Why Is the Oil Price Rising? ASX Oil Stocks to Watch in 2026
Brent crude has climbed above US$105 a barrel as Middle East supply disruptions, tanker attacks, shrinking inventories and limited spare capacity collide. Samso examines what is driving oil, what could reverse the rally and the ASX companies exposed to the move.
Samso News · 11 September 2026 · Concluding comments by Noel Ong
Samso News | oil story | asx news series | samso investment strategy |
THE DOCUMENTS BEHIND THIS PIECE This is a market piece rather than a review of a single company release. The physical-market figures come from the U.S. Energy Information Administration's Short-Term Energy Outlook of September 2026, whose modelling was completed on 3 September 2026 and therefore closed before the escalation of 9 September. Price settlements, shipping estimates and the OPEC+ decision of 6 September come from the wire reports and the OPEC statement listed in Sources at the back. Company figures come from each company's own reports, also listed there. |
Oil is back above US$105
Brent crude has crossed one of the commodity market’s most psychologically important thresholds again. Brent crude has pushed decisively beyond the US$100-a-barrel threshold, extending its rally as escalating Middle East tensions intensified concerns over global oil supplies. At the Thursday, September 10, 2026 settlement, front-month Brent jumped US$6.42, or 6.34%, to US$107.63 a barrel after reaching an intraday high of US$108.42. West Texas Intermediate climbed US$6.43, or 6.69%, to US$102.48. Both benchmarks recorded their highest closes since May 19 and their steepest one-day gains in nearly two months.
The distinction matters: it is Brent - the global seaborne benchmark - that has moved above US$100. WTI, the principal US benchmark, remains below that level (FIG. 02). Yet the direction of travel is clear. Brent had climbed roughly 25% since early August, and the market has again moved into territory that carries implications well beyond oil producers.
Oil above US$100 filters into diesel, petrol, aviation fuel, freight, chemicals and manufacturing costs. It can lift inflation expectations, push bond yields higher and complicate central-bank decisions. On September 9, the S&P 500 fell 0.48% while energy was the only major S&P sector to finish higher, gaining about 1.1%, as markets weighed the inflationary consequences of the latest oil shock.
For Australian investors, the immediate question is not simply whether Brent has crossed US$100. The more useful questions are why the oil price is rising, how much of the rally is structural rather than geopolitical, how long the squeeze could last and which ASX oil stocks have genuine exposure to higher realised prices.
Why is the oil price rising?
The oil rally is being driven by a combination of physical supply disruption, shrinking inventories and an unusually small safety margin in the global production system. The trigger for the September 9 move was another escalation in the US-Iran conflict, including the largest wave of attacks on commercial shipping since the war began. Iran said it attacked 10 ships near the Strait of Hormuz after the United States sank five Iranian oil tankers. Shipping risk quickly translated into an oil-price risk premium.
That would matter in any oil market, but the current market is already fragile. The Strait of Hormuz was carrying around one-fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption before the conflict. It is the narrow outlet from the Persian Gulf for major exporters including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. Alternative pipelines exist, but they cannot replace all of the lost waterborne capacity (FIG. 04).
The US Energy Information Administration’s Short-Term Energy Outlook estimates that crude production shut-ins across the Middle East averaged 6.7 million barrels per day in August, up from 5.0 million barrels per day in July (FIG. 03). The EIA assumes an average 5.7 million barrels per day remains shut in through the fourth quarter of 2026, although the agency expects exporters to keep finding workarounds through pipelines, overland routes and ship-to-ship transfers.
The Strait of Hormuz remains the centre of the oil market
The scale of the disruption is easier to understand through the shipping data. The EIA estimates total crude and petroleum liquids flowing through Hormuz averaged 21.6 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025. That fell to 14.9 million barrels per day in the first quarter of 2026 and just 4.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter.
Those numbers should not be treated as a perfect real-time measure. One of the unusual features of the 2026 crisis is the rise of so-called “dark crossings”, where tankers switch off or manipulate tracking signals. Reuters reported on September 9 that industry estimates placed total Gulf oil exports, including clandestine movements and alternative routes, at roughly 15–16 million barrels per day - about two-thirds of pre-war volumes. Vortexa estimated August exports were still around 10 million barrels per day below pre-war levels.
That uncertainty is itself bullish. Commodity markets normally price a relatively transparent balance between production, consumption and visible inventories. In the Gulf, traders are now trying to estimate how much oil is moving through a conflict zone where vessels may disappear from conventional tracking for days or weeks. The result is a persistent risk premium because the market is not only short of barrels; it is short of reliable information.
Why bypass routes cannot replace Hormuz
The second problem: inventories have been drained
Oil can absorb a short production disruption when commercial inventories and strategic reserves are full. That cushion is much thinner in September 2026. The EIA estimates global oil inventories have fallen by roughly 400 million barrels so far this year. Its September forecast puts the average draw at 3.9 million barrels per day in the second quarter, followed by a further 3.0 million barrels per day in the third quarter and 1.7 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter.
This is why the latest tanker attacks have had an outsized effect. The market is not reacting to a hypothetical threat against a well-supplied system. It is reacting to renewed disruption after months of inventory depletion (FIG. 05).
The United States also has less emergency oil available than it did in earlier crises. Department of Energy data reported by Reuters showed the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve fell by another 1.2 million barrels in the latest week to 285.4 million barrels — its lowest level since November 1982. The SPR still represents a significant emergency buffer, but repeated drawdowns have reduced the flexibility policymakers once had to respond to a prolonged global supply shock.
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OPEC has very little spare capacity left
A third reason the oil price has become so sensitive is that the world has lost much of its traditional production safety valve. The EIA’s September 2026 outlook puts OPEC surplus crude production capacity at only about 0.4 million barrels per day this year, compared with an average of roughly 2.6 million barrels per day between 2016 and 2025 (FIG. 06).
That does not mean OPEC+ has no influence. Seven core OPEC+ producers agreed on September 6 to keep October output policy unchanged after completing the phased rollback of a 1.65 million-barrel-per-day voluntary cut in September. But Reuters noted that actual output remains well below targets because conflict has disrupted production and exports. Production quotas on paper are not the same thing as barrels that can physically reach refiners.
This is the important distinction. In a normal price spike, Saudi Arabia and other producers can increase output and calm the market. In 2026, the bottleneck is not simply how much oil could theoretically be produced. It is whether fields are operating, whether export infrastructure is available, whether ships can safely load and whether cargoes can transit the relevant waterways.
Why oil is not even higher
If such a large volume of Middle Eastern oil has been disrupted, a reasonable question is why Brent is only around US$100 rather than US$150 or US$200. The answer is that several counterweights are preventing the supply shock from becoming a full-scale shortage.
First, Gulf producers have adapted. Saudi Arabia has redirected barrels through its East-West pipeline and Red Sea terminals, exporters have used ship-to-ship transfers, and tankers have increasingly made dark crossings. Second, non-OPEC supply from countries such as the United States, Canada and Guyana has helped offset part of the Middle Eastern loss. Third, high prices themselves weaken demand.
China is an important example. Research from Sinopec’s Economics & Development Research Institute published on September 9 forecasts Chinese oil demand falling by about 600,000 barrels per day, or 8.9%, in 2026 — a third consecutive annual decline. Gasoline demand is forecast to fall 8.7% and diesel 11.4%, while jet fuel demand is expected to rise modestly. Weak Chinese consumption is a major reason oil has not risen as dramatically as the physical disruption might otherwise suggest.
This creates an unusual market: supply conditions are extremely tight, but demand is not universally strong. That tension is central to the oil price outlook (FIG. 07).
Could oil reach US$120 - or return to US$70?
Both outcomes are plausible because oil has already demonstrated that range during 2026. Brent traded as high as roughly US$126 per barrel in late April during an earlier phase of the conflict, then fell back sharply as flows improved and geopolitical risk eased. The September move above US$100 is therefore not the first oil-price shock of the year; it is the latest stage of an exceptionally volatile market.
The bullish scenario is straightforward. Further attacks on tankers, damage to Saudi or Gulf infrastructure, renewed disruption at Bab el-Mandeb, or another sharp fall in Hormuz traffic could push physical premiums and futures higher. With inventories already depleted and OPEC spare capacity low, another major supply loss would have relatively little immediate buffer.
The bearish scenario is equally important. If Gulf shipping stabilises, diplomatic pressure produces a durable de-escalation, bypass capacity expands and shut-in production returns, the current risk premium can disappear quickly. The EIA’s forecast — completed before the latest escalation, on September 3 - assumes Middle Eastern flows gradually improve. Under that scenario, the agency expects Brent to average around US$90 in the second half of 2026, fall to around US$77 by the second quarter of 2027 and average about US$67 in the second half of 2027.
The point is not that the EIA must be right. The agency explicitly warns that short-term volatility is likely to be greater than its forecast captures. The more useful lesson is that US$100 oil is not automatically a permanent new equilibrium. A large part of the current premium depends on a geopolitical bottleneck that could either worsen or partially unwind.
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What US$100 oil means for ASX oil stocks
For an oil producer, a higher benchmark price can translate rapidly into higher revenue — but never on a one-for-one basis. Realised prices depend on crude quality, benchmark differentials, freight, royalties, taxes, hedging and contractual terms. Operating costs can also rise during an energy shock, particularly where diesel, marine logistics or services become more expensive.
For developers, US$100 oil can improve project economics by lifting projected revenue and potentially expanding debt capacity. But boards and lenders rarely finance a long-life project on the assumption that the current spot price lasts forever. Long-term price assumptions remain more conservative.
For explorers, the link is weaker again. Higher oil prices can improve the theoretical value of a discovery, but they do not turn prospective resources into reserves and they do not eliminate geological, appraisal or funding risk. That is why “ASX oil stocks” should be separated by stage rather than treated as a single trade.
ASX oil stocks to watch in 2026
The following list is not a ranking or a recommendation. It is designed to show the different ways investors can obtain oil exposure on the ASX, from large diversified producers to small exploration companies (TABLE 01). For Samso readers interested in small and mid-cap resources, the most direct names are not necessarily the largest companies.
Karoon Energy - one of the cleaner ASX oil exposures
Karoon Energy (ASX: KAR) is particularly relevant to an oil-price discussion because a large share of its production is liquids. Karoon produced 10.3 million barrels of oil equivalent on a net revenue interest basis in 2025. The 100%-owned Baúna Project offshore Brazil contributed 7.7 million barrels of oil, produced at an average rate of about 21,000 barrels per day, and represented roughly 75% of group production (FIG. 08).
At December 31, 2025, Karoon reported 61.8 million barrels of 2P oil and condensate reserves across Baúna and Who Dat, with total 2P reserves of 72.8 MMboe after including gas and natural gas liquids. The company has also been working through operational issues at Baúna in 2026, including production restarts at PRA-2 and SPS-92. That is an important reminder that commodity leverage only matters when wells and facilities are operating reliably.
Horizon Oil — smaller-scale producing exposure
Horizon Oil (ASX: HZN) offers a smaller-cap producing alternative. Horizon reported record FY26 net production of 2.15 MMboe. Following the acquisition of a controlling interest in Cue Energy, the company says current production is around 7,300 barrels of oil equivalent per day across a five-country Asia-Pacific portfolio. Its reserve and resource position at June 30, 2026 included 13.6 MMboe of 2P reserves and 19.8 MMboe of 2C contingent resources.
The portfolio includes established oil production as well as oil-linked and fixed-price gas, so HZN is not a pure Brent proxy. Nevertheless, it sits closer to current cash-flow exposure than most junior oil explorers.
Bass Oil — micro-cap production leverage
Bass Oil (ASX: BAS) is much smaller. Its June 2026 operations update reported group production of 6,746 barrels for the month, averaging 225 barrels per day. That comprised Cooper Basin production and Indonesian production. The scale is modest, but the relationship between realised oil price and revenue is more immediate than it is for a pre-drill explorer.
The trade-off is obvious: small operating bases can be highly sensitive to individual wells, field decline, maintenance, funding and liquidity. A strong Brent price is supportive, but operational execution can overwhelm the commodity benefit at this scale.
Carnarvon Energy — development leverage through Dorado
Carnarvon Energy (ASX: CVN) sits in a different category. The company holds a 10% interest in Dorado offshore Western Australia, operated by Santos. Dorado is estimated to contain approximately 162 million barrels of light oil and condensate on a gross 2C contingent-resource basis, together with a substantial gas resource.
The optimised development concept has been designed around an initial oil production rate of about 60,000 barrels per day and could deliver first oil roughly three years after a final investment decision. The joint venture is currently reviewing the project timeline. Higher long-term oil assumptions could strengthen the economics, but CVN investors remain exposed to the central developer risks: FID timing, capital cost, financing, partner decisions and execution.
88 Energy and Melbana — higher-risk exploration and appraisal exposure
88 Energy (ASX: 88E) provides much higher-risk exposure through Project Phoenix on Alaska’s North Slope. The company reports 239 MMboe of net 2C contingent resources at Phoenix, where Hickory-1 testing demonstrated hydrocarbon flow to surface. These are contingent resources, not reserves, and further appraisal, commercial studies, funding and development work are required before any production case can be established.
Melbana Energy (ASX: MAY) is another high-risk example. Melbana holds a 30% participating interest and operatorship of Block 9 in Cuba. Its 2025 annual report cites an independently assessed 46 million barrels of 2C contingent resources in Unit 1B of the Amistad sheet, alongside larger prospective resources. The company also produced and stored modest quantities of crude from appraisal activity, but the project remains a very different proposition from an established producer such as Karoon or Horizon.
This distinction matters for SEO-driven “oil stocks to watch” lists because a large resource number can look more impressive than production, but the categories measure different things. Reserves support an approved or commercial development case at defined confidence levels. Contingent resources require one or more contingencies to be resolved. Prospective resources relate to undiscovered accumulations and carry both discovery and development risk (FIG. 09).
Large-cap context: Woodside, Santos and Beach
Woodside Energy (ASX: WDS), Santos (ASX: STO) and Beach Energy (ASX: BPT) provide the scale end of Australian-listed upstream energy. They are not small-cap oil stocks and none is a pure Brent trade because LNG and domestic gas are important parts of their businesses. They are nevertheless useful benchmarks for how higher oil prices translate into larger operating portfolios.
Woodside’s Sangomar field in Senegal averaged about 99,000 barrels per day gross during the first quarter of 2026, equivalent to around 80,000 barrels per day net to Woodside, while its Gulf of Mexico portfolio provides additional liquids exposure. Santos reported first-half 2026 production of 45.6 MMboe and achieved first oil from Pikka in Alaska in May, with the project ramping towards a targeted gross plateau of approximately 80,000 barrels per day. Beach reported FY26 production of 19.4 MMboe and an average realised oil price of A$126 per barrel, although the company’s revenue mix remains heavily influenced by gas.
For investors, the large-cap names generally provide stronger balance sheets and diversified cash flow, while the small-cap names can offer more concentrated commodity or project leverage — and considerably greater risk.
Oil stocks still carry substantial risks at US$100 Brent
A higher oil price can improve the backdrop, but it does not eliminate the principal risks in upstream energy. Producing fields decline naturally. Facilities fail. Wells can underperform. Governments change fiscal terms. Hedging can limit upside. Exploration wells can be dry, and development projects can suffer cost inflation precisely when commodity prices are high.
Small-cap companies face an additional funding problem. A junior developer may hold a valuable discovery but still need hundreds of millions or billions of dollars of capital before first production. If financing is unavailable, a high spot oil price does not solve the problem by itself. Equity raisings can also dilute existing shareholders.
Geopolitical risk cuts both ways. The current Middle East conflict is supporting Brent, but a meaningful de-escalation could remove a large risk premium quickly. Conversely, further escalation can increase realised prices while simultaneously raising shipping, insurance and operating costs. The relationship between war and producer value is therefore not as simple as “higher oil equals higher share price”.
What oil investors should watch next
Strait of Hormuz traffic: sustained improvement would ease the physical squeeze; another collapse would tighten it.
Middle East production shut-ins: the EIA currently assumes 5.7 million b/d remains shut in on average during 4Q26.
OPEC+ policy: the next core producer meeting is scheduled for October 4, with 2027 production baselines becoming increasingly important.
Global inventories: continued draws would make the system even more sensitive to supply shocks.
US Strategic Petroleum Reserve: the emergency buffer is already at its lowest level since 1982.
China demand: Sinopec’s forecast of an 8.9% 2026 decline is a major bearish counterweight.
Inflation and interest rates: US$100+ oil can keep transport and goods inflation elevated and complicate central-bank policy.
Company-specific milestones: production reliability at Karoon, integration and growth at Horizon, Dorado timing at Carnarvon, and appraisal/development progress at 88 Energy and Melbana.
THE COUNTERARGUMENT The case against a sustained US$100 oil price is strong enough to set out on its own terms. The EIA’s forecast was completed on 3 September, before the latest escalation, and it has Brent averaging around US$90 in the second half of 2026 and about US$67 in the second half of 2027. That is the agency’s base case rather than its bear case. Most of the current premium rests on one bottleneck. If Gulf shipping stabilises and shut-in production returns, that premium can come out of the price quickly. Brent has already done this once in 2026, falling from roughly US$126 in late April to the mid-eighties in early August. The demand side is softening at the same time. Sinopec’s research institute expects Chinese consumption to fall again in 2026. A supply shock arriving into weakening demand does not price the same way as one arriving into growth. For the ASX names, a lower oil price does not take away what a higher one never gave them. A developer still needs its final investment decision and its funding. An appraisal company still needs to show its resource is commercial. Neither of those jobs changes at US$67 or at US$101. |
Samso Concluding Comments
SAMSO TAKE What I find most interesting about oil above US$100 in September 2026 is that this is not simply another speculative commodity spike. There is a genuine physical-market problem underneath the price. Middle Eastern production has been shut in, the Strait of Hormuz has carried a fraction of its pre-war volume, global inventories have been drawn down and OPEC’s spare capacity is unusually small. But there is another side to the argument. The world has adapted more effectively than many people expected. Gulf exporters are finding alternative routes, ships are making dark crossings, non-OPEC producers are supplying additional barrels and Chinese demand is weakening. Those forces are why Brent is around US$100 rather than dramatically higher despite an extraordinary geopolitical disruption. For me, that makes the oil price outlook less about calling a single number and more about understanding the range of outcomes. If shipping through Hormuz deteriorates again, there is very little cushion and the market has already shown in 2026 that Brent can trade above US$120. If flows normalise, the EIA’s much lower 2027 price path becomes entirely plausible. The same discipline applies to ASX oil stocks. The companies selling barrels now have the clearest near-term exposure. Developers can benefit if stronger long-term oil assumptions improve project economics. Explorers have potentially large upside, but the oil price cannot remove geological risk or turn a prospective resource into a reserve. The key is to understand exactly what investors own: producing barrels, reserves, contingent resources or exploration potential. They are not the same thing, even when the headline commodity price is the same. |
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Previous Samso Coverage of Oil and Energy
Samso has written on oil, gas and energy security before. The pieces below are the relevant thread, newest first, together with the companion article on copper published the day before this one.
10 SEP 2026
The companion piece to this one. Copper above US$14,700 a tonne on mine-supply constraints, tariff stockpiling and electricity demand, then the ASX copper names sorted by development stage.
23 APR 2026
Samso’s earlier read on the same chokepoint, arguing the Australian exposure runs through ammonia and sulphur feeding mining and agriculture costs rather than through the petroleum headline.
3 NOV 2025
Diona-1 in the Surat-Bowen Basin, around 181 metres of hydrocarbon-prone Permian section with 23 metres of net gas pay and an overpressured gas column.
3 APR 2024
An IPO write-up on a natural gas and helium explorer raising A$10 million at 20 cents for Free State assets in South Africa.
31 JAN 2019
Whether the Butler prospect in the Canning Basin could be a company-maker, working through the prospective gas and condensate numbers.
3 JAN 2019
The EP487 acquisition, and Fishbones titanium-tube stimulation as a way for a small-cap oil producer to make marginal barrels work in a weak crude price.
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THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH BRENT CRUDE The seaborne benchmark grade used to price most internationally traded oil. When a headline says oil is above US$100, it usually means Brent. WTI West Texas Intermediate, the main United States benchmark grade. It normally trades a few dollars below Brent because it is landlocked and priced inland. BARREL AND B/D A barrel is 159 litres. Barrels per day, written b/d or bbl/d, is the standard rate measure for production and for flows through a waterway. BOE AND MMBOE Barrel of oil equivalent. Gas and liquids converted to a common unit so a mixed portfolio can be added up. MMboe is a million of them. A boe of gas is not worth the same money as a barrel of oil. 2P RESERVES Proved plus probable reserves. Oil a company expects to produce commercially from an approved or committed development, at a defined confidence level. 2C CONTINGENT RESOURCES Oil that has been discovered but cannot yet be called a reserve, because something still has to be resolved. Funding, approvals, a development decision or further appraisal. PROSPECTIVE RESOURCES Oil thought to exist in accumulations nobody has drilled yet. It carries both the risk of not finding it and the risk of not being able to develop it. SPARE CAPACITY Production that a country could bring on quickly and hold. It is the market’s shock absorber. When it is small, a supply loss moves the price further. SHUT-IN PRODUCTION Wells or fields that could produce but are not producing, usually because of conflict, damage or a lack of a route to market. STRAIT OF HORMUZ The narrow sea passage out of the Persian Gulf. Tankers loading in Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have to pass through it. STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE Crude oil the United States government stores underground for use in an emergency. Drawing it down adds supply, and refilling it takes years. DARK CROSSING A tanker voyage made with the vessel’s tracking transponder switched off or falsified, so the cargo does not appear in normal shipping data. FID Final investment decision. The board and joint-venture partners formally commit the capital to build a project. Before FID, a development is a study. REALISED PRICE What a producer is actually paid per barrel, after quality differences, freight, benchmark differentials and hedging. It is never the headline benchmark price. |
Sources
Figures are drawn from the primary documents below, as published at their stated dates. Market-sensitive numbers change daily and were current at 11 September 2026. Where a Samso figure is calculated from a published number rather than reproduced from one, the editorial notes for this piece say so.
[R1] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Short-Term Energy Outlook, September 2026 (modelling completed 3 September 2026). https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/global_oil.php
[R2] U.S. Energy Information Administration, Global Energy Security Data, Strait of Hormuz flows. https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/report/energysecurity/article.php
[R3] U.S. Energy Information Administration, press release, 9 September 2026. https://www.eia.gov/pressroom/releases/press592.php
[R4] Reuters, oil market wrap reporting the 9 September 2026 Brent and WTI settlements. https://www.brecorder.com/news/40438774/brent-settles-at-over-usd100
[R5] Reuters, One third of Gulf oil is still missing despite dark crossings, 9 September 2026, carrying the Goldman Sachs and Vortexa export estimates. https://www.investing.com/news/commodities-news/one-third-of-gulf-oil-is-still-missing-despite-dark-crossings-data-shows-4894113
[R6] OPEC, statement of the eight participating countries, 6 September 2026. https://www.opec.org/pr-detail/1835613-6-september-2026.html
[R7] Report of the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve falling to 285.4 million barrels, 8 September 2026. https://energynow.com/2026/09/oil-stocks-in-us-strategic-petroleum-reserve-fall-by-1-2-million-barrels-to-lowest-level-since-1982/
[R8] Sinopec Economics & Development Research Institute, China oil demand forecast, 9 September 2026. https://energynow.com/2026/09/china-oil-demand-to-fall-8-9-in-2026-sinopec-research-says/
[R9] Karoon Energy, reserves and resources statement as at 31 December 2025. https://www.karoonenergy.com.au/project/reserves-and-resources/
[R10] Horizon Oil, FY26 Annual Report. https://horizonoil.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/Horizon-FY26-Annual-Report-FINAL.pdf
[R11] Carnarvon Energy, Dorado project page. https://carnarvon.com.au/projects/project/dorado/
[R12] 88 Energy, June 2026 quarterly report, Project Phoenix contingent resources. https://www.investegate.co.uk/announcement/rns/88-energy-limited-di---88e/quarterly-report-and-appendix-5b-/9681434
[R13] Melbana Energy, Annual Report 2025, Block 9 contingent resources. https://www.melbana.com/annualreport/2025/6/
[R14] Woodside Energy, first quarter 2026 report. https://www.woodside.com/docs/default-source/investor-documents/quarterly-and-half-yearly-pdfs-and-data-tables/2026/030-first-quarter-2026-report.pdf
[R15] Santos, 2026 half-year results. https://www.santos.com/news/2026-half-year-results/
[R16] Beach Energy, FY26 fourth quarter activities report, 22 July 2026. https://beachenergy.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/BPT_FY26_Fourth_Quarter_Activities_Report.pdf
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