What Makes a Mining Project Viable in 2026, Part 1 of 3 – The Economics Have Changed

Mining project feasibility has shifted in 2026. Heavy construction prices in Australia are up a quarter in five years and Perth diesel is up 53 per cent in a year. Part 1 sets out what a mine earns and what it now costs to build and run, using projects in Arizona, Western Australia and Malawi.

In 2026 both the revenue side and the cost side of a mining project’s feasibility have moved. The prices Australian builders charge for heavy engineering work are 25 per cent higher than in June 2021 [R1]. South32 now expects its Taylor project at Hermosa in Arizona to cost about US$3.3 billion, against about US$2.16 billion at its 2024 feasibility study [R2].

Gold in Australian dollars is 9.2 per cent lower than a year ago, while the Perth wholesale price of diesel is 53 per cent higher (Samso calculations from COMEX, RBA and AIP data) [R3][R4][R5]. Interest rates in the United States and Australia are rising again. For a company building a mine, the pressure falls mainly on capital, interest and shareholder dilution. The operating margin of a mine that is already running is under less pressure.

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READING THE SERIES

Part 1. The Economics Have Changed. What a mine sells, what it now costs to build and run, and where gold, other metals, oil, diesel and acid stand in October 2026.

Part 2. Who Will Put Up the Money. Interest rates, politics and four paths for the next two years, then royalty, stream, government and Chinese money, and merging instead of building.

Part 3. Follow the Funding and the Delivery. Ten projects tested against the four paths, closing in Noel’s words.

Technical terms are explained where they first appear and are collected in a vocabulary box at the back. Reference markers such as [R1] point to the numbered list of sources at the end.

All prices in this piece are as at the close of ASX trading on 16 October 2026. Global prices for gold, Brent crude oil and the Australian dollar are taken at the same time. Company information is from announcements and reports released up to 19 October 2026, so September quarter reports released after that date are not included.

WHAT THIS PIECE COVERS

1.00 What a mine sells.

A mine is paid for recovered, payable metal, after royalties and processing charges.

2.00 What it costs to build now.

Three ABS price indexes over five years, and what they do and do not measure.

3.00 Where the overrun came from.

South32’s Hermosa, with BHP’s Jansen as a second example.

4.00 Contingency and the accuracy of a study.

How sure a cost estimate is at each stage, and what a 10 per cent allowance covers.

5.00 The mine made money, the refinery did not.

IGO’s Greenbushes and Kwinana in the same year.

6.00 The global gold market now.

Price, forecasts, Samso’s published view, interest rates and what it means for a gold developer.

7.00 What the forecasters expect for other metals.

Copper, lithium and the difference between real and nominal prices.

8.00 Oil, diesel and sulphuric acid.

How far the oil forecasts moved, what diesel costs a mine, and an acid shortage in Malawi.

9.00 Study against first year.

What the restart at Kayelekera looked like month by month.

10.00 Higher revenue is not higher cash flow.

A worked illustration, and the question for Part 2.

1.00 — WHAT A MINE SELLS

Grade, recovery and the cheque from the buyer

FIG. 01 shows the projects in this part, Hermosa in Arizona, Greenbushes, Kwinana and Bald Hill in Western Australia, Kayelekera in Malawi and Jansen in Saskatchewan, Canada.

In our industry people talk about “ounces in the ground”. A company reports a Mineral Resource, which is its estimate of how much metal is in a deposit. That is where the value starts. The mine itself is paid only for the metal its plant recovers and the buyer pays for.

Only part of the resource is ever mined. The part a company has shown can be mined at a profit is called the Ore Reserve. It can only come from the higher-confidence parts of the resource, called Measured and Indicated, and it includes the waste rock that is mined along with the ore [R2, p15]. Only part of the metal in that ore is recovered in the plant, and the rest goes out with the waste, which we call tailings. Then the buyer and the state take their shares.

Grade is how much metal is in each tonne of rock. Recovery is the share of that metal the plant gets out. The two multiply, so a fall in recovery cuts revenue in the same way as a fall in grade (see Samso’s “The Grain Size Tin Problem”) [R9].

In a hypothetical gold example, one tonne of ore carries 1.5 grams of gold per tonne, written 1.5 g/t. If the plant recovers 90 per cent, it produces 1.35 grams. There are 31.1 grams in a troy ounce, so that is 0.043 ounces. At a gold price of A$6,000 an ounce, the tonne is worth about A$260. If the state takes a hypothetical 3 per cent royalty, which is a payment to the owner of the mineral rights based on what the mine sells, the mine keeps about A$253. If recovery falls to 80 per cent, the same tonne earns about A$224 after royalty. That is 11 per cent less money from the same rock (Samso arithmetic, hypothetical figures).

Base metal mines add another step. Most copper, zinc and lead mines sell a concentrate, which is ore that has been crushed and treated to remove most of the waste rock. A smelter buys it and is paid for turning it into metal. The miner is paid for an agreed share of the metal, called the payable metal, less a treatment charge for each tonne of concentrate and a refining charge for each pound of metal. In the first half of 2026 spot treatment charges for copper concentrate fell further below zero, so smelters were in effect paying miners for concentrate. Glencore says free metal credits and strong by-product revenue, particularly from sulphuric acid, supported smelter economics [R10, p17].

At Hermosa, South32’s test work supports average plant recoveries of 90 per cent for zinc and 91 per cent for lead at Taylor [R2, p15]. Its cut-off, the line between ore and waste, is set on net smelter return. That is the value left in a tonne of rock after plant recoveries, royalties, transport and refining charges [R2, p15].

2.00 — WHAT IT COSTS TO BUILD NOW

Five years of price rises in three ABS indexes

The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) publishes producer price indexes. FIG. 02 shows three that are useful for a mine, rebased so that June 2021 equals 100.

The final demand index covers goods and services sold to final buyers across the economy. It rose from 113.6 in June 2021 to 140.0 in June 2026, an increase of 23.2 per cent [R1]. The heavy and civil engineering construction index tracks what builders charge for large engineering works, such as roads, bridges, railways and pipelines. It rose from 119.9 to 150.3, or 25.4 per cent [R1]. The coal mining input index tracks the prices coal miners pay for what they use. It rose from 109.2 to 150.0, or 37.4 per cent [R1]. All three percentages are Samso’s calculations from the ABS index levels.

Samso uses the coal mining input index as the nearest public measure of what a mine buys to keep running, although it covers coal mines only. It rose faster than the other two in the last year. It rose 12.2 per cent in the year to June 2026 and 9.0 per cent in the June quarter. The ABS attributes the rise to the price of diesel, through petroleum and coal product manufacturing, and to road transport [R1].

Wages have risen more slowly than materials. The wage price index for mining rose 3.5 per cent in the year to June 2026, against 3.2 per cent across all industries [R11].

The indexes do not measure how much steel a particular project needs, how productive a crew is or whether the design changes. They are also national averages, and a remote site can face higher costs. The next ABS producer price release is due on 30 October 2026 [R1].

3.00 — WHERE THE OVERRUN CAME FROM

Hermosa’s US$1.1 billion increase and larger reserve, with BHP’s Jansen

Hermosa is South32’s (ASX: S32) zinc, lead and silver project in southern Arizona, which it owns 100 per cent [R2, p4], and Taylor is its first mine. South32 approved construction in February 2024 on a feasibility study, the detailed engineering and cost study a board uses to decide whether to build [R2, p2]. That study put pre-production capital at about US$2,160 million [R2, p3]. FIG. 03 shows where Hermosa is in Arizona.

On 30 April 2026 South32 raised the estimate to about US$3,300 million [R2, p3]. On the published figures that is about 53 per cent higher (Samso arithmetic, 3,300 divided by 2,160). The two totals are in different dollars. The feasibility study is in real terms at 1 January 2024 and the update is in real terms at 1 July 2026. Part of the gap is therefore general inflation over two and a half years [R2, p3].

South32 gives three causes for the increase [R2, p10]. About US$100 million is new scope, a decline from the neighbouring Clark deposit. A decline is a sloping tunnel from surface. About US$450 million is revised shaft construction cost. About US$500 million is materially higher inflation, industry-wide increases in key inputs such as steel, piping, concrete and electrical components, and United States tariffs. The three items add to about US$1,050 million, and South32 describes the total increase as about US$1,100 million [R2, p2]. Both figures are as published and both are rounded. FIG. 04 shows the steps.

Input prices moved further than any general index. South32 says installed prices for steel, piping and concrete have more than doubled against the feasibility study. Detailed engineering cut the steel required by about 30 per cent and the cost still rose [R2, p10]. The US producer price index for steel mill products, which includes the effect of US tariffs, was 27.6 per cent higher in September 2026 than a year earlier (Samso calculation from FRED data) [R12]. PLATE 01 shows the surface works at Hermosa in April 2026.

The schedule moved with the cost. South32 attributes the delay to “contractor performance and productivity challenges” in shaft sinking, and it has brought critical scope under its direct management [R2, p1, p2]. First production moved from the second half of FY27 to the second half of FY28 [R2, p3]. That first ore is to come through the new decline from Clark, ahead of the shafts. Production from the shafts is now expected from the first half of FY29 [R2, p2]. Nameplate capacity, the full design throughput of 4.3 million tonnes of ore a year, moved from FY30 to FY31 [R2, p2]. Expected operating costs rose from about US$86 to about US$100 a tonne of ore processed [R2, p3].

The same update raised the Taylor Ore Reserve by 52 per cent to 99 million tonnes after infill drilling, which is drilling between earlier holes. It extended the expected mine life from about 28 to about 33 years [R2, p2]. South32 puts the post-tax net present value (NPV) at about US$3,100 million at its long-term prices and about US$4,500 million at April 2026 spot prices, using a 7 per cent real discount rate [R2, p3].

The production target behind these figures draws about 10 per cent of its tonnes from Inferred Resources and 10 per cent from an Exploration Target. Inferred is the lowest-confidence class of resource. An Exploration Target is a conceptual estimate where there has not yet been enough drilling to estimate a resource. South32 says the project still forecasts a positive result on the other 80 per cent [R2, p1].

BHP (ASX: BHP) has the same pattern at larger scale at Jansen, a potash fertiliser mine in Saskatchewan, Canada, which it owns 100 per cent [R13, p18]. In June 2026 the Stage 2 estimate rose from US$4.9 billion to US$6.9 billion [R6, p19]. BHP then wrote down its investment in Jansen by US$2.3 billion, “given the higher forecast capital intensity”, meaning a higher capital cost for each tonne of yearly capacity [R6, p19]. Stage 1 was 84 per cent complete at 30 June 2026 and is due to produce in mid-2027 [R6, p19]. FIG. 05 shows where Jansen is in Saskatchewan.

SAMSO TAKE

Hermosa and Jansen belong to two large producers with other mines earning cash. In my opinion a junior developer facing a rise of this size would usually have to go back to its shareholders or its lenders.

When I read a smaller company’s capital estimate, I look for how much is already priced in signed contracts and how much rests on a contractor achieving its planned rates. How many developers on the ASX could absorb a 50 per cent overrun without a new capital raising?

4.00 — CONTINGENCY AND THE ACCURACY OF A STUDY

Mining project feasibility, study accuracy and contingency

A mining company studies a project in stages, and each stage is more detailed and more expensive than the last. A scoping study is the first look, built on early drilling and broad cost estimates. A pre-feasibility study, or PFS, compares the main options and picks one. A definitive feasibility study, or DFS, engineers the chosen option in enough detail for a board to make a final investment decision, which we call FID. Financial close comes when all the funding agreements are signed and their conditions are met, so the money can be drawn.

Each stage carries a stated accuracy range, which is how far the final cost could reasonably end up from the estimate. The range narrows as the work becomes more detailed. AMC Consultants, a mining engineering consultancy, gives an estimating accuracy of about 30 to 35 per cent for a scoping study and 20 to 25 per cent for a pre-feasibility study [R58]. Rox Resources’ Youanmi DFS, as one example of the last stage, states its estimates at plus or minus 10 to 15 per cent, which is Class 3 in the cost estimating standard of AACE International [R57, pp88 to 89].

Contingency is an extra amount added to an estimate for costs the engineers expect but cannot yet list item by item. It is usually kept separate from escalation, which is an allowance for prices rising during the build. The WA gold studies Samso has reviewed carry contingencies from none to about 10 per cent of capital (see Samso’s Workups on Capricorn Metals, Rox Resources and Horizon Gold) [R55, p24][R57, p1][R56, p58][R14][R16][R17].

South32 made its April 2026 update when about 80 per cent of Taylor’s growth capital was already “invested, contracted or subject to final pricing” [R2, p10]. The company says the remaining shaft development is being done under unit rate contracts [R2, p10]. A unit rate contract pays the contractor a set price for each metre or tonne of work. It fixes the rate but not the total, because the total depends on how much work is needed and how fast it is done.

A hypothetical project with a base estimate of A$300 million and a 10 per cent contingency of A$30 million shows what that allowance covers. A rise of 53 per cent, the same as Hermosa on the published figures, adds A$159 million. A rise of 41 per cent, the same as the Jansen Stage 2 revision (6.9 divided by 4.9), adds A$122 million. In those cases the contingency covers about a fifth to a quarter of the increase (Samso arithmetic, hypothetical project). The rest has to come from cash, new debt or new shares.

5.00 — THE MINE MADE MONEY, THE REFINERY DID NOT

Greenbushes earned a 73 per cent margin while Kwinana lost money

IGO (ASX: IGO) holds a 24.99 per cent indirect interest in the Greenbushes lithium mine and a 49 per cent interest in the Kwinana lithium hydroxide refinery. Both are south of Perth, and IGO holds both through Tianqi Lithium Energy Australia, a company it owns with Tianqi Lithium [R7, p3]. Greenbushes produces concentrate of spodumene, the lithium-bearing mineral in hard-rock lithium ore. Kwinana converts spodumene into lithium hydroxide, a chemical used to make battery cathodes. FIG. 06 shows Greenbushes, Kwinana and Perth on a map of Western Australia.

In the year to 30 June 2026, Greenbushes produced 1.41 million tonnes of concentrate at a cash cost of A$415 a tonne [R7, p3]. It earned revenue of A$2,858.4 million and EBITDA of A$2,098.8 million, on a 100 per cent basis, which is an EBITDA margin of 73 per cent against 66 per cent the year before [R7, p3]. The average realised price was US$1,443 a tonne, against US$783 a tonne in FY25 [R7, p3].

Kwinana produced 8,839 tonnes of lithium hydroxide, below its guidance of 9,000 to 11,000 tonnes [R7, p3]. Its conversion cost, which excludes the spodumene it buys, fell from A$22,748 to A$18,379 a tonne [R7, p2]. It recorded an EBITDA loss of A$167.0 million on a 100 per cent basis, after a loss of A$209.5 million in FY25 [R7, p3]. The FY26 loss includes A$83.8 million of spending that was expensed because the Kwinana assets had been fully impaired at 30 June 2025 [R7, pp3 to 4]. IGO says production stayed below guidance because of “operational challenges associated with the ramp-up” together with “broader structural market pressures affecting downstream processing in Australia” [R7, p3]. Guidance for FY27 is again 9,000 to 11,000 tonnes [R7, p6]. FIG. 07 sets the two results side by side.

Downstream processing is the later step that turns a mineral concentrate into a chemical or metal. A refinery buys spodumene as its main raw material, so a higher spodumene price lifts the mine’s revenue and the refinery’s costs together.

SAMSO TAKE

IGO’s year puts the lithium chain in one set of accounts. The mine lifted its margin from 66 to 73 per cent, while the refinery lost money again.

We talk a lot in Australia about processing our own minerals, and I support the aim. The ramp-up years of a refinery cost real money. Who should carry that cost, the shareholders, the customers or the taxpayer?

6.00 — THE GLOBAL GOLD MARKET NOW

Lower in Australian dollars than a year ago, and inside Samso’s July range

The price in both currencies

The nearest COMEX gold futures contract, which tracks the spot price closely, closed at US$4,181.1 an ounce [R3]. At the Reserve Bank of Australia’s exchange rate of US$0.6947, that is about A$6,019 an ounce (Samso arithmetic) [R3][R4]. The Australian dollar price is the one an ASX producer receives.

On 16 October 2025 the price was US$4,304.6, or about A$6,631. Gold is 2.9 per cent lower in US dollars and 9.2 per cent lower in Australian dollars over the year (Samso arithmetic). The difference comes from the Australian dollar, which rose 7.0 per cent against the US dollar, from US$0.6492 to US$0.6947 [R4].

The spot price reached a record of about US$5,595 during trading on 29 January 2026, as reported by Reuters through Kitco [R18]. The highest COMEX close was US$5,318.4 that day, and the highest Australian dollar close was about A$7,584 on 28 January (Samso arithmetic) [R3]. FIG. 08 shows the path in both currencies.

What has moved the price

Interest rates have worked against gold this year. The US 10-year real yield rose from 1.71 per cent on 16 October 2025 to 2.78 per cent on 15 October 2026 [R20]. Gold pays no interest, so a higher real yield makes it more costly to hold. FIG. 09 compares the real yield with the gold price.

In Samso’s reading, on past patterns a rise of that size in real yields would have pushed gold lower, and buying by central banks and funds has offset part of it. Central banks bought 288.9 tonnes in the June 2026 quarter, up from 56.5 tonnes in the March quarter, according to the World Gold Council (WGC) [R21, p2]. Gold exchange-traded funds then had record inflows of US$31 billion in the September quarter and ended it with record holdings of 4,256 tonnes [R22].

The Middle East conflict has not lifted the price. Reuters reported that spot gold fell about 22 per cent from the start of the Iran war to late July, as oil pushed up inflation and rate expectations [R18].

What the global commentators say

The large banks cut their targets through the middle of the year. The figures below are from news reports of the bank notes, which Samso has not read.

FIG. 10 shows the same targets against the current price.

What Samso has published

Samso’s two main recent Insights on the gold price are “The Gold Question” of 21 June 2026, which set out three pathways for the price, and “The Big Consolidation” of 8 July 2026, which put a number on where the price would settle [R27][R19].

The view published on 8 July has four parts [R19]. For the second half of 2026, gold trades in a range of US$3,900 to 4,500, with US$4,100 to 4,300 as the centre. The base case, weighted at about 55 per cent, has the Fed turning back towards easing in 2027 and gold trading at US$5,000 to 5,500 by mid to late 2027. The bull case, at about 25 per cent, reaches US$6,000 to 6,300. The bear case, at about 20 per cent, falls to US$3,200 to 3,600. The same note named what would change the view. That was central bank buying falling away materially, or “a Fed hiking cycle that extends deep into 2027” [R19].

Testing Samso’s range against the price since

From 10 July to 16 October 2026 there were 70 COMEX closes, averaging US$4,293. They ranged from US$3,992 on 16 July to US$4,698 on 24 August. Nine were above US$4,500, eight in late August and one on 3 September, and none were below US$3,900. The 16 October close of US$4,181 is inside the centre band (Samso arithmetic from COMEX data) [R3].

The 2027 base case needs a rise of 19.6 to 31.5 per cent from US$4,181 to reach US$5,000 to 5,500 within roughly nine to fifteen months (Samso arithmetic). Goldman Sachs’ US$5,400 is inside that band. HSBC’s end-2027 target of US$5,025 is at its lower edge. Bank of America’s 2027 range of US$5,000 to 6,000 covers the band and runs above it. UBS’s US$4,800 and the Reuters poll average of US$4,610 are below it [R23][R24][R25][R26][R18].

The base case rests on the Fed turning to cuts in 2027. Futures markets price higher US rates through 2027 instead, which is the condition the July note named as the one that would change the view. Samso’s published view has not been changed in this piece.

Interest rates in the United States and Australia

On 16 September 2026 the Fed raised its target for the federal funds rate by 0.25 percentage points, to a range of 3.75 to 4.00 per cent [R28]. The statement gave no guidance on the next move. The median projection of Fed officials is 4.1 per cent at the end of 2026 and again at the end of 2027, which implies one more rise this year [R29].

Federal funds futures imply average rates of about 4.15 per cent in January 2027, 4.55 per cent in June 2027 and 4.61 per cent in December 2027 (Samso calculation from CBOT 30-day federal funds futures closes on 16 October 2026) [R30]. That is about 0.65 to 0.75 percentage points of further rises by mid to late 2027 and no cuts through 2027.

The RBA raised the cash rate by 0.25 percentage points to 4.60 per cent on 29 September 2026. It was the fourth rise of 2026, after three cuts in 2025 [R31][R32]. The board said it would do what it considers necessary, including raising the cash rate further if needed [R31][R33]. On 16 October the three-month bank bill rate was 4.76 per cent and the six-month rate 5.12 per cent, both above the cash rate [R32].

A floating project loan priced off the bank bill rate costs an extra A$250,000 a year for each A$100 million drawn, for each 0.25 percentage point rise (Samso arithmetic).

What it means for a gold developer

A gold project’s study assumes a gold price in Australian dollars. The table converts US dollar prices at three exchange rates, before any hedging (Samso arithmetic).

Recent WA gold feasibility studies covered in Samso’s Workups assume gold prices of A$5,200 to A$6,000 an ounce. Their all-in sustaining costs are about A$1,870 to A$3,000 an ounce (see Samso’s Workups on Capricorn Metals, Rox Resources, Brightstar Resources and Horizon Gold) [R14][R16][R15][R17]. All-in sustaining cost, or AISC, is the cost of producing an ounce including the spending needed to keep the mine running at its current level. At about A$6,019 an ounce, those studies still show a wide operating margin.

For a gold developer the pressure in 2026 falls mainly on capital. Building costs have risen, interest is dearer and new shares are being sold at lower prices.

SAMSO TAKE

In July I said gold would spend the second half of 2026 basing between US$3,900 and 4,500, with US$4,100 to 4,300 the centre. So far the price has done that, with one run above the range in late August and early September.

I also said that a Fed hiking cycle running deep into 2027 would change my mind about the move to US$5,000 to 5,500. Futures now price rates rising into mid-2027. Central banks are still buying and the ETFs had a record quarter. Which of the two will hold for longer, the official buyers or the higher rates?

7.00 — WHAT THE FORECASTERS EXPECT FOR OTHER METALS

Agency forecasts for gold, copper and lithium

The Australian Government’s Resources and Energy Quarterly (REQ) is the official Australian forecast for mineral prices. Samso could not open the September 2026 edition, so the figures here are as reported by Market Index on 6 October 2026 [R34]. According to that report, the REQ expects gold to average US$4,600 an ounce in 2026 and to fall to US$3,760 in real terms by 2031. It expects copper at about US$13,500 a tonne in 2026 and 2027, falling to US$11,600 in real terms by 2031. It expects lithium hydroxide to fall from US$21,100 a tonne to US$20,995 in 2027, and to US$16,200 in real terms later in the outlook.

A mine pays its bills in nominal dollars, so when diesel and steel rise faster than general inflation, a forecast that is steady in real terms still leaves a thinner margin.

The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) is a body of copper producing and using countries. It expects a surplus of refined copper of about 104,000 tonnes in 2026 and 368,000 tonnes in 2027, after 419,000 tonnes in 2025 [R35, pp1 to 2]. It cut its forecast of mine output growth for 2026 from 1.6 to 1.3 per cent and expects 3.1 per cent in 2027. China accounts for 59 per cent of world use [R35]. The ICSG says the balance may vary, “notably” because of the Middle East conflict [R35, p1]. FIG. 11 shows the balance.

On 18 May 2026 Mineral Resources (ASX: MIN) announced the restart of its Bald Hill lithium mine, 50 kilometres south-east of Kambalda in the WA Goldfields and marked on FIG. 01. The mine had been on care and maintenance, kept safe and ready to restart but not operated, since November 2024. Mineral Resources cited “a significant and sustained recovery in lithium prices” [R36]. Mining was to start in June and first concentrate was due from July, with restart costs, including working capital, estimated at A$20 million [R36]. A mine kept in care and maintenance can restart for a small part of what a new build costs.

8.00 — OIL, DIESEL AND SULPHURIC ACID

The oil forecast doubled between January and October, and acid ran short

The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) publishes a Short-Term Energy Outlook every month. In its January 2026 edition it forecast Brent crude to average US$53.34 a barrel in the December 2026 quarter. By the October edition, released on 6 October, the forecast for the same quarter was US$104.69 [R37]. FIG. 12 shows each edition. The October edition expects Brent to average US$96.32 in 2026 and US$83.74 in 2027, falling to US$74 by the December 2027 quarter. That path assumes pipelines and ship-to-ship transfers around the Strait of Hormuz let most regional output return to pre-conflict levels by the end of the June 2027 quarter [R37, p6].

The World Bank’s April outlook forecast US$86 a barrel for 2026 if the most acute disruption ended in May, with an adverse case “as high as $115” [R38]. Brent futures closed at US$109.86 a barrel [R39]. The International Energy Agency (IEA) said diesel benchmarks peaked above US$200 a barrel in September and remain nearly double the price of crude [R40].

The terminal gate price is the wholesale price of fuel at the terminal, including GST and excise. In Perth it was 253.8 cents a litre for diesel, 53 per cent above the 165.9 cents of 16 October 2025. It peaked at 323.8 cents on 9 April 2026 [R5]. FIG. 13 shows the daily price. Fuel excise of 52.6 cents a litre was more than halved from 1 April 2026, then set at 36.6 cents from 1 July to 2 August. It returned to pre-conflict rates from 3 August, so both October dates carry full excise [R41]. Mines claim fuel tax credits on diesel used off public roads, at 53.7 cents a litre from 3 August 2026 [R52]. The rise between the two dates is therefore mostly the price of the fuel itself.

A hypothetical mine burning 20 million litres of diesel a year, with GST claimed back, pays about 79.9 cents a litre more than a year ago (87.9 cents divided by 1.1). That is about A$16 million a year (Samso arithmetic, hypothetical mine). The excise part of the price comes back to the mine as a fuel tax credit, so any rise in the excise rate between the two dates would make the net figure slightly smaller.

Sulphuric acid is the other input that moved. Many plants use it to leach, or dissolve, metal out of ore, including uranium, copper and nickel plants. It is made by burning sulphur or is captured from smelter gases. The IEA says the Middle East supplies about a quarter of the world’s sulphur and that about half of seaborne sulphur trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz. China curbed its exports of sulphuric acid from May 2026. In some processing chains acid has overtaken energy as the largest cost [R42]. BHP has reported the same upward pressure on acid, diesel and ammonia [R6, p6]. Shanghai Metals Market reported its China smelter acid index at 1,658 yuan a tonne on 8 May, up 83.6 per cent in 2026 [R43].

Lotus Resources (ASX: LOT) restarted the Kayelekera uranium mine in northern Malawi in August 2025, which the company says was on time and on budget [R44]. Lotus used acid bought from third parties while it commissioned its acid plant, which burns sulphur. In January it said acid availability would delay full monthly production to the June 2026 quarter [R44]. On 25 June it said production had been paused. Contracted and prepaid acid deliveries had been delayed or not delivered, a disruption it linked to “Middle East geopolitics” [R45, p1]. Soon after its new acid plant made its first acid, several refractory bricks, the heat-resistant lining of its sulphur furnace, failed [R45, p1]. FIG. 14 shows where Kayelekera is in northern Malawi.

On 12 August Lotus said the acid plant and the processing plant had restarted after repairs [R46]. By 8 October the acid plant was running at about 50 to 60 per cent of design. Lotus said uranium output would “broadly align” with acid production while third-party supply remained hard to obtain [R8, p1, p3]. Failures in on-site power generation also disrupted August and September, and a connection to the national grid is expected in the March 2027 quarter [R8, p1, p4].

9.00 — STUDY AGAINST FIRST YEAR

Kayelekera month by month

Full production at Kayelekera is about 200,000 pounds of uranium oxide a month, or 2.4 million pounds a year. In January Lotus expected a full month at that rate in the June 2026 quarter [R44]. In June it moved that to later in 2026, and in July to late 2026 [R45][R47].

Monthly output from January to May 2026 was 14.2, 24.3, 39.9, 47.3 and 73.6 thousand pounds [R45, p3]. The best month, May, was about 37 per cent of the full monthly rate (Samso arithmetic). Total output from restart to the June 2026 pause was 332,100 pounds [R47, p2]. The two releases give slightly different totals for the March quarter. The 25 June release says 78.3 thousand pounds and the 16 July release says 78.2 thousand pounds [R45, p1][R47, p2]. Both are as published. FIG. 15 shows the months.

Product quality was part of the ramp-up. By 16 July, of the 332,000 pounds produced since restart, 115,000 pounds had been accepted as on specification, 124,000 pounds were awaiting final assay and 93,000 pounds were off specification [R47, p3]. Lotus later reported that about 173,000 pounds had been judged off specification by Orano CE, the French converter that takes its product [R8, p3]. An independent review by Novamet found the plant’s measurement and sampling of feed needed improvement. This is metal accounting, the tracking of how much metal goes into a plant and how much comes out. Earlier recovery data for the period to December 2025 had been withdrawn pending that review [R47, p2].

In August and September the plant produced about 100,000 pounds over 31 operating days [R8, p3]. A first shipment of four containers, about 144,000 pounds, is packed and waiting on one Namibian transport approval for the road route through Zambia to Walvis Bay [R8, p2]. PLATE 02 shows it.

Lotus owed customers 1.01 million pounds in the second half of 2026 and put its maximum liability for a shortfall at about US$10 million, at a spot price of US$85 a pound [R45, p2]. In February it raised A$76 million in a placement at A$2.15 a share, a 25.3 per cent discount to the previous close of A$2.88 [R48, p1].

In July it announced what it called a “Balance Sheet Reset” [R49, p1]. That comprised an A$60.1 million entitlement offer of one new share for each share held, at A$0.22, a 66.7 per cent discount to the last trade of A$0.66 on 17 June 2026 [R49, p2]. The package added A$35 million of convertible notes from CVI Investments [R49]. Mercuria agreed a US$30 million inventory prepayment facility, which advances cash against uranium once it is shipped [R49, p1]. The entitlement offer was completed in August [R50]. Put together, the price at which Lotus sold new shares fell from A$2.15 in February to A$0.22 in July.

Samso’s Workups record the same gap between study and first year in WA gold. Meeka Metals’ first full year produced about 37 per cent less gold than its study’s first year (see Samso’s Meeka Metals Workup) [R51].

SAMSO TAKE

Kayelekera was a restart of an existing pit and plant, and Lotus says it came in on time and on budget. Acid, a furnace lining, power, sampling and an export permit still stopped or slowed it in its first year.

In my experience the surprises in a first year come more often from the plant and the supply chain than from the orebody. When a company says it is “on track”, should we be asking it to show the monthly numbers?

10.00 — HIGHER REVENUE IS NOT HIGHER CASH FLOW

The same mine with three small changes

A hypothetical gold mine shows how small changes combine. It produces 100,000 ounces a year, sells at A$6,000 an ounce and has an all-in cost of A$3,600 an ounce. Its revenue is A$600 million and its margin is A$240 million (Samso arithmetic, hypothetical mine, all figures illustrative).

In the second case each of three numbers moves by 15 per cent and the margin falls by 66 per cent. In the third case revenue rises by A$90 million and the margin does not change, because costs rose faster than the price. FIG. 16 shows the three cases.

These are operating margins. A developer also has to pay interest, repay its debt and earn back the capital spent on construction.

THE CASE AGAINST

Many prices are still high. Gold at about A$6,019 an ounce is above the gold prices used in recent WA studies, and those studies show all-in costs of about A$1,870 to A$3,000 an ounce [R3][R14][R15][R16][R17].

Hermosa’s NPV is still about US$3,100 million after the overrun, and about US$4,500 million at April spot prices [R2, p3]. Greenbushes earned a 73 per cent margin [R7, p3]. The ABS index for heavy construction rose 25.4 per cent in five years, close to the 23.2 per cent rise in final demand prices [R1].

The overrun at Hermosa came with more ore. The same update raised the Taylor Ore Reserve by 52 per cent and the expected mine life from about 28 to about 33 years, and about 80 per cent of the growth capital was already invested, contracted or subject to final pricing [R2, p2, p10]. Mining wages rose 3.5 per cent in the year to June 2026, slower than materials [R11]. Spot treatment charges below zero meant copper smelters were in effect paying miners for concentrate [R10, p17]. Mineral Resources restarted Bald Hill for an estimated A$20 million on a recovery in lithium prices, and Lotus says the Kayelekera restart came in on time and on budget [R36][R44].

The agencies’ central case also has oil easing, with the EIA expecting Brent at US$74 by late 2027 [R37]. On this reading the cost rise is a normal part of the cycle and the better projects will absorb it.

SAMSO TAKE

If I had to sum up Part 1, it is this. The cost overruns we have seen, together with the uncertainty in the global market, put a small-cap wannabe producer in a very precarious position.

South32 could absorb a billion-dollar overrun at Hermosa. BHP could write off US$2.3 billion at Jansen and keep building. A small company with one project, a 10 per cent contingency and no mine already paying the bills does not have that cushion. When the cost grows, it goes back to the market for more money, often at a lower share price.

Most of the projects in this part will probably still be built or keep running. The mine’s margin has held up better than the balance sheet behind it. The overruns, the slow ramp-ups and the dearer money all land before the first gold or metal is sold.

So before we even go to Parts 2 and 3, investors looking at these kinds of projects should keep one thing in mind. In an environment where cost is more prone to going higher than lower, the decision to take part in an investment of this nature should be considered very cautiously. In my opinion, the question to ask first is how much room the company has if the cost rises again.

That leads to Part 2. Once the study is done and the cost has grown, who takes the remaining risk and who supplies the cash?

THE VOCABULARY, IN PLAIN ENGLISH

All-in sustaining cost (AISC).

The cost of producing one ounce of gold, including the spending needed to keep the mine running at its current level.

Care and maintenance.

A mine or plant kept safe and ready to restart, but not operating.

Concentrate.

Ore that has been crushed and treated to remove most of the waste rock, so that the metal-bearing mineral can be sold to a smelter or refinery.

Contingency.

An amount added to a cost estimate for costs that are expected but cannot yet be listed item by item.

Decline.

A sloping tunnel driven from surface to reach an underground orebody.

Downstream processing.

The later steps that turn a mineral concentrate into a chemical or a metal, such as refining spodumene into lithium hydroxide.

Feasibility study, PFS and DFS.

The stages of studying a project. A scoping study is a first look. A pre-feasibility study (PFS) compares options and picks one. A definitive feasibility study (DFS) engineers that option in enough detail for a decision to build.

Final investment decision (FID).

The point at which a company’s board commits to build.

Financial close.

The point at which all funding agreements are signed and their conditions met, so money can be drawn.

Grade.

How much metal is in each tonne of rock, for example grams of gold per tonne (g/t).

Metal accounting.

The tracking of how much metal goes into a processing plant and how much comes out.

Mineral Resource and Ore Reserve.

A Mineral Resource is a company’s estimate of the metal in a deposit. An Ore Reserve is the part it has shown can be mined at a profit.

Nameplate capacity.

The output a plant is designed to achieve when running fully.

Net smelter return (NSR).

The value left in a tonne of rock after plant recoveries, royalties, transport and refining charges.

Prepayment facility.

An arrangement in which a buyer or trader advances cash against product before it is sold.

Recovery.

The share of the metal in the ore that a processing plant gets out.

Refractory bricks.

The heat-resistant lining of a furnace.

Royalty.

A payment to the owner of the mineral rights, usually a share of what the mine sells.

Spodumene.

The lithium-bearing mineral in hard-rock lithium ore.

Sulphuric acid leach.

Using sulphuric acid to dissolve metal, such as uranium or copper, out of crushed ore.

Tailings.

The finely ground waste left after the metal has been recovered.

Terminal gate price.

The wholesale price of fuel at a fuel terminal, including GST and excise.

Treatment and refining charges.

The fees a smelter deducts for turning concentrate into metal, charged per tonne of concentrate and per pound of metal.

Unit rate contract.

A contract that pays a set price for each metre or tonne of work. It fixes the rate but not the total.

11.00 — REFERENCES AND SOURCES

Each source carries an identifier, [R1] to [Rn], and the same identifier appears in the text where the source is used. Status codes follow each entry. V means read in the primary document. R means as reported by the named secondary source, where Samso has not read the original. S means Samso’s own arithmetic from the named data. PLATE 01 and PLATE 02 are photographs reproduced from company releases. FIG. 03, FIG. 05, FIG. 06 and FIG. 14 are location maps reproduced from the company documents named in their captions. Every other FIG. is an original Samso chart or map drawn from the data named in its caption. Where a web address could not be confirmed from the source register, the entry says URL REQUIRED.

[R1] Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Producer Price Indexes, Australia, June 2026”, released 31 July 2026, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/producer-price-indexes-australia/jun-2026. Table 1, final demand excluding exports (series A2314865F). Table 11, input to the coal mining industry (A83737106J), and release text on coal mining inputs. Table 17, output of heavy and civil engineering construction (A85219099L). Future releases list for the 30 October 2026 date. V for index levels, S for percentage changes.

[R2] South32 Limited, “Hermosa Project Update”, ASX release, 30 April 2026, ASX document 03087974, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03087974. p1 (footnote 1, production target basis, CEO statement), p2 (project update, causes and schedule), p4 (Hermosa 100 per cent owned by South32), p3 (Table 1 and Table 2), p5 (Table 4, Ore Reserve and cut-off), p8 (Figure 2, photograph), p10 (capital expenditure estimate), p15 (processing), p35 (Figure 1, regional location plan). V.

[R3] COMEX gold futures, front-month continuous contract (Yahoo Finance symbol GC=F), daily closes January 2024 to 16 October 2026, retrieved 19 October 2026, finance.yahoo.com/quote/GC=F/. Futures closes, not the LBMA benchmark. Australian dollar prices are Samso arithmetic using [R4]. V as market data, S for conversions and statistics.

[R4] Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Table F11.1 “Exchange Rates”, series FXRUSD (AUD/USD, 4pm Sydney), daily, retrieved 19 October 2026, www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f11.1-data.csv. V.

[R5] Australian Institute of Petroleum, “AIP_TGP_Data_16-Oct-2026.xlsx”, sheet “Diesel TGP”, Perth column, terminal gate prices including GST and excise, 16 October 2026, aip.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/10/AIP_TGP_Data_16-Oct-2026.xlsx. V for prices, S for the change.

[R6] BHP Group Limited, “Financial results for the year ended 30 June 2026”, ASX release, 18 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03126197. p6 (costs and inflation), p19 (Jansen business outlook and project table). V.

[R7] IGO Limited, “FY26 Financial Results – Year ended 30 June 2026”, ASX release, 27 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03130784. p2 (operational summary table), p3 (Greenbushes and Kwinana), p6 (FY27 guidance). V.

[R8] Lotus Resources Limited, “Marketing and Inventory Prepayment Facility Agreed and Export Permitting Progresses”, ASX release, 8 October 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03150023. p1 (key points), p2 (Figure 1, photograph, first shipment), p3 (off-specification product, acid plant, production), p4 (grid connection). V.

[R9] Samso, “The Grain Size Tin Problem”, 8 September 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/the-grain-size-tin-problem. Further reading.

[R10] Glencore plc, “Half-Year Report 2026”, August 2026, www.glencore.com/.rest/api/v1/documents/static/98cf0f2a-ede7-4ced-9539-061198c3b6be/GLEN-2026-Half-Year-Report.pdf (news release dated 5 August 2026). p17 (copper treatment charges, by-product and acid credits). V.

[R11] Australian Bureau of Statistics, “Wage Price Index, Australia, June 2026”, released 19 August 2026, www.abs.gov.au/statistics/economy/price-indexes-and-inflation/wage-price-index-australia/jun-2026. Chart “Annual and quarterly movement - industries” (mining, original series) and key statistics. V.

[R12] US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Producer Price Index, steel mill products (series WPU1017), monthly, September 2026 preliminary, via FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, fred.stlouisfed.org, retrieved 19 October 2026. V for index, S for the annual change.

[R13] BHP Group Limited, “Annual Report 2026” (Appendix 4E), 18 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03126193. p18 (Jansen location map, ownership BHP 100 per cent). V.

[R14] Samso, “Capricorn Metals Ltd (ASX: CMM), Part 1 of 3”, 14 October 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/capricorn-metals-ltd-asx-cmm-part-1-of-3. Further reading.

[R15] Samso, “Brightstar Resources Limited (ASX: BTR), Part 1 of 3”, 24 September 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/brightstar-resources-limited-asx-btr-part-1-of-3. Further reading.

[R16] Samso, “Rox Resources Limited (ASX: RXL)”, 11 October 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/rox-resources-limited-asx-rxl. Further reading.

[R17] Samso, “Horizon Gold Limited (ASX: HRN)”, 11 October 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/horizon-gold-limited-asx-hrn. Further reading.

[R18] Reuters, as published by Kitco, report of the spot record of about US$5,595 on 29 January 2026, report of a fall of about 22 per cent from the start of the Iran war to late July, and Reuters poll of 29 analysts, 28 to 29 July 2026, www.kitco.com/news/off-the-wire/2026-07-29/gold-forecasts-fall-central-bank-buying-expected-cushion-retreat (poll and 22 per cent fall, with the record given as January) and www.kitco.com/news/off-the-wire/2026-07-09/hsbc-lowers-2026-27-gold-price-forecasts-hawkish-fed-tilt (record of US$5,594.82 on 29 January). R.

[R19] Samso, “The Big Consolidation”, 8 July 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/the-big-consolidation-where-the-gold-price-settles-before-its-next-move. Section 5.00 (the call and the scenarios) and its Samso Take. V.

[R20] Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, FRED, series DFII10 (US 10-year inflation-indexed yield) and DGS10 (US 10-year nominal yield), daily, 16 October 2025 and 15 October 2026, fred.stlouisfed.org. V.

[R21] World Gold Council, “Gold Demand Trends Q2 2026”, executive summary, 30 July 2026, www.gold.org/download/file/20967/GDT-Q2-2026-Executive-Summary.pdf. Table 1, p2. V.

[R22] World Gold Council, “Gold ETF holdings and flows”, October 2026 update, 7 October 2026, www.gold.org/goldhub/research/gold-etfs-holdings-and-flows/2026/10. Record Q3 inflows of US$31 billion, holdings up 211 tonnes in Q3, record 4,256 tonnes at end September. V.

[R23] investingLive, report of a Goldman Sachs gold note of about 18 September 2026, published 23 September 2026, investinglive.com/commodities/icymi-goldman-trims-end-2026-gold-forecast-to-4-650-but-holds-5-400-target-for-2027/. R.

[R24] Metals Mine, citing Kitco, report of HSBC gold forecasts of 9 July 2026, www.metalsmine.com/news/1407956-hsbc-lowers-2026-27-gold-price-forecasts-on-hawkish. R.

[R25] Deep News (via itiger), report of UBS gold forecasts, published 23 July 2026 (UBS note date not given), www.itiger.com/news/1198434038. R.

[R26] BNN Bloomberg, 8 July 2026, report of Bank of America’s 2026 average gold forecast of 7 July 2026, and Channel 8, 20 July 2026, report of its 2027 range of US$5,000 to 6,000 (note date not given), www.bnnbloomberg.ca/markets/gold/2026/07/08/bofa-cuts-2026-average-gold-forecast-sees-long-term-upside/ and channel8.com/english/news/61694. R.

[R27] Samso, “The Gold Question”, 21 June 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/the-gold-question-which-way-form-here. Further reading.

[R28] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, FOMC statement, 16 September 2026, www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20260916a.htm. V.

[R29] Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Summary of Economic Projections”, 16 September 2026, www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomcprojtabl20260916.htm. Table 1. V.

[R30] CBOT 30-day federal funds futures (contracts November 2026 to December 2027), closes 16 October 2026, via Yahoo Finance, finance.yahoo.com/quote/ZQX26.CBT/ (November 2026 contract), finance.yahoo.com/quote/ZQF27.CBT/ (January 2027, 95.85), finance.yahoo.com/quote/ZQM27.CBT/ (June 2027), finance.yahoo.com/quote/ZQZ27.CBT/ (December 2027). Implied rate is 100 minus the price. S.

[R31] Reserve Bank of Australia, monetary policy decision, media release 2026-27, 29 September 2026, www.rba.gov.au/media-releases/2026/mr-26-27.html. Decision and the sentence on doing what the Board considers necessary. V.

[R32] Reserve Bank of Australia, Statistical Table F1, cash rate target (FIRMMCRTD) and bank bill rates, daily to 16 October 2026, www.rba.gov.au/statistics/tables/csv/f1-data.csv. V.

[R33] Commonwealth Bank of Australia, CBA Newsroom, September 2026, report quoting the RBA board statement of 29 September 2026, www.commbank.com.au/articles/newsroom/2026/09/rba-official-cash-rate-decision-september-2026.html (published 30 September 2026). R.

[R34] Market Index, article reporting the Resources and Energy Quarterly, September 2026, 6 October 2026, www.marketindex.com.au/news/2026-27-commodities-outlook-iron-ore-copper-uranium-lithium-and-more. The REQ itself was not readable by Samso. R.

[R35] International Copper Study Group, “Copper Market Forecast 2026/2027”, press release, 14 October 2026, icsg.org/download/2026-10-14-press-release-icsg-copper-market-forecast-2026-2027/. p1 and p2 table. V.

[R36] Mineral Resources Limited, “Bald Hill lithium mine restart”, ASX release, 18 May 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03095067. p1 (location, restart schedule and cost). V.

[R37] US Energy Information Administration, “Short-Term Energy Outlook”, October 2026 edition, released 6 October 2026, www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/. pp2 to 6 and Table 2. January to September 2026 editions, Table 2, row “Brent Spot Average”, from the EIA archive (www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/archives/). V.

[R38] World Bank, “Commodity Markets Outlook April 2026” press release, 28 April 2026, www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2026/04/28/commodity-markets-outlook-april-2026-press-release. Paragraph 3. V.

[R39] ICE Brent crude futures, front month (Yahoo Finance symbol BZ=F), close 16 October 2026, finance.yahoo.com/quote/BZ=F/. V as market data.

[R40] International Energy Agency, “Oil Market Report - October 2026”, 14 October 2026, www.iea.org/reports/oil-market-report-october-2026. Overview. V (public summary).

[R41] Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development, Communications, Sport and the Arts, “Fact sheet: fuel price relief measures from 1 July 2026”, 23 June 2026 (excise more than halved 1 April to 30 June, 52.6 to 36.6 cents a litre from 1 July to 2 August, return to pre-conflict rates from 3 August), www.infrastructure.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/fact-sheet-fuel-excise-relief-measures-from-1-july-2026.pdf. V.

[R42] International Energy Agency, “Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2026”, Executive summary, www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2026/executive-summary. V.

[R43] Shanghai Metals Market (SMM), report of 8 May 2026 on the China smelter acid index and sulphur prices, news.metal.com/newscontent/103892148-smm-analysis-sulphuric-acid-a-key-variable-reshaping-copper-pricing-logic. R.

[R44] Lotus Resources Limited, “Acid supply chain improvements support Kayelekera steady-state production”, ASX release, 29 January 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03053748. p1 (acid and steady-state timing), p3 (restart in August 2025). V.

[R45] Lotus Resources Limited, “Kayelekera Project and Funding Update; Request for Extension of Voluntary Suspension”, ASX release, 25 June 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03107657. p1 (key points and acid), p2 (offtake liability), p3 (monthly production table). V.

[R46] Lotus Resources Limited, “Kayelekera acid plant and uranium processing operations resume”, ASX release, 12 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03124320. p1. V.

[R47] Lotus Resources Limited, “Kayelekera Project and Voluntary Suspension Update”, ASX release, 16 July 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03115479. p1 (key points), p2 (quarterly production table and metal accounting review), p3 (product inventory). V.

[R48] Lotus Resources Limited, “Lotus launches ~A$76 million Placement to deliver enhanced financial flexibility during ramp up in response to strong uranium market fundamentals”, ASX release, 5 February 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03057153. p1. V.

[R49] Lotus Resources Limited, “Operational and Balance Sheet Reset Through Strategic Funding Package”, ASX release, 23 July 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03117534. p1 (package), p2 (offer price), convertible note terms table. V.

[R50] Lotus Resources Limited, “Successful Completion of Retail Entitlement Offer”, ASX release, 17 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03125774. p1. V.

[R51] Samso, “Meeka Metals Limited (ASX: MEK)”, 7 October 2026, www.samso.com.au/post/meeka-metals-limited-asx-mek. Further reading.

[R52] Australian Taxation Office, “From 1 July 2026 to 30 June 2027”, fuel tax credit rates for business, last updated 29 July 2026, www.ato.gov.au/businesses-and-organisations/income-deductions-and-concessions/incentives-and-concessions/fuel-schemes/fuel-tax-credits-business/rates-business/from-1-july-2026-to-30-june-2027. Liquid fuels, all other business uses, 36.6 cents a litre from 1 July to 2 August 2026 and 53.7 cents from 3 August 2026. V.

[R53] IGO Limited, “2026 Annual Report”, ASX release, 27 August 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03130782. PDF p8 (“Where we work” map), pp33 to 35 (Greenbushes about 250 kilometres south of Perth, Kwinana 35 kilometres south of Perth). IGO’s retraction of 23 September 2026 withdraws one statement on page 38 and does not affect these pages. V.

[R54] Lotus Resources Limited, “Investor Presentation - Operational & Balance Sheet Reset”, ASX release, 23 July 2026, www.asx.com.au/asx/v2/statistics/displayAnnouncement.do?display=pdf&idsId=03117535. Slide 11 (Kayelekera location map). V.

[R55] Capricorn Metals Ltd, “Compelling Mt Gibson PFS Update”, ASX release, 27 July 2026, capmetals.com.au/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Compelling-Mt-Gibson-PFS-Update.pdf. PDF p24 (process plant estimate at plus or minus 25 per cent, 90 per cent confidence, no contingency). V.

[R56] Horizon Gold Limited, “Gum Creek Open Pit DFS Confirms Pathway for WA’s Next Major Gold Mine Development”, ASX release, 22 July 2026, ASX document key 2924-03113073-6A1334864, URL REQUIRED. PDF p57 (capital estimate accuracy plus or minus 10 to 15 per cent), p58 (A$30.4 million contingency). V.

[R57] Rox Resources Limited, “DFS confirms high-grade, high-margin gold production at Youanmi” (Youanmi Gold Project Definitive Feasibility Study), ASX release, 13 November 2025, api.investi.com.au/api/announcements/rxl/801f83eb-71e.pdf (company-hosted copy). PDF p1 (A$15 million contingency on processing infrastructure), pp88 to 89 (feasibility estimates plus or minus 10 to 15 per cent, AACE Class 3). V.

[R58] AMC Consultants, “Feasibility studies for mining projects”, web page, 21 February 2018 (page metadata), amcconsultants.com/experience/feasibility-studies-for-mining-projects/, read 19 October 2026. Scoping study “Estimation accuracy may be 30 to 35%”, pre-feasibility study “Study accuracy 20% to 25%”. The page gives no range for a final feasibility study. V.

[Cover photo] Haul truck in an open-pit coal mine near Wright, Wyoming, 29 July 2019, Lance Cheung, U.S. Department of Agriculture. Public domain, via Wikimedia Commons, commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3A20190802-OSEC-LSC-0514_(48443663852).jpg

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This article is general information only. It is not financial product advice and it does not take into account any reader's objectives, financial situation or needs. It contains no price targets, no valuations and no recommendation to buy, hold or sell any security. Companies named in this article are used as historical illustrations of events that have already occurred and no view is expressed on their current merits. Readers should consider obtaining advice from a licensed financial adviser and should conduct their own research before making any investment decision. Samso and its associates may hold interests in companies mentioned.

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Samso Insights are independent research commentary for general information only. Nothing in this document is financial product advice, and it does not take into account any reader's objectives, financial situation or needs. Figures are drawn from public sources believed reliable at the stated dates but are not guaranteed; market-sensitive numbers change daily. Samso or associated parties may hold positions in, or have commercial arrangements with, companies mentioned. Seek professional advice before making investment decisions. © Samso 2026 · samso.com.au