Gibson gold project, owned by Capricorn Metals (ASX: CMM), and the Western Queen gold project, owned by Rumble Resources (ASX: RTR). This Insight is the Yalgoo page of Samso's Gold Regions Series. A mill is the plant that processes ore into gold. This page covers what the field is, the rocks that hold the gold, what was mined and when, who owns each mine and each mill on 11 October 2026, and the dates each company has given for what comes next. All prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 16 October 2026. Global prices for gold are taken at the same time. WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS 1.00 THE YALGOO MINERAL FIELD AND ITS BOUNDARY What a mineral field is, where this one is, and the map. 2.00 THE ROCKS THAT HOLD THE GOLD The geology in plain English, and the names companies use for it. 3.00 MINING HISTORY TO 1987 What the State's geologists recorded, centre by centre. 4.00 THE MODERN MINES Mt Gibson, Dalgaranga, Golden Range, Western Queen and Deflector since the 1980s. 5.00 WHO PRODUCES GOLD TODAY Vault Minerals, Ramelius Resources and 29Metals. No Samso workup on these. 6.00 CAPRICORN METALS, MT GIBSON AND GOLDEN RANGE The Mt Gibson study, the approvals, and why Golden Range is separate. 7.00 RUMBLE RESOURCES AND WESTERN QUEEN The resource, the study, and why it does not yet meet Samso's near-term rule. 8.00 THE MILLS Where ore is processed, and the restart timings for Kirkalocka. 9.00 THE GOLD PRICE AND INTEREST RATES The price in two currencies, the bank targets, Samso's view and the rate rises. 10.00 WHAT TO WATCH Each company's stated timing, and the risks and limits. A NOTE ON THE VOCABULARY AND THE SOURCES Technical terms are explained where they first appear and are collected in a vocabulary box at the end. A marker such as [R1] points to the numbered source in the reference list. Where two sources give different figures for the same thing, both are quoted with their source and neither is preferred. Gold is measured in troy ounces. The tables shorten ounces to oz, thousand ounces to koz, million ounces to Moz, tonnes to t and million tonnes to Mt. Mt Gibson and Mount Gibson are the same place, and GSWA uses the longer spelling. READING THE SERIES Gold Regions Series, Release 1 Samso News. Gold price and the gold regions. Samso Insights. East Murchison. Samso Insights. Yalgoo Mineral Field. This page. Samso Research. Rox Resources (ASX: RXL), Youanmi. Samso Research. Horizon Gold (ASX: HRN), Gum Creek. Samso Research. Brightstar Resources (ASX: BTR), Sandstone, in three parts. Samso Research. Capricorn Metals (ASX: CMM), Mt Gibson. Samso Research. Rumble Resources (ASX: RTR), Western Queen. A page with no link is not yet published. That includes the Samso News piece, so this page carries no link back to it. The thumbnail for this piece uses a public domain photograph of a gold nugget [R48] 1.00 — THE YALGOO MINERAL FIELD AND ITS BOUNDARY An administrative district of about 60,000 square kilometres A mineral field is a district declared by the Western Australian Government for administering mining titles. The State is divided into these fields, and each has a number. The Yalgoo Mineral Field is number 59 [R2]. It began as the Yalgoo Goldfield. The proclamation was dated 23 January 1895 and was published in the Government Gazette on 8 February 1895 [R1]. A bulletin of the Geological Survey of Western Australia (GSWA), the State's geological agency, recorded that the goldfield “embraces an area of 23,230 square miles” and counted 19 mining centres on it [R3]. That area converts to about 60,200 square kilometres. The conversion is Samso arithmetic, and Samso has not checked whether the boundary has changed since the bulletin was written. The name is the department's, and this Insight uses it. Company announcements more often say the Murchison or name a greenstone belt, and section 2.00 explains both terms. Fig 1 is Samso's map of the field. It was compiled from the department's boundary file and from MINEDEX, the department's database of mines and mineral deposits, which lists 895 gold sites inside the boundary [R2]. The four mines that produce gold and the two workup projects are marked. Golden Range and the Kirkalocka mill are discussed later and are not marked on Fig 1. They appear on Fig 5 in section 6.00 and Fig 6 in section 8.00. Western Queen is at the north-eastern edge of the field. The town of Mount Magnet, where Ramelius Resources has its mill, is outside the boundary to the east. 2.00 — THE ROCKS THAT HOLD THE GOLD Greenstone belts, granite and the faults between them The field is on the Yilgarn Craton. A craton is a piece of continental crust that has been stable for billions of years. GSWA places the Yalgoo area in the Youanmi Terrane, one of the large blocks that make up the craton [R4]. An older GSWA bulletin uses the name Murchison Province for this part of the craton [R5]. Investors usually say the Murchison. The gold is in greenstone belts. A greenstone belt is a strip of old volcanic and sedimentary rock that has been folded and altered, with granite on either side. Fig 2 shows the pattern across the Murchison. The shaded strips are greenstone and the pale areas between them are granite and gneiss. Gneiss is a banded rock formed when granite and other rocks are deformed and recrystallised at depth. The largest belt in the field is the Yalgoo-Singleton Greenstone Belt. A GSWA Record of 2020 describes it as “a ~190 km, north-northwest trending, arcuate-shaped greenstone belt” that is “primarily prospective for gold, in addition to base metals, W-Mo and iron ore” [R6]. Arcuate means curved. Base metals are copper, zinc and lead, and W-Mo is tungsten and molybdenum. Warriedar Resources, which owned Golden Range before Capricorn, gave the belt's length as about 120 kilometres [R7]. Both figures are quoted as published. Companies use several other belt names. Bulletin 137 names the Gullewa, Dalgaranga, Warda Warra and Meekatharra-Wydgee belts among others [R5]. Deflector is in the Gullewa belt [R8]. Western Queen is in the Warda Warra belt and Kirkalocka is in the Meekatharra-Wydgee belt. These are local names for parts of the same geology, and a company may use any of them. Capricorn places Mt Gibson at the “southern extremity of the Retaliation Greenstone Belt, in the SW portion of the Yalgoo-Singleton Greenstone Belt in the Murchison Province” [R9]. Most of the gold is tied to shear zones. A shear zone is a band of rock that has been smeared out, and in places broken, by movement in the crust. Hot fluids carrying gold moved along these bands. Bulletin 137, published in 1990, put most of the province's gold deposits at about 2,650 to 2,600 million years old [R5]. Geologists call deposits of this kind orogenic gold. The field also holds deposits of a second kind. Golden Grove is a volcanic-hosted massive sulphide deposit, or VHMS. It formed on or just below an ancient sea floor as a body of metal sulphides, which are minerals of metal and sulphur, and it is mined for copper and zinc. Capricorn's study says the main trend at Mt Gibson is “hypothesised” to have begun as a deposit of this type, rich in gold, copper and zinc, that was overprinted, meaning altered, by a later gold event [R9]. Weathering then left gold in laterite, the iron-rich crust at the surface [R5]. Deflector carries copper with its gold. Its former owner classed it as a “hybrid Archean orogenic gold-copper deposit” [R8]. The mix of deposit types affects how the ore is processed. Capricorn describes Mt Gibson ore as free-milling, meaning the gold can be recovered by grinding and by leaching, which dissolves the gold in a cyanide solution, with no treatment needed beforehand [R9]. Deflector produces both gold bars and a gold-copper concentrate, a metal-rich powder sold to a smelter, the works that extracts the metal [R8]. 3.00 — MINING HISTORY TO 1987 Many small centres and a late arrival at Mt Gibson GSWA's Bulletin 137 gives the “first authenticated discovery of economic gold mineralization” in the Murchison Province as Yuin, in 1890 [R5]. Yuin is one of the centres Samso places inside the Yalgoo field. GSWA's notes on the Yalgoo map sheet record that “Gold was discovered at Yalgoo in 1894” [R10]. The early mines were small. The same notes say that “by 1900 production from the Yalgoo field was only minor”, that there was “renewed activity at most centres in 1930”, and that “except for Bilberatha, production finally ceased in 1942” [R10]. Two centres in the south have their own GSWA bulletin. It records that gold was first found at Rothsay in 1894 by George Woodley and that the mine there “finally shut down in 1902”. At Paynes Find, the first gold “is reported to have been found by T. Payne in May, 1911” [R11]. Table 34 of Bulletin 137 lists recorded gold production for each mining centre in the Murchison Province to 31 December 1987 [R5]. The table is alphabetical and does not group centres by mineral field. Samso has picked out the 21 centres it places inside today's Yalgoo boundary, plus the row the Bulletin records against the Yalgoo Mineral Field with no centre named. Fig 3 charts them. Those rows add to about 11,277 kilograms of gold, or about 362,600 ounces. The sum and the conversion are Samso arithmetic, at 32.15 ounces to the kilogram, and the choice of centres is Samso's. The Bulletin's total for the whole province is 227,564 kilograms. On that count the Yalgoo field produced about 5 per cent of the Murchison's recorded gold to 1987. The field was a small part of the Murchison's gold production before the modern mines. Fig 4 is the Bulletin's map of where the province's gold came from. The large centres are Mount Magnet, Day Dawn, Meekatharra and Big Bell, and all four are outside the Yalgoo field. At two centres, most of the gold came from one mine. The Bulletin says about 87 per cent of the Yalgoo centre's production came from the Emerald Reward mine, and about 90 per cent of production at Warda Warra came from the Western Queen mine [R5]. Western Queen is the project Rumble Resources owns today. Mount Gibson's 2,447 kilograms came from 752,041 tonnes of ore, far more ore than any other centre in the field. The Bulletin explains that before 1986 the centre had only small-scale mining, at Tobias Find, Orion, Leakes Find and Paynes Crusoe. Mining of the laterite gold deposit began in 1986, and gold production from the rock beneath it began in 1988 [R5]. Most of that ore would therefore have been mined in 1986 and 1987. That is Samso's inference, because the Bulletin gives no split by year. 4.00 — THE MODERN MINES Open pits from 1986, then closures and restarts The laterite pits at Mt Gibson opened a period of larger mines. Table 1 lists them. The production figures are as each company published them and have not been reconciled with State records. Grade is the amount of gold in each tonne of ore, measured in grams a tonne (g/t). Western Queen's 7.6 g/t is the highest grade in Table 1 [R12]. The Ore Reserve at Mt Gibson, the part of the deposit a study has shown can be mined at a profit, grades 1.0 g/t [R13]. Most of these mines stopped at least once. Golden Range went onto care and maintenance, meaning the plant was shut but kept in working order, three times [R7]. Dalgaranga produced 229,000 ounces between 1996 and 2000, restarted with a first gold pour in May 2018, and was suspended on 8 November 2022 [R14] [R15]. Ore was often trucked to a plant somewhere else. Rothsay ore has been hauled to the Deflector plant since June 2021 [R8]. Dalgaranga ore now goes to Mount Magnet. Rumble plans to truck Western Queen ore to another owner's mill. Section 8.00 covers the mills. Table 1 also records a discrepancy. Capricorn's July 2026 study gives Mt Gibson's past production as 868,478 ounces in one place and 868,468 ounces in another [R9]. Both are quoted as published. 5.00 — WHO PRODUCES GOLD TODAY Three owners, four mines and a takeover vote Three companies produce gold in the field. Samso has not written a workup on any of them. Each is an established producer, and they are noted here from their latest reports. Table 2 at the end of this section sets them beside the two workup companies. Vault Minerals, Deflector and Rothsay Vault Minerals owns Deflector and Rothsay on the day of writing. It reports them together as the Deflector region. In the year to 30 June 2026 the region produced 77,649 ounces at an all-in sustaining cost of A$3,282 an ounce [R16]. All-in sustaining cost, or AISC, is the industry's measure of what it costs to produce an ounce at a working mine, including the spending needed to keep the mine going. It leaves out the cost of building the mine, interest and tax, and companies do not all calculate it the same way. Guidance is the company's forecast. For the year to June 2027 it is 74,000 to 78,000 ounces at A$4,300 to A$4,500 an ounce, which is higher than last year's cost. Vault says that figure includes a non-cash inventory charge [R16]. Rothsay is near the end of its reserve. An Ore Reserve is the part of a deposit that a study of at least pre-feasibility level has shown can be mined at a profit. Vault's July outlook “assumes production from Rothsay ceases in January 2028” [R16]. Its September reserve statement says Rothsay's reserve will be “substantially completed by the end of FY27”, which is June 2027 [R17]. Both are quoted as published. Rothsay's reserve at 30 June 2026 was 25,000 ounces, within a Mineral Resource of 258,000 ounces [R17]. A Mineral Resource is an estimate of the gold in the ground that has reasonable prospects of eventually being mined at a profit. The owner may change. On 14 July 2026 Genesis Minerals (ASX: GMD) and Vault agreed to merge by a scheme of arrangement, a takeover that needs a shareholder vote and court approval. Vault shareholders would receive 0.7629 Genesis shares plus A$0.475 in cash for each Vault share. Vault had an earlier scheme with Regis Resources, which was terminated [R18]. The court has ordered the scheme meeting for 9.30am Perth time on Wednesday 11 November 2026 [R19]. The scheme booklet was registered on 6 October 2026 [R20]. If shareholders and the court approve, Deflector and Rothsay will belong to Genesis. Ramelius Resources, Dalgaranga Ramelius Resources has owned Dalgaranga since 31 July 2025, when its takeover of Spartan Resources was completed [R21]. The mine works the Never Never deposit from underground and from an open pit. In the June 2026 quarter the underground mined 115,000 tonnes at 5.95 g/t. The open pit ore, 79,000 tonnes at 2.10 g/t at the end of June, was stockpiled at site [R21]. Plate 1 shows the Never Never open pit. Dalgaranga's own mill is on care and maintenance [R22]. Ore is trucked 70 kilometres to the Checkers mill at Mount Magnet, which is outside the Yalgoo field, and Ramelius reports Dalgaranga as part of its Mount Magnet operation [R23]. Dalgaranga's gold is therefore produced at a plant outside the field. Ramelius plans to move the main grinding mill and other parts of the Dalgaranga plant to Mount Magnet. The grinding mill is the machine that grinds the ore. The move is part of an expansion of the Mount Magnet plant to 4.3 million tonnes a year, which Ramelius targets for the March 2028 quarter [R22]. Dalgaranga's Ore Reserve at 30 June 2026 was 7.0 million tonnes at 7.2 g/t for 1.6 million ounces, within a Mineral Resource of 24 million tonnes at 4.0 g/t for 3.0 million ounces [R23]. Ramelius's update of 8 October 2026 gave group production of 48,839 ounces for the September quarter and said Dalgaranga was “ramping up tonnages”. It did not give Dalgaranga's ounces separately [R24]. 29Metals, Golden Grove The first Golden Grove deposit was found in 1971 and mining began in 1989 [R25]. It is a copper and zinc mine. Gold is a by-product, and 29Metals reports its costs per pound of copper [R26]. Gold production was 4,700 ounces in the June 2026 quarter and 1,100 ounces in the March quarter. Guidance for calendar 2026 is 6,000 to 14,000 ounces [R26]. Gold output at Golden Grove depends on the mine plan for copper and zinc. The June figure was higher because a stockpile of gold ore was processed [R26]. Plate 2 shows Gossan Valley, a new mining area where 29Metals expects first ore by the end of 2026 [R26]. In Table 2, Mtpa is million tonnes a year and FY26 is the year to 30 June 2026. The study stages named in the Status column are explained in sections 6.00 and 7.00, and toll milling is explained in section 7.00. SAMSO TAKE Table 2 shows how the field is owned. Three of the four producing mines belong to companies whose larger operations are in other districts, and one of those companies is about to be voted on as a takeover target. The two projects with studies belong to a mid-sized producer and a small explorer. That is a common pattern in a mature gold district. The ground gets consolidated, ore gets trucked to whichever mill has room, and a small deposit depends on access to someone else's plant. When you look at a project in a district like this, do you ask who owns the nearest mill before you ask how many ounces are in the ground? 6.00 — CAPRICORN METALS, MT GIBSON AND GOLDEN RANGE A 3.67 million ounce reserve and a pending State approval Capricorn Metals produces gold at Karlawinda, in the Pilbara [R13]. It plans its second mine at Mt Gibson, about 280 kilometres north-east of Perth [R9]. This series classes Capricorn as “Producer elsewhere. Mt Gibson is near-term”. Near-term has a set meaning in this series. A project meets Samso's near-term rule when it has a published pre-feasibility or definitive feasibility study and the company has stated a date for first gold. Mt Gibson meets both parts. Capricorn published an updated pre-feasibility study, or PFS, on 27 July 2026 [R9]. A PFS is the middle of three study stages. It is firmer than a scoping study and less firm than the definitive feasibility study a lender usually wants. The study's timetable is construction and pre-production mining from the December quarter of 2026 and operations from the March quarter of 2028. Capricorn says both “are dependent on timing of final regulatory environmental approvals which are not within Capricorn's control” [R9]. Plate 3 shows a flooded pit at the project. What the study says The Mineral Resource at Mt Gibson is 188.9 million tonnes at 0.9 g/t for 5.67 million ounces. The Ore Reserve is 119.3 million tonnes at 1.0 g/t for 3.67 million ounces, and the resource includes the reserve [R13]. All of the reserve is in the Probable category, the lower of the two confidence levels for a reserve. It includes a first underground reserve of 365,000 ounces at 2.3 g/t [R9]. The plan is a plant designed for 5.0 million tonnes a year (Mtpa) of fresh rock, running for 19.25 years. The study mills 120.9 million tonnes over that life. It forecasts 3.51 million ounces recovered from 3.82 million ounces mined, a recovery of 92.1 per cent. The study says 96 per cent of that production is derived from Ore Reserves. In the underground part of the plan, 28 per cent of the ounces come from Inferred material [R9]. Production averages 182,500 ounces a year over the whole life, which includes fifteen months of processing low-grade stockpiles. It averages 260,900 ounces a year in years three to six, when the open pits and the underground run together. AISC is estimated at A$1,870 an ounce. Capital cost before production is A$474 million, made up of A$345 million for the plant and infrastructure and A$129 million for mining before production. The estimate carries no contingency, which is the allowance a study normally adds for costs not yet identified [R9]. These are the study's forecasts, modelled at a gold price of A$5,500 an ounce [R9]. Mt Gibson's reserve grades 1.0 g/t, so a large tonnage has to be treated for each ounce. The open pits mine 558 million tonnes of waste, a strip ratio of 5.0 tonnes of waste to each tonne of ore [R9]. In Samso's reading, that is why the plan is large. Where the approvals stand Capricorn's update of 5 October 2026 lists the position. Detailed engineering is complete. Federal environmental approval has been received. The State environmental review has been lodged and its public review phase has closed. Secondary State approvals have been lodged [R27]. The State decision had not been announced on the day of writing, and Capricorn has not announced a final investment decision, the board's formal commitment to build. Cash and gold on hand were A$535.0 million at 30 September 2026, a preliminary figure [R27]. The study's start date therefore depends on a State decision that has no date. Golden Range is a separate project Capricorn also owns Golden Range and Fields Find, north of Mt Gibson. They came with Warriedar Resources, which Capricorn agreed to buy in July 2025 [R28]. Fig 5 is Capricorn's map of the combined ground [R29]. Golden Range is outside the Mt Gibson PFS. The study states that it covers Stage 1 only. Stage 2 is a separate options study into “a second processing hub at the Golden Range Project located 65 - 100 kilometres north of the Mt Gibson processing site”, with preliminary results expected in the December quarter of 2026 [R9]. None of the Mt Gibson production, cost or capital figures above includes Golden Range. Golden Range's resource is also reported separately. When Capricorn announced the acquisition it gave the resource as 1.38 million ounces of gold, with 60,000 tonnes of antimony in addition [R28]. More than half of those ounces were in the Inferred category, the lowest confidence level for a resource. That share is Samso arithmetic on Warriedar's table [R7]. The site has a 0.8 Mtpa plant that Capricorn describes as non-operating [R28]. Warriedar said it had been on care and maintenance since August 2019 [R7]. Fig 5 marks a haul route between the two projects. Capricorn has not published a study for Golden Range. Samso Research has written a workup titled “Capricorn Metals Ltd (ASX: CMM)”, in three parts. It was not yet published on the day this Insight was written, so it is named here without a link. The figures in this section match the workup. 7.00 — RUMBLE RESOURCES AND WESTERN QUEEN A scoping study, with a new one due this month Rumble Resources owns 100 per cent of Western Queen, which is “approximately 90km Northwest of Mt Magnet” [R12]. This series classes Rumble as “Scoping study stage. Does not yet meet the near-term rule”. Western Queen has a scoping study, the earliest and least certain of the three study stages. It has no pre-feasibility or definitive feasibility study, no Ore Reserve, and no firm date for first gold. Until those exist it does not meet Samso's near-term rule. The rule measures the study stage only and is no measure of the deposit. The deposit Western Queen was first worked in the 1930s [R12]. It was mined again from 1998 to 2002, in 2007, and in 2013 and 2014, the last time by Ramelius [R30]. Rumble gives past production as 880,000 tonnes at 7.6 g/t for 215,000 ounces [R12]. The Mineral Resource was upgraded on 24 June 2026 to 5.13 million tonnes at 2.6 g/t for 433,600 ounces. Of that, 227,700 ounces are in the Indicated category, the middle confidence level, and the rest are Inferred. The upgrade included a zone of 145,000 tonnes at 11.3 g/t beneath the old underground workings [R30]. The resource grades 2.6 g/t, against 7.6 g/t for past production. The study The scoping study of 27 November 2025 covers an underground mine at Western Queen South only. Its production target, the tonnage the study plans to mine, is 617,000 tonnes at 2.95 g/t for 58,500 ounces of contained gold, which is gold in the ore before any is lost in processing. The study estimates less than A$10 million of capital before development and an AISC of A$2,970 an ounce, at a gold price of A$5,540 an ounce. It assumes 94 per cent of the gold is recovered, a figure taken from earlier owners' processing, and A$100 a tonne for trucking and milling combined [R12]. The study predates the toll milling agreement. It plans to mine 58,500 ounces from a resource that now holds 433,600 ounces. Rumble has released testwork of its own since the study, in an announcement dated 25 March 2026. The sample was 466 kilograms of material mined in the past at Western Queen South, which carries tungsten as well as gold. A bulk test on part of that sample projected overall gold recovery of about 92 per cent with a tungsten concentrate also produced. Baseline tests with no tungsten recovery, using gravity separation and then a cyanide leach, which dissolves the gold, extracted 95.4 per cent of the gold at a fine grind of 75 microns and 88.7 per cent at a coarser grind of 145 microns [R31]. A micron is a thousandth of a millimetre. Rumble's Diggers and Dealers presentation of 4 August 2026 still gave 94 per cent for the study [R32]. A scoping study is a low-accuracy study. It cannot support an Ore Reserve, and there is no certainty that its production target will be realised. The study states that 34 per cent of the production target is Inferred material, and that “there is a low level of geological confidence associated with Inferred Mineral Resources” [R12]. That study predates the June 2026 resource. Rumble is updating it. On 6 October 2026 the company said the work was “slightly delayed” and that it was “Now aiming to release the Study during October” [R33]. It had not been released on the day of writing. The same update says a feasibility study and a decision to mine are “still targeting the December quarter 2026”, and that a State approval called the Mine Development and Closure Proposal “remains the key outstanding approval” [R33]. Rumble has given a conditional year for first gold, calendar 2027, and no quarter. The Annual Report says that if its remaining steps are achieved in a timely manner the company should be “producing gold in calendar year 2027” [R34]. The steps it lists include final approvals, working capital, a mining contractor and a final investment decision. The Annual Report also carries a going concern note, which says the company depends on raising capital. Cash was A$11.1 million at 30 June 2026 [R34]. Western Queen has no plant. Rumble plans to truck ore to the Kirkalocka mill under a toll milling agreement, a contract to have ore processed at another owner's plant for a fee. The Kirkalocka mill is not running, and section 8.00 sets out the restart dates given so far. Samso Research has written a workup titled “Rumble Resources Limited (ASX: RTR)”, in two parts. It was not yet published on the day this Insight was written, so it is named here without a link. The figures in this section match the workup. Samso also published five earlier pieces on Rumble and Western Queen between March and December 2025. 8.00 — THE MILLS Five mills near Western Queen, and the Kirkalocka restart A gold deposit needs a processing plant, usually called a mill, to turn ore into gold bars. The Mt Gibson study puts A$474 million into a new mine and plant [R9]. The Western Queen study plans no plant. It assumes the ore is treated at another owner's mill [R12]. Fig 6 is Rumble's map of the mills within reach of Western Queen. Five mills are shown. Two belong to Ramelius. Checkers, at Mount Magnet, is running and takes Dalgaranga's ore. The Dalgaranga mill is on care and maintenance and its grinding mill is to be moved [R22]. Tuckabianna, further east, belongs to Westgold Resources [R12]. It is outside the Yalgoo field on Samso's map. The Golden Range mill belongs to Capricorn and is not operating [R28]. The fifth is Kirkalocka. Fig 6 prints 1.9 Mtpa for Kirkalocka. The text of the same study says 2.0 Mtpa [R12], and so does the owner's website [R35]. Rumble's announcement of the toll milling agreement says 2.1 Mtpa [R36]. Each is quoted as published. Kirkalocka Kirkalocka belongs to Gylden Resources, a private company that says it is owned by an affiliate of Värde Partners [R35]. The plant is not running. Odyssey Gold (ASX: ODY) had a toll milling agreement there until 14 October 2026, when it told the ASX that the agreement had been terminated. Odyssey says the plant last operated in 2022 and has been on care and maintenance since [R37]. Gylden is refurbishing it. Plate 4 shows the plant. Rumble announced its agreement with Gylden on 19 May 2026. It covers all forecast gold ore from Western Queen for four years and 11 months from the first ore processed, with fees fixed for calendar 2027. It has three conditions. Rumble must make a decision to mine, the two companies must sign a joint refining contract, and Ramelius must not have exercised its pre-emptive rights to process ore from Western Queen [R36]. The plant is about 180 kilometres from Western Queen [R38]. The parties have given different timings for the restart. Table 3 sets out each statement as its author gave it. Table 3 holds two differences. Rumble's last dated statement was the second half of 2026, and the owner's website says mid Q1 2027, which is about February 2027. Rumble names Interquip Construction as the contractor and Odyssey names MACA Limited. Each is quoted with its source [R38] [R33] [R35] [R39]. The restart date decides when Western Queen ore can be processed. The November 2025 study said first ore could come “within six months of commencing decline development”, a decline being the sloping tunnel that gives access to an underground mine [R12]. Ore mined before the mill is running has to wait in a stockpile. 9.00 — THE GOLD PRICE AND INTEREST RATES Gold is inside Samso's range and above both study prices Gold mined in Australia is sold in Australian dollars, so the Australian dollar price is the one that applies to these mines and studies. The prices below are futures closes. A futures contract is an agreement to buy gold at a set price on a later date, and the nearest contract trades close to the spot price, the price for immediate delivery. The price now Gold closed at US$4,170 an ounce. At an exchange rate of 0.6978 US dollars to the Australian dollar, that is A$5,976 [R40]. The highest close of this cycle was US$5,318 on 29 January 2026, and A$7,581 on 28 January 2026. Gold is 21.6 per cent below that high in US dollars and 21.2 per cent below it in Australian dollars. Fig 7 shows both. Over a year the gold price is lower in both currencies, and lower by more in Australian dollars. The US dollar price is 0.7 per cent lower than a year earlier, and the Australian dollar price is 7.7 per cent lower than a year earlier [R40]. The difference comes from the exchange rate. The Australian dollar has risen against the US dollar over the year, and a stronger Australian dollar lowers the local gold price. At today's levels a move of one US cent in the exchange rate changes the Australian dollar gold price by about A$84 an ounce. These comparisons are Samso arithmetic. What the banks and the World Gold Council say London Gold Exchange, a UK gold dealer directory, compiles the published gold targets of the large banks. Its list of 1 October 2026 has nine targets for late 2026, from US$4,450 at the low end to a range of US$4,900 to US$5,100 at the high end. All nine are above the price on 16 October 2026. Most also give a later figure, for 2027 or for the next 6 to 12 months, and those run from US$5,000 to a range of US$5,400 to US$5,600 [R41]. Fig 8 charts them with the date each was issued. A tenth bank on the list gives an average for 2026 and is left off the chart. Samso has read the compilation and has not read the bank notes behind it. The World Gold Council, the industry's association, reported total gold demand of 1,269 tonnes in the June 2026 quarter, unchanged from a year earlier. Central banks bought 289 tonnes, up 62 per cent. Gold exchange-traded funds, which hold gold on behalf of share market investors, sold 45 tonnes. Jewellery demand fell 17 per cent to 278 tonnes [R42]. Central banks bought more gold, funds sold, jewellery buyers bought less, and total demand was unchanged. What Samso has published Samso's current view is in “The Big Consolidation” of 8 July 2026, which followed “The Gold Question” of 21 June 2026 [R43] [R44]. It gave a range of US$3,900 to US$4,500 for the second half of 2026, with a centre of US$4,100 to US$4,300. It put the chance of that range at about 55 per cent, a higher outcome at about 25 per cent and a lower one at about 20 per cent. It also set an objective of US$5,000 to US$5,500 over two years, tied to the US central bank changing course in 2027. Since 8 July 2026 there have been 71 trading days. Gold closed inside US$3,900 to US$4,500 on 62 of them and above it on 9, all between 19 August and 3 September 2026. It has not closed below US$3,900. The close of US$4,170 is inside the centre of that range. Samso has not published a change to the view. At today's exchange rate the range is about A$5,589 to A$6,449. The count and the conversion are Samso arithmetic. Interest rates The US and Australian central banks have both raised rates. The US Federal Reserve lifted its target range on 16 September 2026 to 3.75 to 4.00 per cent, its first rise since July 2023, after three cuts late in 2025. Its statement said “Inflation remains elevated” [R45]. The Reserve Bank of Australia has raised its cash rate target, the rate it sets for overnight lending between banks, four times in 2026, from 3.60 per cent to 4.60 per cent. The latest rise was decided on 29 September 2026, and the statement referred to “increasing the cash rate target further if needed” [R46]. Higher rates work against gold through the real yield, which is the interest on a government bond after expected inflation. Gold pays no interest, so a higher real yield raises the cost of holding it. The US 10-year real yield was 1.89 per cent on the day of gold's highest close and is 2.78 per cent now [R47]. Fig 9 shows gold falling as the real yield rose. What it means for the two projects The Australian dollar price of A$5,976 is 8.7 per cent above the A$5,500 used in the Mt Gibson study and 7.9 per cent above the A$5,540 used in the Western Queen study. Both comparisons are Samso arithmetic. The Mt Gibson study estimates AISC at A$1,870 an ounce and the Western Queen study estimates A$2,970 [R9] [R12]. The Western Queen estimate is closer to the gold price than the Mt Gibson estimate. Both are study figures at different study stages, and AISC leaves out the capital to build, which is A$474 million before contingency at Mt Gibson. Higher interest rates also raise the cost of any debt used to build a mine. Rumble says potential lenders are waiting for its updated study [R33]. 10.00 — WHAT TO WATCH Dates from now to 2028 Table 4 lists the dates the companies have given. Each is the company's statement. Several depend on approvals or on other parties, and the companies say so. When Rumble releases its updated study, the figures in section 7.00 will be replaced. Rumble's class in this series may change. The Vault vote on 11 November 2026 will decide who is named as the owner of Deflector and Rothsay. The State decision on Mt Gibson has no date and is not in the table. THE RISKS AND THE LIMITS The record to 1987 is of small mines, about 5 per cent of the Murchison's gold from a district of 60,000 square kilometres. Most of the larger mines since then have stopped at least once. Vault's outlook assumes Rothsay stops producing in January 2028, and its cost guidance for the Deflector region rises from A$3,282 an ounce last year to A$4,300 to A$4,500 this year. Dalgaranga's gold is processed outside the field, so a 1.6 million ounce reserve feeds a plant elsewhere. The Deflector region's reserve, for comparison, is 170,000 ounces [R17]. The two projects with studies are not yet mines. Mt Gibson's reserve is all in the lower confidence category, the State approval is outstanding, the capital estimate has no contingency and there is no final investment decision. Golden Range is mostly Inferred and Capricorn has published no study for it. Western Queen has no reserve, a study in which a third of the target is Inferred, a going concern note in the Annual Report and a mill that is not running. Its resource grades 2.6 g/t against the 7.6 g/t of past production, and the restart dates given for Kirkalocka do not agree. The toll milling agreement still depends on a decision to mine, on a joint refining contract, and on Ramelius not using its pre-emptive right to process Western Queen ore. The study assumes 94 per cent of the gold is recovered, and Rumble's own testwork of March 2026 projected about 92 per cent when tungsten is also recovered. The updated study is late, and Rumble says potential lenders are waiting for it. Gold is more than a fifth below its January high, the Australian dollar price is 7.7 per cent lower than a year earlier, and both central banks have just raised rates. Gold funds sold 45 tonnes in the June quarter. Samso's July view gave a lower outcome about a one in five chance, and the bank targets come from a compilation, with the bank notes unread by Samso. SAMSO TAKE I read the Yalgoo field as a district where gold was found in many places, and the hard part was scale and processing. Mt Gibson's plan relies on size. Western Queen's relies on grade and on another owner's mill. Neither is built. The next few months put dates and numbers on both. If you had to choose which fact to learn first about either project, would it be the grade, the approval, or the day the mill turns on? THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH Mineral field A district declared by the Western Australian Government for administering mining titles. Craton A piece of continental crust that has been stable for billions of years. Greenstone belt A strip of old volcanic and sedimentary rock, folded and altered, with granite on either side. Most Western Australian gold is in greenstone belts. Shear zone A band of rock smeared out, and in places broken, by movement in the crust. Gold-bearing fluids often moved along shear zones. Orogenic gold Gold deposited from hot fluids along faults and shear zones while the crust was being deformed. VHMS Volcanic-hosted massive sulphide. A body of metal sulphides formed on or just below an ancient sea floor, usually mined for copper, zinc and lead. Laterite The iron-rich crust left at the surface by long weathering. It can hold secondary gold, moved and redeposited during weathering. Grade, g/t The amount of gold in ore, in grams for each tonne. Mineral Resource An estimate of the metal in the ground that has reasonable prospects of eventually being mined at a profit. Its confidence levels, lowest to highest, are Inferred, Indicated and Measured. Ore Reserve The part of a resource that a study of at least pre-feasibility level has shown can be mined at a profit. Its confidence levels are Probable and Proved. Inferred material cannot become a reserve. Scoping study, PFS, DFS The three stages of mine study, from least to most certain. PFS is a pre-feasibility study and DFS is a definitive feasibility study. Near-term rule Samso's rule for this series. A project is near-term when it has a published PFS or DFS and a stated date for first gold. AISC All-in sustaining cost. What it costs to produce an ounce at a working mine, including the spending needed to keep the mine going. It leaves out the cost of building the mine, interest and tax. Mill The plant that processes ore into gold. A grinding mill is the machine inside it that grinds the ore. Workup Samso Research's long study of a single company. Production target The tonnage and grade a study plans to mine. Mtpa Million tonnes a year, the usual measure of a mill's capacity. Free-milling Ore from which gold can be recovered by grinding and cyanide leaching with no treatment beforehand. Concentrate A powder rich in metal, produced at the mine and sold to a smelter. By-product A metal sold alongside a mine's main product. Care and maintenance A mine or plant that is shut but kept in working order. Toll milling Having ore processed at another owner's plant for a fee. Decline The sloping tunnel that gives access to an underground mine. Scheme of arrangement A takeover that needs a shareholder vote and court approval. Final investment decision A board's formal commitment to build a project. Futures contract An agreement to buy or sell gold at a set price on a later date. Real yield The interest on a government bond after expected inflation. Cash rate target The rate the Reserve Bank of Australia sets for overnight lending between banks. References and sources Each source below has an identifier, and the same identifier appears in the text where the source is used. Figures 2 and 4 are reproduced from the Geological Survey of Western Australia. Figures 5 and 6 and Plates 1 to 4 are reproduced from company documents, each credited in its caption. Figure 1 and Figures 3, 7, 8 and 9 were drawn by Samso from the data named in their captions. ASX announcements link to the company's announcements page on the ASX website. GSWA publications are available from the department's online bookshop and carry no link here. [R1] Government Gazette of Western Australia, No. 9, 8 February 1895. Proclamation of the Yalgoo Goldfield under the Goldfields Act 1886, dated 23 January 1895. [R2] Department of Mines, Petroleum and Exploration, Western Australia. Mineral Field Boundaries (DMIRS-005) and MINEDEX (DMIRS-001) datasets, downloaded 5 October 2026. Map compiled by Samso. [R3] Feldtmann, F.R., 1921. Geological Survey of Western Australia, Bulletin 81, on the Warriedar gold-mining centre of the Yalgoo Goldfield. Prefatory note dated 8 December 1918. [R4] Zibra, I., Peternell, M., Schiller, M., Wingate, M.T.D., Lu, Y. and Clos, F., 2018. “Tectono-magmatic evolution of the Neoarchean Yalgoo Dome (Yilgarn Craton): diapirism in a pre-orogenic setting”. Geological Survey of Western Australia, Report 176. [R5] Watkins, K.P. and Hickman, A.H., 1990. “Geological evolution and mineralization of the Murchison Province, Western Australia”. Geological Survey of Western Australia, Bulletin 137. Table 34, Figure 2, Figure 154 and the mining centre descriptions. [R6] Price, J.J., Blenkinsop, T.G., Goodenough, K.M. and Kerr, A.C., 2020. “Stratigraphy, petrography and structure of Archaean rocks in the Rothsay mining area, western Yilgarn Craton”. Geological Survey of Western Australia, Record 2020/13. [R7] Warriedar Resources Limited, 1 May 2025. “Ricciardo Delivers Australia's Largest Open-Pit Antimony Resource”. ASX announcement. [R8] Silver Lake Resources Limited, 15 September 2021. “Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve Statement and Outlook to FY24”. ASX announcement. [R9] Capricorn Metals Ltd, 27 July 2026. “Compelling Mt Gibson PFS Update, Production Ramp Up to 260,000 Ounces PA, Low Cost & 19 Year Mine Life”. ASX announcement. Link [R10] Muhling, P.C. and Low, G.H., 1977. “Yalgoo, Western Australia”. Explanatory notes to the 1 to 250,000 geological map series, Sheet SH/50-2. Geological Survey of Western Australia and Bureau of Mineral Resources. [R11] Clarke, E. de C., 1925. Geological Survey of Western Australia, Bulletin 86, on the gold mining centres of Rothesay and Goodingnow (Payne's Find), Yalgoo Goldfield. [R12] Rumble Resources Limited, 27 November 2025. “Western Queen South Scoping Study Highlights Robust Underground Mining Project”. ASX announcement. Link [R13] Capricorn Metals Ltd, 27 July 2026. “Capricorn Gold Reserves Increase to 5.2 Million Ounces Driving Strong Growth Outlook”. ASX announcement. Link [R14] Gascoyne Resources Limited, 3 October 2019. “Dalgaranga Gold Mine – Updated Ore Reserve”. ASX announcement. [R15] Spartan Resources Limited. Annual Report 2023. [R16] Vault Minerals Limited, 29 July 2026. “June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report”. ASX announcement. Link [R17] Vault Minerals Limited, 3 September 2026. “2026 Resource and Reserve Statement”. ASX announcement. Link [R18] Genesis Minerals Limited and Vault Minerals Limited, 14 July 2026. “Genesis and Vault agree ~A$12.6bn merger to create a new Australian gold major”. ASX announcement. Link [R19] Vault Minerals Limited, 5 October 2026. “Court Approves Convening of Scheme Meeting and Dispatch of Scheme Booklet”. ASX announcement. Link [R20] Vault Minerals Limited, 6 October 2026. “Scheme Booklet Registered with ASIC”. ASX announcement. Link [R21] Ramelius Resources Limited, 29 July 2026. “June 2026 Quarterly Activities Report”. ASX announcement. Link [R22] Ramelius Resources Limited, 21 September 2026. “4-Year Outlook & FY27 Guidance”. ASX announcement. Link [R23] Ramelius Resources Limited, 25 August 2026. “2026 Resources & Reserves Statement”. ASX announcement. Link [R24] Ramelius Resources Limited, 8 October 2026. “September 2026 Quarter Update”. ASX announcement. Link [R25] 29Metals Limited. Golden Grove operation page, company website, read October 2026. Link [R26] 29Metals Limited, 15 July 2026. “June 2026 Quarterly Report”. ASX announcement. Link [R27] Capricorn Metals Ltd, 5 October 2026. “KGP Q1 Production 31koz, KEP Completed on Schedule”. ASX announcement. Link [R28] Capricorn Metals Ltd and Warriedar Resources Limited, 24 July 2025. “Capricorn Metals to Acquire Warriedar Resources”. ASX announcement. Link [R29] Capricorn Metals Ltd, August 2026. Diggers & Dealers Mining Forum presentation. Slides 10 and 20. Link [R30] Rumble Resources Limited, 24 June 2026. “Western Queen Gold Resources upgraded to 433koz with 228koz now in Indicated category and a new high-grade zone of 53koz @ 11.3g/t gold”. ASX announcement. Link [R31] Rumble Resources Limited, 25 March 2026. “Excellent Metallurgical Results for Western Queen Gold and Tungsten Project”. ASX announcement. Link [R32] Rumble Resources Limited, 4 August 2026. Diggers and Dealers Mining Forum Presentation. ASX announcement. Link [R33] Rumble Resources Limited, 6 October 2026. Western Queen Mine Project Development Update. ASX announcement. Link [R34] Rumble Resources Ltd, 30 September 2026. Annual Report for the year ended 30 June 2026. Link [R35] Gylden Resources. Company website, About page and Kirkalocka Processing Plant page, read 11 October 2026. Link [R36] Rumble Resources Limited, 19 May 2026. “Toll Milling and Blending Agreement for Western Queen gold ore executed with Gylden and Kirkalocka Gold”. ASX announcement. Link [R37] Odyssey Gold Limited, 20 May 2026. “Kirkalocka Toll Milling Agreement Provides Near Term Processing Capacity for Tuckanarra Project”. ASX announcement. Link [R38] Rumble Resources Limited, 24 August 2026. Western Queen Mine Project Development Update. ASX announcement. Link [R39] Odyssey Gold Limited, 30 September 2026. “Update on Tuckanarra Gold Project”. ASX announcement. Link [R40] Yahoo Finance. COMEX gold futures, nearest contract (GC=F), and the Australian dollar against the US dollar (AUDUSD=X), daily closes. Last bar complete at the ASX close of 16 October 2026. Australian dollar gold price is Samso arithmetic. Link [R41] London Gold Exchange. Gold price outlook for 2026 and 2027, a compilation of published bank targets, updated 1 October 2026. Read 11 October 2026. Samso has not read the bank notes. Link [R42] World Gold Council. Gold Demand Trends, Q2 2026, executive summary. Data as of 30 June 2026. Link [R43] Samso Insights, 8 July 2026. “The Big Consolidation, Where the Gold Price Settles Before Its Next Move”. Link [R44] Samso Insights, 21 June 2026. “The Gold Question, Which Way for the Gold Price From Here”. Link [R45] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 16 September 2026. Federal Open Market Committee statement, and the Open Market Operations page for the history of the target range. Link [R46] Reserve Bank of Australia, 29 September 2026. Statement by the Monetary Policy Board, and statistical table A2 for the history of the cash rate target. Link [R47] US Department of the Treasury. Daily par real yield curve rates, 10-year. Link [R48] Cover photo. Gold Nugget, National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, image SIA-98-4800. CC0 1.0, Smithsonian Open Access. The nugget is from California and not from the Yalgoo Mineral Field. Link The Samso Way – Seek the Research Here at Samso, we pride ourselves on delivering content for investors that is independent and informed by over three decades of experience in the industry. Our content is well-researched and is only created if I see merit in discussing the company's story. Our mission is simple. Cut through the noise and spotlight what matters. Genuine stories, grounded insights, and real opportunity. Investors can explore our four core platforms: Coffee with Samso Samso Insights Samso News Samso Research There may be numerous paths to success in investing, but the common thread among successful individuals is that they remain committed to making informed decisions. 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It is not financial product advice and it does not take into account any reader's objectives, financial situation or needs. It contains no price targets, no valuations and no recommendation to buy, hold or sell any security. The views expressed in this article, including the Samso Take, are Samso's own. We are entitled to hold them, and they are opinion. Readers should consider obtaining advice from a licensed financial adviser and should conduct their own research before making any investment decision. Samso and its associates may hold interests in companies mentioned. Read full Disclaimer. About Samso Samso is a trusted platform that equips dedicated investors with up-to-date industry knowledge and insights from top CEOs and thought leaders. By staying informed on business advancements and market trends, investors can enhance their financial decisions through a combination of expert guidance and their own research. Coffee with Samso, Samso Insights, Samso News and Samso Research are four ways into the same work. Interviews, long-form research, short takes on announcements and company-specific studies. Every one of them is about how to think about investing rather than what to buy. Samso Insights | www.samso.com.au | An Investor Lens on ASX-Listed Companies Samso Insights are independent research commentary for general information only. Nothing in this article is financial product advice, and it does not take into account any reader's objectives, financial situation or needs. Figures are drawn from public sources believed reliable at the stated dates but are not guaranteed. Market-sensitive numbers change daily. Samso or associated parties may hold positions in, or have commercial arrangements with, companies mentioned. Seek professional advice before making investment decisions. © Samso 2026 · samso.com.au

Green iron needs a grade of iron ore that few mines produce, and the Labrador Trough in eastern Canada is one of the places that produces it. This Samso Insight lists the mines and projects in the Trough, sets out what the Canadian government is offering, and then looks at Iron Bear Resources (ASX: IBR) now that Vale has left the project. Iron Bear's concentrate tested inside the green iron specification, and the company again owns all of the project. On 7 October 2026 the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, known as IEEFA, published a piece that compared Canada with Australia in the supply of green iron [R1]. IEEFA is a research body that writes about energy and heavy industry. Its conclusion was that Australia may not compete head-to-head with Canada in this market. The Labrador Trough is the centre of its argument. Samso has written about the Labrador Trough many times, mostly through Iron Bear Resources (ASX: IBR), which was called Cyclone Metals until January 2026. Three weeks before the IEEFA piece, Vale told Iron Bear that it would not fund the next stage of the Iron Bear project [R3]. Vale is the Brazilian miner that had the right to earn 75 per cent of it. The Canadian government announced support for the district on 17 August 2026. A month later Iron Bear, the Labrador Trough project with the largest production plan, lost its funding partner. Figure 1 shows where the Trough is. All share prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 7 October 2026. WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS 1.00 What IEEFA said The comparison between Canada and Australia, and the four points IEEFA makes about Canada. 2.00 Green iron and the ore it needs What direct reduction is, the grade of ore it needs, and what the forecasters say. 3.00 The mines operating in the Trough Five operators, what each produces, and who is already upgrading. 4.00 The projects not yet built Kami, Lac Virot, Lac Otelnuk and the smaller ones, with the stage each has reached. 5.00 What Canada is offering The hydro package, the corridor, the approvals bill, and what none of them promises. 6.00 Iron Bear, the resource and the study What the July 2026 Pre-Feasibility Study says about the reserve, the costs and the power line. 7.00 Vale leaves The terms Vale had, what it spent, and what it declined. 8.00 Does Iron Bear still need a partner? What Samso said before, and what the numbers say now. 9.00 Iron Bear's market capitalisation Samso's arithmetic on the market capitalisation, with the reasons the market may be right. 10.00 The case against Why green iron may arrive late, and what stands between a project this size and its funding. 11.00 Samso view What the IEEFA piece means for an Iron Bear shareholder. A NOTE ON THE VOCABULARY AND THE SOURCES Each technical term is explained where it first appears, and all of them are collected in one box at the back, above the references. A marker such as [R2] points to the numbered source in the reference list that supports the sentence it follows. Noel Ong, who writes for Samso, holds shares in Iron Bear Resources. 1.00 — WHAT IEEFA SAID IEEFA's four points on Canada and its view of Australia The IEEFA piece was written by Soroush Basirat, an analyst in its Australian office [R1]. It makes four points about Canada. The first is that Canada already mines the right ore. IEEFA says the Labrador Trough has produced high-grade iron ore since 1954 and now produces about 50 million tonnes a year. It names Canada as one of the largest exporters of the pellets used in green iron, alongside Brazil, Sweden and Bahrain. The second is that the existing mines are being upgraded. IEEFA names ArcelorMittal and Champion Iron as two companies spending money to lift their product from the grade a blast furnace uses to the grade that green iron needs. The third is that Canada put high-purity iron ore on its list of critical minerals in 2024. Australia has not. IEEFA notes that iron ore is Australia's highest-value export and is not on the Australian list. The fourth is approvals and power. IEEFA points to a federal bill built around the phrase “one project, one review, one year”, and to what the Canadian Prime Minister called the largest clean energy investment in North American history. IEEFA's last paragraph names two projects as the new generation of high-grade supply. One is Champion Iron's Kami project. The other is Iron Bear. IEEFA's closing judgement on Australia is that the country “may not compete head-to-head with Canada in this evolving market” [R1]. Australia's side of the comparison is short. IEEFA says Australia can produce almost 65 million tonnes a year of magnetite concentrate, and that none of it currently meets the green iron specification. Magnetite is the magnetic iron mineral, and concentrate is the powder left after the waste rock has been removed. 2.00 — GREEN IRON AND THE ORE IT NEEDS How direct reduction works and the ore it needs Most of the world's iron is made in a blast furnace. Iron ore goes in with coke, which is coal that has been baked. The coke supplies the heat and also strips the oxygen out of the ore. Carbon dioxide comes out of the top. Direct reduction is a different process. It strips the oxygen out of the ore with natural gas or hydrogen, at a temperature below the melting point of iron. The product is a solid called direct reduced iron, or DRI. The DRI is then melted in an electric arc furnace, usually shortened to EAF. When the gas is hydrogen made with clean electricity, the DRI is called green iron. A blast furnace melts everything, so the impurities in the ore float off as slag, which is the molten waste skimmed from the top. Direct reduction never melts the ore. Silica and alumina are the two main waste minerals in iron ore. Whatever silica and alumina go in with the ore are still there when the DRI reaches the electric furnace, and the steelmaker pays to remove them. So the process needs ore with very little of either. Samso has written about direct reduction and DR pellets in two earlier Samso Insights. The first was Direct Reduction Iron – The Iron Ore Opportunity Investors May Be Missing, published on 11 March 2026. The second was Direct Reduction (DR) Pellets and Green Steel – Who are the Industry Leaders?, published on 22 April 2026. The International Iron Metallics Association, writing in the journal of the Midrex company, puts the specification at more than 66 per cent iron and ideally more than 67 per cent, with silica and alumina together at no more than 3.5 per cent and ideally 2 per cent or less [R27]. Midrex is the company behind the most widely used direct reduction process. Ore that meets this specification is called DR-grade iron ore. The main price index for the ore Australia sells is set on 62 per cent iron. DR-grade ore is usually sold as pellets. A pellet is a marble-sized ball made by rolling concentrate and baking it hard, so that gas can flow between the balls inside the furnace. Plate 1 shows pellets made from Iron Bear ore in a test. How large the market is now Midrex counted 151.0 million tonnes of DRI produced in the world in 2025, up 7.2 per cent on 2024 [R28]. IEEFA's March 2026 report says less than 10 per cent of the world's iron is made by direct reduction, and that only about 31 per cent of DR-grade pellets were traded by sea in 2024 [R26]. What the forecasters say The same IEEFA report sets four forecasts side by side. Samso has read IEEFA's report and has not read the four forecasts themselves. Six of the seven forecasts in Table 1 show a shortfall, and one Midrex scenario shows a surplus. The shortfalls run up to 133 million tonnes a year. The largest shortfalls are forecast for 2035 and 2040. The premium in September 2026 On 8 September 2026 the benchmark price for 62 per cent ore delivered to China was US$98.70 a tonne, and the price for 65 per cent ore was US$117.50 [R29]. DR pellets earn a further premium on top of the 65 per cent price. Labrador Iron Ore Royalty Corporation, which owns part of Iron Ore Company of Canada, reported that premium at US$43 a tonne for the June quarter of 2026 [R17]. Samso wrote in April 2026 that plenty of juniors talk about DR-grade concentrate and very few have delivered commercial DR pellets [R41]. Its conclusion said “The main aspect of this DR pellets story is to identify those that can and those that are using the term to promote”. 3.00 — THE MINES OPERATING IN THE TROUGH The five iron ore operators in the Labrador Trough The Labrador Trough is a belt of iron-bearing rock about 1,100 kilometres long [R13]. Most of the ore in the ground is low grade, at around 30 per cent iron. The mines crush it, separate the iron minerals from the waste and ship a concentrate or a pellet at 63 to 69 per cent iron. Figure 2 shows where the operators are. Natural Resources Canada, the federal department, records that Canada produced 70 million tonnes of iron ore in 2024 and that 60 per cent of it came from Québec [R25]. The rest came from Newfoundland and Labrador and from Nunavut. It gives no figure for the Trough alone. IEEFA's source for the 50 million tonnes is Iron Bear's website. Table 2 lists the five operators. Iron Ore Company of Canada This operation owns the 418-kilometre railway to the port at Sept-Îles. Labrador Iron Ore Royalty Corporation reported 15.9 million tonnes of saleable product in 2025 at an average price of about US$109 a tonne [R16]. The June 2026 quarter was weak. Saleable production fell 31 per cent on a year earlier, and the royalty company said the mine was catching up on waste removal it had deferred and that this would take several years [R17]. ArcelorMittal ArcelorMittal announced in November 2021 that it would convert its whole 10 million tonne a year pellet plant at Port-Cartier to DR pellets for C$205 million, and finish before the end of 2025 [R21]. In August 2026 the Canadian publication The Logic reported a federal commitment of C$125 million and completion in early 2029 [R22]. The two documents are about three years apart on the finish date. IEEFA uses 2029. Champion Iron Champion Iron (ASX: CIA) is the only ASX-listed company whose main business is a Labrador Trough mine. Its Bloom Lake mine produced 3.5 million tonnes of concentrate at 66.5 per cent iron in the June 2026 quarter, at a cash cost of C$83.4 a tonne [R18]. Cash cost is what it costs to mine, process and deliver a tonne, before interest, tax and new capital. The company made a net loss of C$41.5 million in that quarter. Champion has spent C$493.7 million of a C$500 million budget on a plant that lifts half of Bloom Lake's output to 69 per cent iron, which is DR-grade [R18]. The new plant produced 0.6 million tonnes of concentrate in the quarter while its quality was still being lifted. Champion has a commercial agreement for part of the plant's expected near-term output, and expected the first shipment in the September quarter of 2026 [R46]. We found no report that the first cargo has sailed. That is what we found, but we have not been able to verify it. Figure 3 puts the DR-grade tonnes planned across the Trough on one chart. The two upgrades at operating mines are the tonnes most likely to arrive first. 4.00 — THE PROJECTS NOT YET BUILT Kami and four other undeveloped projects A mining project moves through a series of studies before anyone builds it. A scoping study or preliminary economic assessment (PEA) is the first rough estimate. A Pre-Feasibility Study (PFS) is the second and narrows the options. A Definitive or Bankable Feasibility Study (DFS or BFS) is the detailed version a bank will lend against. Table 3 lists the Trough projects by the study each has reached. A Mineral Resource is the tonnage a company estimates is in the ground and has a reasonable prospect of being mined. An Ore Reserve is the part of the resource that a study has shown can be mined at a profit. Australian companies report both under the JORC Code, the Australian rulebook for these estimates. Canadian companies use a similar code. Kami Kami is near Wabush, close to Bloom Lake. Champion's study of January 2024 put the capital cost at C$3,864 million, which was US$2,972 million at the time [R20]. It gave two results. At a long-term price of US$120 a tonne for 65 per cent ore, the project returned 9.8 per cent a year after tax. At the average price of the three years before the study, it returned 14.8 per cent. A return of 9.8 per cent is 1.8 percentage points above the 8 per cent discount rate used in the study. Champion did not go ahead alone. In 2025 it brought in two Japanese partners. Nippon Steel is a steelmaker, and Sojitz is a trading house. Together they agreed to contribute C$245 million to a new partnership that owns the project, and they hold 49 per cent of it [R19]. They contributed C$68.6 million at the first closing. The other C$176.4 million is due only when the DFS is complete and the partners decide to continue. That figure is useful because it is money committed for a known share of a Trough project at the PFS stage. Section 9.00 uses it as a comparison. Kami is the only iron ore project named in the Canadian Prime Minister's announcement of 17 August 2026 [R12]. The release also names a graphite project, a port and rail project and a transmission study. The federal government will support planning and feasibility work on the transport and energy that Kami needs. The announcement gives no dollar figure for Kami. The four other projects Lac Otelnuk is the largest deposit on the list at more than 20 billion tonnes, on an estimate its owner no longer treats as current. Labrador West and Lac Virot are much smaller. Joyce Lake is a short-life project selling ordinary ore and is outside the green iron discussion. Samso found no funding partner announced for any of the four. Joyce Lake's stage in Table 3 is as at Century's June 2026 filing. 5.00 — WHAT CANADA IS OFFERING The hydro package, the corridor, the approvals bill and the critical minerals list IEEFA lists four measures. This section sets out what the government document behind each one says. The hydro package IEEFA says the Canadian government announced an investment of C$70 billion in clean energy. The Prime Minister's release says something narrower [R12]. The projects together are worth “nearly $70 billion”. The federal contribution is “$10 billion in federal financing”. The release does not say whether that C$10 billion is a loan, a guarantee or a grant, and it does not say who pays the other C$60 billion. The projects are an upgrade and expansion of the Churchill Falls hydro station in Labrador, a new station at Gull Island, the transmission lines for both, and a wind project. The release puts the total at 14,000 megawatts. The corridor On the same day the government referred the “Labrador Trough Clean Power, Critical Minerals and Infrastructure Corridor” to its Major Projects Office [R13]. The corridor page names the two hydro stations, the Port of Sept-Îles and the two provincial power utilities. It names no mining company. Referral and designation are two separate steps. Designation as a project of national interest is the step that brings conditional federal approvals up front and a target of proceeding within two years [R37]. The corridor page records a referral, which is the earlier of the two steps. The approvals bill The Building Canada Strong Act was introduced to Parliament on 21 September 2026 [R14]. It would require federal reviews to finish within one year of a complete application. The bill has not been passed. It would build on an earlier law, Bill C-5, the One Canadian Economy Act of June 2025, which created the national interest pathway. The critical minerals list Canada added high-purity iron ore to its critical minerals list on 10 June 2024, with the sentence “High-purity iron ore is essential to green steel and integral to decarbonization” [R15]. The release says the list guides federal policy and programs. It names no fund that a listed mineral automatically qualifies for. What this means for a project owner Canada has committed C$10 billion of financing towards power and has introduced a bill to shorten approvals. Those are the two things a single mining company cannot arrange alone. The hydro and transmission would benefit every project in the Trough. The money for a mine, a concentrator and a pellet plant still has to come from the owner and its partners. Iron Bear told the ASX on 24 September 2026 that these measures benefit its project [R8]. The same announcement says the company “will continue to monitor” the corridor. Iron Bear announced on 3 June 2026 that it had applied to the Major Projects Office for recognition as a project of national significance, with the aim of cutting federal permitting from about five years to two [R10]. The company has not announced a decision on that application. 6.00 — IRON BEAR, THE RESOURCE AND THE STUDY The Iron Bear resource, the July 2026 PFS and the power line Iron Bear is about 30 kilometres north-west of Schefferville. The deposit is a magnetite iron formation. The rock holds about 30 per cent iron. About 21 per cent is iron in magnetite, which is the part the plant recovers. The resource and the reserve Iron Bear's resource is 13.6 billion tonnes at 30.03 per cent iron, estimated in May 2026 [R6]. Of that, 4.5 billion tonnes is in the Indicated category, which is the middle level of confidence, and 9.1 billion tonnes is Inferred, the lowest. The earlier estimate was 16.6 billion tonnes. The total fell 18 per cent. The company put this down to a revised geological interpretation, new pit parameters and a stricter test of what could be mined. In the same update the Indicated tonnage rose from 2.1 to 4.5 billion tonnes, which the company said came from new classification criteria. The estimate uses drilling from 2011 and 2012. The PFS of 29 July 2026 declared the first reserve, at 3.3 billion tonnes at 29.1 per cent iron [R2]. All of it is Probable, the lower of the two reserve categories. A reserve can only be drawn from the Indicated or higher categories. The mine plan processes 3.4 billion tonnes, which is about a quarter of the resource. About 5 per cent of that is Inferred material that is outside the reserve. What the study plans to build The base case is a mine that runs for 44 years and sells 23 million tonnes a year at full rate [R2]. Of that, 18.4 million tonnes is DR pellets and 4.5 million tonnes is concentrate for blast furnaces. The DR concentrate tested at 71.0 per cent iron with 1.2 per cent silica and alumina together, which is inside the specification in section 2.00. The study's test table gives the pellets made from it as 68.4 per cent iron. The project is built in three stages. Stage 1 starts at 5.4 million tonnes a year. Full rate comes in about year 11 of production. Figure 4 shows the build-up. For the first four years the project sells only blast furnace concentrate. The DR pellets come with Stage 2, because the pellet plants are built in Stages 2 and 3. The headline numbers Net present value, or NPV, is the cash a project is forecast to earn over its life, less what it costs to build and run, with later years counted for less. The rate used to count them down is the discount rate. Internal rate of return, or IRR, is the yearly return the project earns on the money put into it. Table 4 sets the PFS beside the scoping study it replaced. Table 4 shows the NPV fell from US$9,792 million to US$9,007 million while most of the inputs moved. The return fell from 18.6 to 15.2 per cent. Payback went from under seven years to about ten. The operating cost of a tonne of pellets rose by about US$19. Samso's reading is that four changes offset the higher costs. The mine life more than doubled, the price assumption rose, more of the product is pellets, and the power line moved out of the capital cost. The study assumes a DR pellet price of US$212.3 a tonne delivered to the customer, in today's dollars, and most of the value rests on that price [R2]. The study's cash flows include inflation of 2.5 per cent a year, and the 8 per cent rate is applied to those inflated figures. The study's sensitivity table shows the NPV falling from US$9.0 billion to US$5.4 billion if that rate is 9.6 per cent. So the 8 per cent rate and the 15.2 per cent return both include inflation. The power line, the power price and the cost of Stages 2 and 3 The power line is not in the capital cost. The project needs about 342 kilometres of transmission line from Churchill Falls. The PFS assumes a third party builds and owns it, and quotes an estimate of about US$3.1 billion from the engineering firm Hatch [R2]. The scoping study had power inside its capital estimate. Samso's reading is that this is one reason the capital figure did not rise between the two studies. The first stage is also smaller. The power price in the model is higher than the one in the highlights. A kilowatt hour is the unit of electricity on a power bill. The highlights quote US$0.0315 a kilowatt hour. That is the charge for the energy alone. The financial model uses US$0.148, which includes paying the third party for the line [R2]. Both figures are in the same document. So moving the line out of the capital cost is not a saving. The project pays for it through the higher power price over the life of the mine. The full build costs more than Stage 1. The US$4.25 billion is the cost of Stage 1 only. Stages 2 and 3 add US$3,441 million and US$3,473 million, for US$11,164 million in total. The study expects the later stages to be paid for partly from Stage 1's earnings. The capital cost estimate is accurate to plus or minus 30 per cent, which is normal for a PFS. The study names 26 project risks and rates 16 of them high. It says the environmental and social impact assessment is expected to take up to six years. That assessment sets the timetable. It has to meet Newfoundland and Labrador's requirements. Canada's fast-track process covers only the federal part. It states that no offtake discussions have been concluded, which it puts down to the Development Agreement with Vale. An offtake agreement is a contract in which a customer commits to buy the product. How the value moves with the price Figure 5 uses the sensitivity table in the PFS. A 20 per cent fall in the benchmark iron ore price cuts the NPV from US$9.0 billion to US$4.8 billion, which is a fall of 46 per cent. The study does not publish what happens to the 15.2 per cent return in that case. Iron Bear has said it will publish an updated PFS in the December quarter of 2026 with “materially improved financial outcomes and new operational scenarios” [R3]. The optimisation studies behind it are due in November. 7.00 — VALE LEAVES The Vale agreement, the payments and the decision The terms of the Development Agreement The Development Agreement was signed in February 2025 [R5]. It had two phases. In Phase 1 Vale would pay US$18 million towards the PFS, drilling and environmental work, and earn nothing unless it went on. In Phase 2 a joint venture would form, Vale would take 30 per cent at once, and it would fund up to a further US$120 million for the BFS and the permitting. Its share would rise to 75 per cent when that money was spent, or earlier if Vale chose to take the project to a decision to mine. The decision to build the mine would then have been Vale's. After that decision, Vale could buy the last 25 per cent at a fair market price, or arrange the build funding so that Iron Bear kept 25 per cent without dilution. Vale's payments and decision Vale paid the US$18 million in five instalments, the last on 21 August 2026. The PFS was published on 29 July. Iron Bear asked the ASX to halt trading in its shares on 11 September, ahead of an announcement. On 15 September it announced that Vale had completed Phase 1 and would not proceed to Phase 2 [R3]. The final notice arrived on 18 September [R4]. The board said “The Iron Bear Board believes that the decision by Vale to not proceed to Phase 2 is not related to the project itself but recent internal corporate developments at Vale beyond the control of Iron Bear”. The announcement does not quote a reason from Vale. Paul Berend, the Managing Director, said in the same announcement “We are sad that this productive relationship with Vale is at an end. However, IBR's retention of 100% ownership unlocks exciting opportunities to secure future funding from industrial partners, institutional investors or off takers…”. Iron Bear keeps 100 per cent of the project. Vale earned no interest. The company had A$15.3 million in cash on 11 September and said it had no need to raise capital in the near term [R3]. Iron Bear said the Phase 1 drilling can now be deferred by up to two years with no impact on project timelines [R3]. What the share price did The shares closed at 6.7 cents the day before the PFS and at 4.5 cents on 10 September, the last trade before the halt. That is a fall of about a third while Vale was still a partner. On 15 September they closed at 2.4 cents, down 46.7 per cent in one session. The last price on 7 October 2026 was 2.3 cents [R11]. Figure 6 shows the price since January 2025. Samso's chart piece of 28 September made the same observation. “Vale's departure is the second event on this chart, not the first. The price had already given back everything the study delivered before the market knew Vale was leaving” [R42]. 8.00 — DOES IRON BEAR STILL NEED A PARTNER? Samso's earlier view and Iron Bear's funding position now What Samso said before Samso's position was consistent from March 2025 to July 2026. The piece on the PFS, published on 31 July 2026, said “You need a big brother to come along this journey” [R38]. A piece on 1 July put it as “A quarter of a project Vale will build beats all of a project a junior could never build” [R39]. Parts of that coverage have been overtaken. The 1 July piece said Vale's funding “takes the biggest risk off the table”. An earlier piece in March 2025 said a company like Vale would not sign a binding agreement “only to walk away afterwards” [R43]. Vale completed the phase it had committed to and then declined the next one, which the agreement allowed it to do. The Insight of 23 July 2026 said “the Vale agreement is staged rather than guaranteed”, and described Iron Bear as able to be “a company-maker and a value trap from the same spreadsheet, depending entirely on the funding path” [R40]. What the numbers say now This part is Samso's reasoning from the published figures. It is not a statement by the company. Vale's Phase 2 budget for the BFS and permitting was up to US$120 million. At the exchange rate the PFS uses, that is about A$185 million. Iron Bear has A$15.3 million. So the company holds about one-twelfth of the money that Vale had set aside for the next stage alone. Stage 1 costs US$4.25 billion, or about A$6.5 billion. Iron Bear's market capitalisation is A$25.4 million. Market capitalisation is the share price multiplied by the number of shares. Stage 1 costs about 257 times that. On those two figures the company cannot fund the next study from its cash, and cannot fund the mine. Iron Bear still needs outside funding. What has changed since February 2025 Three things are different from February 2025, when the Vale agreement was signed. The PFS exists and Iron Bear owns it. A new partner starts from a finished study and a declared reserve, both funded by Vale. The drilling planned for Phase 1 can be deferred and is still to be paid for. No other party now holds a claim over the project. Under the old agreement 75 per cent was reserved for Vale, and Vale could match any offer a third party made for the rest. Other parties can now negotiate for any share. The federal government has announced support for power and approvals in the region. The PFS assumed a third party would build a US$3.1 billion transmission line. In August 2026 the federal government committed C$10 billion of financing to hydro and transmission in the same region. Neither document says the Iron Bear line is part of that package. A different kind of partner Kami shows another structure. Champion kept 51 per cent. A steelmaker and a trading house took 49 per cent and are contributing cash for it. Vale is a miner that already sells DR pellets, so a new mine in Canada may have been one option among several for Vale. Iron Bear said on 15 September that it intends to appoint a Tier 1 financial adviser to define a possible project financing package and to sign a cooperation agreement with an Indigenous group [R3]. Iron Bear's ASX announcements up to 8 October 2026 name no new partner. That is what we found, but we have not been able to verify whether anything has changed outside them. SAMSO TAKE Iron Bear still needs a big brother. It no longer has to give one company three quarters of the project to get one. Could a steelmaker, a trading house or a government fund take a minority share and leave Iron Bear with more than the 25 per cent that the Vale agreement would have left it? 9.00 — IRON BEAR'S MARKET CAPITALISATION Iron Bear's market capitalisation against the tonnes, the PFS and Kami Samso publishes no valuations and no price targets. What follows is arithmetic on published numbers, set out so that anyone can check it and disagree with it. Every figure for the project is for 100 per cent, which Iron Bear now owns. The starting figures Iron Bear had 1,106,253,248 shares on issue on 4 September 2026 [R9]. The last price on 7 October was 2.3 cents [R11]. Multiplying the two gives a market capitalisation of A$25.4 million. The company held A$15.3 million in cash on 11 September. Taking the cash away leaves about A$10 million as the price the market is putting on the project and everything else the company owns. The cash figure is four weeks old and is likely to be lower now. The PFS uses an exchange rate of 65 US cents to the Australian dollar and 73 US cents to the Canadian dollar. Samso has used the same rates so the comparisons match the study. Table 5 gives six comparisons. Figure 7 puts the market capitalisation beside four reference figures. Its Vale bar is the Phase 2 budget of A$185 million from section 8.00. The scale on that chart is logarithmic, which means each gridline is ten times the one before it. A normal scale would leave the first bar too small to see. What the comparisons do and do not show The Kami comparison is the strongest because two industrial companies made it with their money. They committed the equivalent of 87 Australian cents for each tonne of reserve at a PFS-stage project in the same district. The market is paying under one cent a tonne for Iron Bear's reserve. Kami and Iron Bear differ in three ways. Kami is beside existing rail and power at Wabush, and Iron Bear is 250 kilometres further north. Kami has a 51 per cent owner that operates a mine next door and has cash flow. And only C$68.6 million of the C$245 million has been contributed. The rest depends on a study that is not finished. The Vale and Kami sums are the same kind of money. Both were to be spent on the project, and neither was a payment to the owner. The US$138 million shows the terms on which a major took an option over 75 per cent in February 2025. The same major decided not to continue in September 2026. The NPV comparison is the weakest. The NPV assumes the mine is funded, approved and built on the study's schedule. Iron Bear has none of the three. The gap between 0.18 per cent and 100 per cent reflects the chance the mine is never built, the new shares issued on the way, and whether the market accepts the study's prices and costs. Is it the cheapest on the ASX? On the potential in the ground against the price of the company, Samso thinks it may be. Against the tonnes in the ground, against its own study and against the Kami transaction, the market capitalisation is a small fraction of each figure. Samso called the stock undervalued at A$50 million in April 2026 [R44] and at A$77 million on 31 July [R38]. In May it asked how many companies at this stage were valued at A$62 million [R45]. It is A$25.4 million now. A low price on these measures was no protection over those six months. When the pellets would reach the market The PFS gives two sets of dates. Its financial model assumes the mine is operating in 2035. Its power section targets 2031 to 2032 for the first stage. Both are quoted as published. Its allowance of four to six years to a decision to mine was written when Vale was the partner. On the 2035 date the first DR pellets are made in about 2039, and the full 18.4 million tonnes a year is reached from about 2045. The BloombergNEF forecast in Table 1 has a shortfall of 15 million tonnes a year in 2030 and 133 million tonnes a year in 2040. Most of Iron Bear's pellets would arrive after the second date. On that timetable the product would be sold from about 2039. The shares on issue between now and then are unknown. An option is a right to buy a new share at a set price. There are 370 million listed options that can be turned into shares at 3.2 cents until November 2028 [R9]. A BFS and permitting budget of up to twelve times the company's cash also has to be paid for by someone. 10.00 — THE CASE AGAINST Green iron delays, the iron ore price, competing supply and Vale's decision THE CASE AGAINST Green iron is running late. Thyssenkrupp paused its tender for hydrogen in March 2025 because the price was well above what it had assumed [R32]. Stegra, the Swedish green steel company, needed rescue financing of €1.4 billion in April 2026 and put its timetable under review [R31]. Each delay at a steel plant pushes back the date a DR pellet is needed. The iron ore price is the larger risk. The Simandou mine in Guinea shipped 5.7 million tonnes between January and 9 June 2026, against less than half a million tonnes in all of 2025 [R30]. S&P Global put the oversupply in the seaborne market at about 16 million tonnes. Figure 5 shows what a 20 per cent lower price does to the Iron Bear study. The tonnes likely to reach customers first are at ArcelorMittal and Champion. Both are converting mines that already run, on rail they already use. Figure 3 shows 17.5 million tonnes a year of DR-grade product from those two upgrades. On current timetables they reach customers ten years or more before Iron Bear's pellets. The outstanding risks are the environmental assessment, the ability to sell the product and the capital required to build the project [R2]. Vale funded the study and did not continue. Iron Bear's PFS describes Vale as the largest producer of DR pellets in the world [R2]. Vale paid US$18 million towards the PFS and then chose not to spend up to US$120 million more. The board believes the reason was internal to Vale. Iron Bear's announcement gives no reason from Vale. The defence of the project is in the same documents. The reserve is large and the concentrate meets the specification. A railway and a port exist, and the PFS includes upgrades to both. The federal government has committed financing for power in the region. 11.00 — SAMSO VIEW What the IEEFA piece means for an Iron Bear shareholder SAMSO TAKE The IEEFA piece is good news for the Labrador Trough and I think it is fair. Canada is backing the power and has a bill to shorten approvals. It has also listed high-purity iron ore as a critical mineral. Australia has not put iron ore on its critical minerals list. A government does not build the mine. Kami has partners and the two operators are upgrading their own mines. Iron Bear has the largest production plan of any project in the district and no partner. I said in July that Iron Bear needed a big brother. I still think so. I was wrong to treat Vale's cheque as the answer. It paid for a study and it bought Vale an option, and Vale did not take it up. Is this the cheapest mineral asset on the ASX? Put the potential value in the ground beside a market capitalisation of about A$25 million, and on those two things I think it is. This is not a valuation. It is a comment that the price of the company is very small for what it holds. The dates I am watching are the updated PFS in the December quarter, the Kami DFS, and whether Iron Bear is named in anything the Major Projects Office does. A new partner that leaves Iron Bear with more than 25 per cent would improve the picture. A capital raising at around two cents would weaken it. Will a partner arrive before the company needs more cash? Does a partner need to come for the company to make this work? Can the company actually do this on its own? I am a shareholder in Iron Bear Resources. Do your own research. THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH Blast furnace The traditional way to make iron. It burns coke made from coal and releases carbon dioxide. Direct reduction (DR) and DRI A process that removes oxygen from iron ore with gas, without melting it. The product is direct reduced iron. Electric arc furnace (EAF) A furnace that melts DRI or scrap steel with electricity. Green iron Direct reduced iron made using hydrogen and clean electricity. DR-grade Ore pure enough for direct reduction, at more than 66 per cent iron and ideally more than 67 per cent, with very little silica and alumina. Magnetite A magnetic iron mineral. It is low grade in the ground and can be upgraded to a very pure concentrate. Concentrate and pellets Concentrate is the iron-rich powder left after processing. Pellets are marble-sized balls made from it and baked hard. Fe The chemical symbol for iron. A grade of 62% Fe means 62 per cent of the weight is iron. Mt and Bt Million tonnes and billion tonnes. Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve A resource is what is estimated to be in the ground. A reserve is the part a study has shown can be mined at a profit. Indicated, Inferred and Probable Confidence levels. Inferred is the lowest for a resource and Indicated is the next. Probable is the lower of the two reserve levels. JORC The Australian code that sets how resources and reserves are reported. PEA, PFS, DFS and BFS The sequence of studies on a project, from the first rough estimate to the one a bank will lend against. NPV, IRR and discount rate NPV is a project's forecast cash, less its costs, counted in today's dollars. IRR is its yearly return. The discount rate is how much less a future dollar is counted for. Payback The time it takes a project to earn back what it cost to build. Offtake A contract in which a customer commits to buy a project's product. Market capitalisation The share price multiplied by the number of shares on issue. References and sources Figures 1, 2 and 4 and Plate 1 are reproduced from Iron Bear Resources' ASX announcements, with the document and page given in each caption. Figures 3, 5, 6 and 7 are original Samso charts of published data. Figures marked S in Table 5 are Samso's own arithmetic. Each entry below opens with the marker used in the text. [R1] Soroush Basirat, “Labrador Trough vs the Pilbara and South Australia: Who will win the green iron race?”, Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 7 October 2026. ieefa.org [R2] Iron Bear Resources, “Iron Bear Project PFS delivers outstanding results”, ASX announcement, 29 July 2026, 160 pages. PDF [R3] Iron Bear Resources, “Completion of Phase 1 Development Agreement”, ASX announcement, 15 September 2026. PDF [R4] Iron Bear Resources, “Receipt of final development agreement notice”, ASX announcement, 18 September 2026. PDF [R5] Cyclone Metals, “Cyclone Metals and Vale execute Development Agreement”, ASX announcement, 17 February 2025. PDF [R6] Iron Bear Resources, “Indicated Mineral Resource increased to 4.5BT @29% Fe”, ASX announcement, 12 May 2026. PDF [R7] Cyclone Metals, “Iron Bear Project Scoping Study”, ASX announcement, 11 August 2025. PDF [R8] Iron Bear Resources, “Canadian Government Initiatives Benefit Iron Bear Project”, ASX announcement, 24 September 2026. PDF [R9] Iron Bear Resources, Annual Report to shareholders, 30 September 2026, pages 66 and 114. PDF [R10] Iron Bear Resources, “Application for Project of National Significance”, ASX announcement, 3 June 2026. PDF [R11] Iron Bear Resources share price and price history, from the market data feed used by the company's website, read 7 October 2026. A secondary source for the ASX price. ironbearresources.com [R12] Prime Minister of Canada, “Prime Minister Carney announces the largest clean energy investment in North American history”, 17 August 2026. pm.gc.ca [R13] Government of Canada, Major Projects Office, “Labrador Trough Clean Power, Critical Minerals and Infrastructure Corridor”, referred 17 August 2026. canada.ca [R14] Government of Canada, “Government of Canada introduces legislation to transform how Canada builds”, 21 September 2026. canada.ca [R15] Natural Resources Canada, “Government of Canada releases updated Critical Minerals List”, 10 June 2024. canada.ca [R16] Labrador Iron Ore Royalty Corporation, results for 2025, 11 March 2026. labradorironore.com [R17] Labrador Iron Ore Royalty Corporation, results for the second quarter of 2026, 5 August 2026. labradorironore.com [R18] Champion Iron, results for the first quarter of its 2027 financial year, ASX announcement, 30 July 2026. PDF [R19] Champion Iron, “Champion Iron forms a partnership for the Kami Project with Nippon Steel and Sojitz”, 29 September 2025. championiron.com [R20] Champion Iron, third quarter results for its 2024 financial year, with the DRPF approval and the Kami project study, 30 January 2024. championiron.com [R21] ArcelorMittal, “ArcelorMittal announces CAD$205 million decarbonisation investment in its flagship Canadian mining operations”, 3 November 2021. The 2025 production figure of 25.6 Mt is from ArcelorMittal's annual report on Form 20-F for 2025 (sec.gov). arcelormittal.com [R22] The Logic, report on ArcelorMittal's Québec expansion and federal funding, 6 August 2026. A secondary source. thelogic.co [R23] Scully Royalty Ltd, annual report on Form 20-F for 2024, which gives 3,060,800 tonnes shipped in 2024 as reported by the mine operator (sec.gov), and Tacora Resources company page. tacoraresources.com [R24] Tata Steel Minerals Canada, operations page, undated, read October 2026. tatasteelcanada.com [R25] Natural Resources Canada, “Iron ore facts”, updated 27 February 2026. canada.ca [R26] Soroush Basirat, “Global high-grade iron ore market is set to grow”, IEEFA, 19 March 2026. ieefa.org [R27] Chris Barrington, “The Iron Ore Challenge for Direct Reduction”, Direct From Midrex, June 2022. midrex.com [R28] Midrex, “World DRI production reaches 151.0 Mt in 2025”, September 2026. midrex.com [R29] MMi Daily Iron Ore Report, 8 September 2026, IOSI62 and IOSI65 indices. PDF [R30] S&P Global Commodity Insights, report on Simandou exports, 17 June 2026. spglobal.com [R31] ESG Today, report on the Stegra financing, April 2026. A secondary source. esgtoday.com [R32] Eurometal, report on thyssenkrupp Steel pausing its green hydrogen tender, March 2025. A secondary source. eurometal.net [R33] Red Paramount Iron, Lac Virot project summary and February 2025 PEA results. redparamount.ca [R34] SteelOrbis, report on MetalQuest Mining starting DR pellet test work at Lac Otelnuk, September 2026. A secondary source. steelorbis.com [R35] High Tide Resources, news release on the 2026 drilling at Labrador West, 30 September 2026. webdisclosure.com [R36] Century Global Commodities, feasibility results for the Joyce Lake project, October 2022, and year-end filing, June 2026. miningstockeducation.com [R37] Government of Canada, Major Projects Office, process infographic. PDF [R38] Samso, “Iron Bear Resources (ASX:IBR) Maiden PFS: A 3.3 Billion Tonne Ore Reserve, a US$ 9 Billion NPV, and What It All Means”, 31 July 2026. samso.com.au [R39] Samso, “Iron Bear Resources (ASX: IBR): Why Vale Is Funding Its Way to 75% of Iron Bear”, 1 July 2026. samso.com.au [R40] Samso, “The Dilemma of Investing in the Iron Ore Story”, 23 July 2026. samso.com.au [R41] Samso, “Direct Reduction (DR) Pellets and Green Steel – Who are the Industry Leaders?”, 22 April 2026. samso.com.au [R42] Samso, “Iron Bear Resources (ASX: IBR) - What the Technical Traders See After the Vale Exit”, 28 September 2026. samso.com.au [R43] Samso, “Cyclone Metals Limited (ASX: CLE)—Magnetite is the Age of Green Iron.”, 9 March 2025. samso.com.au [R44] Samso, “Coffee with Samso – Iron Bear Resources Limited (ASX: IBR) – A Magnetite Story Positioned for Steel Decarbonisation”, 12 April 2026. samso.com.au [R45] Samso, “Iron Bear Resources Limited (ASX: IBR) — Indicated Resource Doubles to 4.5 Billion Tonnes at 29.5% Fe and 20.6% Magnetic Fe at the Iron Bear Project”, 18 May 2026. samso.com.au [R46] Champion Iron, “Champion Iron produces DR quality iron ore from its DRPF project and enters into commercial agreement”, 28 June 2026. championiron.com Cover photo Iron Bear DR pellets after testing. Iron Bear Resources, “Iron Bear Project PFS delivers outstanding results”, ASX announcement, 29 July 2026, Figure 19, page 60. The Samso Way – Seek the Research Here at Samso, we pride ourselves on delivering content for investors that is independent and informed by over three decades of experience in the industry. Our content is well-researched and is only created if I see merit in discussing the company's story. Our mission is simple. Cut through the noise and spotlight what matters. Genuine stories, grounded insights, and real opportunity. Investors can explore our four core platforms: Coffee with Samso Samso Insights Samso News Samso Research There may be numerous paths to success in investing, but the common thread among successful individuals is that they remain committed to making informed decisions. Equip yourself with the right knowledge and tools, and you will be well on your way to achieving your financial goals. 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